Evidence
An apartment was burglarized while the owner was away, and a neighbor was charged with the burglary. At the neighbor's jury trial, the apartment manager testified that the apartment complex had an unmanned security camera in the vicinity of the burglarized apartment. The apartment manager further testified that he had viewed the video footage from the day of the burglary, but that it was accidentally erased before he could turn it over to the police. The court then allowed the apartment manager to testify, over the neighbor's objection, that the video clearly showed the neighbor breaking into the apartment. The neighbor, noting personal animosity between the apartment manager and himself, argued that the camera was not working at the time of the break-in and that a video recording was never made.
Which of the following accurately describes the role of the jury in determining issues related to the video?
A The jury may determine whether the video ever existed, but the judge must determine whether the apartment manager's testimony accurately reflected the content of the video.
B The jury may determine whether the apartment manager's testimony accurately reflected the content of the video, but the judge must determine whether the video ever existed.
C The jury may determine both whether the video ever existed and whether the apartment manager's testimony accurately reflected the content of the video.
D The jury may not determine whether the video ever existed or whether the apartment manager's testimony accurately reflected the content of the video; these determinations are left to the judge.
C The jury may determine both whether the video ever existed and whether the apartment manager's testimony accurately reflected the content of the video.
The best evidence rule requires that an original or reliable duplicate of a recording, writing, or photograph (referred to as "document") be produced to prove its content. However, a party may use other, secondary evidence (e.g., testimony) to prove a document's content if certain factual conditions are established (e.g., all originals are lost or destroyed).
Whether a party has fulfilled the factual conditions for admitting secondary evidence is a determination for the court. But in a jury trial, the jury determines any issue about whether:
The court determines whether a party has fulfilled the factual conditions to admit other evidence to prove the content of a document. But in a jury trial, the jury determines any issue of whether (1) an asserted document ever existed, (2) another document is the original, or (3) other evidence of content accurately reflects the content.
For Lacienega ...
Four plaintiffs initiated an action in a federal district court against officers of a corporation. The suit alleged that the officers violated a federal statute by misstating the effect of a recent merger on the corporation's revenues and liabilities. The plaintiffs sought to certify the case as a "common question" class action. The court determined that the plaintiffs met the requirements for serving as class representatives. The court also ruled that permitting the action to proceed as a class action was superior to individual lawsuits in bringing about a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, although the court noted that prosecution of the claims through separate actions would not impair the class members' interests. In addition, the court found that although there were questions of law and fact that were common to the class members, these questions did not predominate over questions affecting only individual members.
On these facts and findings, should the court grant class certification?
A. No, because prosecution of the class members' claims through separate actions would not impair their interests.
B. No, because the common questions of law or fact did not predominate over questions affecting only individual members.
C. Yes, because a class action was superior to individual lawsuits in the adjudication of this controversy.
D. Yes, because the plaintiffs met the requirements for serving as class representatives.
B. No, because the common questions of law or fact did not predominate over questions affecting only individual members.
A suit may be certified as a "common question" class action when common questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions and a class action is the best method to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the dispute.
After arresting a man on a charge of first-degree murder, the police demanded that the man provide a blood sample to determine if his DNA matched DNA found at the crime scene and provide a voice sample to compare the sound of his voice to a voice heard in the background on the victim's 911 call for help.
If the man were to challenge the police demands, which of the demands could be successfully challenged as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimination?
D. Neither the demand for the blood sample nor the demand for the voice sample.
Neither the blood sample nor the voice sample are testimonial evidence, which is the only type of evidence the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination protects. Non-testimonial physical evidence, such as a blood sample or voice identification, is not protected. Answer choices A, B, and C are incorrect because each of these describe types of non-testimonial physical evidence.
In response to growing concerns about the overcrowding of landfills with scrap metal nationwide, Congress passed a statute requiring all unwanted vehicles to be disposed of at federally licensed auto-recycling facilities. These facilities were able to recycle more components of vehicles than most other recycling facilities. However, due to the high operating costs of these facilities, the cost of disposing of the vehicles was much higher than the cost of disposing of them at general-purpose recycling facilities. A state wants to dispose of its fleet of decommissioned trucks at a state-operated recycling facility. However, this facility is not federally licensed.
Is the state permitted to dispose of its decommissioned trucks at the state-operated facility?
A
No, because the federal statute was passed pursuant to Congress's power to legislate for the general welfare.
B
No, because the federal statute regulates interstate commerce.
C
Yes, because the market-participant exception applies.
D
Yes, because states are given broad discretion in areas governed by the state's police power.
B. No, because the federal statute regulates interstate commerce.
The commerce clause gives Congress broad authority to regulate interstate commerce—including in-state activities that substantially impact interstate commerce, singly or in the aggregate.
Two college roommates were driving back to their dormitory after attending a party. The roommates were in a hurry to return to the dorm because it was late and curfew was approaching. To hasten the trip back, the driver began speeding on a poorly lit stretch of winding road. As the car sped around a tight corner, the car lost its traction on the wet road and crashed into a tree.
Although the driver was uninjured in the accident, the passenger sustained multiple fractures to her right arm. The driver called an ambulance and then attempted to place the passenger's arm in a makeshift sling over the passenger's repeated objections. Due to the driver's inexperience, she dislocated the passenger's shoulder and exacerbated her arm injuries in the process. The ambulance arrived shortly thereafter.
The passenger subsequently sued the driver for negligence for her injuries. At trial, it was established that the passenger's injuries would have been lessened had the driver waited for the ambulance to care for the passenger's arm.
Is the passenger likely to prevail?
Answers:
D. Yes, because the driver was under a duty to prevent further harm when she rendered aid to the passenger.
Although a defendant generally has no affirmative duty to act, such a duty arises when (1) the defendant's conduct creates a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff or (2) the defendant voluntarily aids or rescues the plaintiff. When this occurs, the defendant must use reasonable care to prevent further harm to the plaintiff.
A plaintiff sued a company for damages incurred when the company's delivery truck drove through the plaintiff's storefront. The plaintiff wants to testify that the driver, a permanent employee of the company, told the plaintiff, "These brakes were on their last miles, but the company didn't replace them. They failed as I turned that corner." The company owns the truck.
Is the plaintiff's testimony regarding the truck driver's statement likely admissible?
A. No, because the testimony is hearsay not within any exception.
B. No, because there is no proof that the truck driver was authorized to speak for the company.
C. Yes, because the testimony is nonhearsay.
D. Yes, because the testimony falls within a hearsay exception.
C. Yes, because the testimony is nonhearsay.
A statement offered against a party-opponent is nonhearsay if it was (1) made or adopted by the party-opponent, (2) made by a person the party-opponent authorized to make such a statement, (3) made by the party-opponent's agent or employee about a matter within the scope of that relationship and during the relationship, or (4) made by the party-opponent's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
A job applicant who was hearing-impaired filed an action under a federal statute in federal district court against a corporate employer for discriminatory hiring practices. The applicant alleged that the employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation to the applicant in light of his impairment. After a bench trial during which the parties presented conflicting evidence, the judge found that the applicant had requested that the job interview be facilitated by the presence of a sign-language interpreter, that the employer had provided an interpreter, and that the applicant's rejection of the interpreter was unreasonable. Consequently, the judge ruled in favor of the employer.
The job applicant has appealed the court's ruling, challenging the judge's factual findings.
What standard of review should the appellate court apply in considering the job applicant's challenge?
A. Abuse of discretion.
B. Clearly erroneous.
C. De novo.
D. Harmless error.
B. Clearly erroneous.
In a bench trial, the judge acts as both the finder of fact and the interpreter of the law. As a result, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 requires that the judge provide those factual findings and legal conclusions on the record (orally or in writing) after the close of evidence. If an appeal is later filed, the appellate court can review the trial judge's decision under the following standards:
de novo (no deference) – where a judge's conclusions of law (e.g., elements of a claim) will be reversed if the appellate court reasonably believes that the judge misinterpreted the applicable law (Choice C)
clear error (high deference) – where a judge's findings of fact (e.g., witness credibility) will be reversed only if they were clearly erroneous such that no reasonable judge would have made them
A Caucasian woman was charged with a felony. During voir dire, the woman’s attorney objected to the make-up of the jury venire, which consisted entirely of Caucasian members, but the trial judge overruled the objection. Following jury selection, the woman’s attorney objected that the jury consisted entirely of Caucasian members, and the trial judge again overruled the attorney’s objection. At trial, the prosecution produced overwhelming evidence of the woman’s guilt, and the jury convicted the woman. Following her conviction, the woman appealed on the grounds that her rights under the Equal Protection Clause were violated. The woman produced data showing that 30% of the relevant community were African-American, and that the overwhelming majority of these community members lived in three distinct zip codes. The defense further showed that the computer system used to summon citizens for jury duty did not have those three zip codes programmed into its software.
Is the appellate court likely to rule in the woman’s favor?
D. Yes, because the venire from which the jury was chosen was not a representative sample of the community.
he Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial discrimination in the selection of juries. A jury must be selected from a representative cross-section of the community. To establish a prima facie case for non-representative jury selection, a defendant must show that: (i) the group excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (ii) the group was not fairly represented in the venire from which the jury was selected; and (iii) the underrepresentation resulted from a systematic exclusion of the group. In this case, all three elements are present, and the appellate court is likely to rule in the woman’s favor.
In response to recent unusual earthquake activity, a large city has enacted an ordinance requiring the permanent placement of seismographic equipment in the basements of 20 randomly selected commercial buildings throughout the city as part of the creation of an early-warning network. Although the owners of the buildings will not be compensated, the cost of the purchase and installation of the equipment is to be borne by a private university that will operate the early-warning network. The owner of one building that has been randomly selected as a site for this equipment has challenged this law as unconstitutional, though the actual impact on him would be negligible.
Should the court rule in favor of the owner?
A
No, because the economic impact on the owner would be slight.
B
No, because the owner's building was randomly selected.
C
Yes, because the city will not operate the network.
D
Yes, because the equipment will reside permanently in the owner's building.
D. Yes, because the equipment will reside permanently in the owner's building.
A physical taking occurs when the government (or a third party authorized by the government) permanently and physically occupies private property—regardless of the public interest it may serve. The Fifth Amendment takings clause, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, bars the government from taking private property unless (1) the taking is for a public use and (2) the owner receives just compensation—i.e., the property's fair market value.
Here, the ordinance authorized a private university (third party) to place seismographic equipment on the owner's land (permanent and physical occupation) to create an early-warning network for earthquake activity (public use). Although installation of the equipment serves the public interest by warning of earthquake activity and the economic impact on the owner will be slight, the city's action constitutes a taking. And since the owner will not be compensated for this taking, the ordinance is unconstitutional. Therefore, the court should rule in the owner's favor.
Civ Pro
A commercial landlord from State A brought an action in federal district court to recover six months of overdue rent from a corporation incorporated and with its principal place of business in State B. The total amount owed under the terms of the parties' lease agreement was $80,000. After being properly served, the corporation refused to respond to the landlord's complaint.
Three months later, the landlord submitted an affidavit to the court clerk attesting to the fact that the corporation failed to respond to the complaint and had not defended against the landlord's claim in any way. Accordingly, the court clerk entered the corporation's default.
After default was entered, the landlord requested that the court clerk enter a default judgment against the corporation. Along with his request, the landlord submitted an affidavit indicating the amount due and owing under the terms of the lease agreement, $80,000. The court clerk then entered a default judgment against the corporation for $80,000.
Was the court clerk's entry of the default judgment proper?
A. No, because the court clerk must seek court approval before entering a default judgment.
B. No, because the landlord must petition the court to obtain a default judgment.
C. Yes, because the evidence presented shows no genuine issue as to any material fact.
D. Yes, because the relief sought by the landlord was a sum certain, set forth in his affidavit
D. Yes, because the relief sought by the landlord was a sum certain, set forth in his affidavit
A court clerk must enter a default judgment when (1) the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by calculation, (2) the plaintiff's request for default judgment includes an affidavit establishing the amount due, (3) the defendant failed to appear, and (4) the defendant is not legally incompetent or a minor.
The director of a company that produces organic products was being sued by the minority shareholders of the company for allegedly breaching his duty of care and unwisely investing corporate funds into an organic clothing venture. During the trial, a witness for the minority shareholders testified that the director had been accused of battery three years ago, although he was never charged or arrested for the crime. The director's lawyer then attempted to call a witness to testify that the witness heard the individual who had accused the director of battery verbally retract his accusation. The lawyer for the minority shareholders objected to the introduction of this evidence. The court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony.
Did the court err by overruling this objection?
A. No, because the admission of additional evidence refuting the battery accusation was necessary to remove any unfair prejudice.
B. No, because a court can always allow additional evidence to rebut previously admitted inadmissible evidence.
C. Yes, because the evidence of the retraction of the battery accusation was not relevant to the lawsuit.
D. Yes, because the individual's retraction of the battery accusation constitutes hearsay.
A. No, because the admission of additional evidence refuting the battery accusation was necessary to remove any unfair prejudice.
When inadmissible evidence (e.g., nonrelevant evidence) is improperly admitted against a party, the court may permit that party to introduce additional inadmissible evidence (e.g., hearsay) for the purpose of rebuttal. This is known as a curative admission and is meant to remedy the prejudicial effect caused by the previously admitted evidence.
A plaintiff filed a complaint in state court based on a negligence claim arising from an accident. Before the defendant responded to the complaint, the plaintiff voluntarily filed a notice of dismissal. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction, asserting the same claim. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, and the court denied this motion. Before the defendant filed an answer to the complaint, the plaintiff again voluntarily filed a notice of dismissal.
Can the plaintiff later pursue this claim through an action filed in federal court?
A. No, because the second dismissal occurred after the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue.
B. No, because the second dismissal was with prejudice.
C. Yes, because both dismissals were voluntary.
D. Yes, because the first dismissal was filed in a state action, not a federal action
B. No, because the second dismissal was with prejudice.
A plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss a suit without a court order. This can be done by filing (1) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves an answer or a summary-judgment motion or (2) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties. A voluntary dismissal is generally without prejudice, which allows the plaintiff to sue the defendant again on the same claim. But a voluntary dismissal is with prejudice when specified in a court order, notice, or stipulation OR the two-dismissal rule applies. This rule applies when:
Here, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the first action in state court. The plaintiff then dismissed the second action in federal court by voluntarily filing a notice of dismissal. Since these actions asserted the same claim, the second dismissal was with prejudice. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot pursue this claim a third time through an action filed in federal court.
A defendant was arrested for armed robbery of a convenience store. Immediately after he was informed of his Miranda rights, the defendant invoked his right to counsel and right to remain silent. During the robbery, the defendant held the store clerk at gun point and hit him in the face with the gun before fleeing the convenience store. The police located the convenience store clerk in the hospital. While at the store clerk’s bedside, the police officers presented a photo array of possible suspects to the store clerk, and went through each photo without making any statements or gestures to the store clerk. The store clerk identified the defendant as the robber. The defendant was subsequently charged with armed robbery. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to exclude the store clerk’s identification.
How should the court rule?
Answers:
B. Deny the motion, because there is no right to counsel at a photo array.
There is no right to counsel during an identification through a photo array, regardless of when the photo array is conducted. In this case, the defendant was not entitled to have counsel present during the photo array, regardless of whether he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
A state with heavy snowfall each winter sought to prevent accidents and injuries on the road caused by snow falling off of the roofs of large trucks. To further this interest, the state enacted a statute that requires state-employed road maintenance crews to set up random checkpoints at highway on-ramps and state border crossings during the winter months. At these checkpoints, every truck above a certain size is required to stop so the maintenance crews can make sure that any snow on its roof is brushed off. The statute has caused significant traffic delays, but the effect on the rate of accidents on highways in the winter has been minimal.
An out-of-state company that ships its goods across the state has started losing business because this program has made it nearly impossible to estimate delivery times due to the delays. As a result, the out-of-state company has brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the state statute.
Is the company likely to succeed in its constitutional challenge to the state statute?
A
No, because the state statute does not discriminate against out-of-state commerce.
B
No, because the state statute serves an important state interest.
C
Yes, because the state statute imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce.
D
Yes, because the state statute is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
C. Yes, because the state statute imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Under the dormant commerce clause, a nondiscriminatory state law is valid unless the challenging party shows that the law's burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds its local benefits.
Essay ID 3537
A builder constructed a vacation house for an out-of-state customer on the customer’s land. The house was completed on June 1, at which point the customer still owed $200,000 of the $800,000 contract price, which was payable in full five days later.
On June 14, the basement of the house was flooded with two inches of water during a heavy rainfall. When the customer complained, the builder told the customer, “The flooding was caused by poorly designed landscaping. Our work is fine and fully up to code. Have an engineer look at the foundation. If there’s a problem, we’ll fix it.”
The customer, pleased by the builder’s cooperative attitude, immediately hired a structural engineer to examine the foundation of the house. On June 30, the engineer provided the customer with a written report on the condition of the foundation, which stated that the foundation was properly constructed.
Unhappy with the conclusions in the engineer’s report, the customer then hired a home inspector to evaluate the house. The home inspector’s report concluded that the foundation of the house had been poorly constructed and was inadequately waterproofed.
On July 10, the customer sent the builder the home inspector’s report with a note that said, “Until you fix this problem, you won’t get another penny from me.” The builder immediately contacted an attorney and directed the attorney to prepare a draft complaint against the customer for nonpayment. Hoping to avoid litigation, the builder sent several more requests for payment to the customer. The customer ignored all these requests.
On September 10, the builder filed suit in federal district court, properly invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction and seeking $200,000 in damages for breach of contract. The customer’s answer denied liability on the basis of alleged defective construction of the house’s foundation.
Several months later, the case is nearly ready for trial. However, two discovery disputes have not yet been resolved.
First, despite a request from the builder, the customer has refused to provide a copy of the report prepared by the structural engineer who examined the foundation of the house. The customer claims that the report is “work product” and not discoverable because the customer does not intend to ask the engineer to testify at trial. The builder has asked the court to order the customer to turn over the engineer’s report.
Second, the customer has asked the court to impose sanctions for the builder’s failure to comply with the customer’s demand for copies of all emails concerning construction of the foundation of the house. The builder has truthfully informed the customer that all such emails were destroyed on August 2. This destruction was pursuant to the builder’s standard practice of permanently deleting all project-related emails from company records 60 days after construction of a project is complete. There is no relevant state records-retention law.
1. Should the court order the customer to turn over the engineer’s report? Explain.
2. Should the court sanction the builder for the destruction of emails related to the case, and if so, what factors should the court consider in determining those sanctions? Explain.
1. The issue is whether the engineer’s report was prepared in anticipation of litigation and is therefore discoverable.
Discovery is generally permitted with regard to any non-privileged matter relevant to any party’s claim or defense in the action. Information within the scope of discovery need not be admissible evidence at trial to be discoverable. Instead, the test is whether the information sought is relevant to any party’s claim or defense. In general, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative. Such materials will be subject to discovery, however, if the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.
Here, the structural engineer’s report is discoverable because it is relevant to the builder’s defense in the action.
In addition, if an expert is retained by another party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial but is not expected to be called as a witness, then discovery is permitted only on a showing of exceptional circumstances.
Here, the engineer was not retained in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial because he was retained to discover the reason for the flooding. because the engineer did not create the report in anticipation of litigation, the report is a discoverable report by an expert not expected to testify at trial.
Therefore, the structural engineer’s report is discoverable, and the court should order the customer to turn it over.
2.a. The issue is whether the destruction of the emails is excused when litigation was being contemplated by the builder.
A party may request the other party to produce and permit the inspection of any discoverable documents or electronically stored information. Spoliation of evidence is the negligent or intentional destruction or significant alteration of evidence required for discovery. When litigation is reasonably anticipated, even if it has not yet commenced, potential litigants in possession of potentially relevant evidence have a duty to preserve such evidence. Once a duty to preserve evidence is triggered, the party in possession of the evidence must take reasonable measures to preserve it. If a party has a policy in place that results in routine operations that may destroy evidence, such as electronically stored information, that party must affirmatively act to prevent the destruction or alteration of such evidence, even if the destruction would typically occur in the regular course of business.
Here, the emails are discoverable because they relate to the foundation and may be relevant to the litigation. Even though the emails were destroyed pursuant to the builder's standard of practice, the builder failed to preserve information that the builder had a duty to preserve.
2.b. The issue is whether sanctions can be imposed against the builder for permanently deleting the emails.
A party may be subject to sanctions for failing to take reasonable steps to preserve evidence that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation. Sanctions are authorized for spoliation of evidence only if the information cannot be restored or replaced by additional discovery. In determining sanctions, the court should consider the prejudice to another party and the intent of the party that failed to preserve the evidence.
When retrieval of the information is possible, even if typically considered inaccessible due to the cost of retrieval, a court may order it and assign the costs to the party who destroyed the evidence; no further sanctions may be imposed. If a party failed to preserve electronically stored information that should have been preserved and it cannot be restored or replaced, the court may order alternate sanctions against the wrongful party, limited to the court’s discretion of those necessary to cure any prejudice to the other party.
In this case, the loss of the emails likely will not prejudice the customer’s case because the customer can present other evidence that the foundation of the house was poorly constructed. Further, it is not clear that the emails would be helpful to the customer’s case because their contents are unknown. Additionally, the emails were destroyed pursuant to the builder’s standard document retention plan. There is no evidence that the builder acted deliberately in preventing discovery. Under these circumstances, the court is not likely to impose severe sanctions such as presuming the emails were unfavorable to the builder or entering default judgment.
A defendant was charged with possession of prescription drugs without a prescription. At trial, the defendant testified that he received the drugs from a friend and believed they were an acceptable over-the-counter medication. The prosecutor intends to ask the defendant about his previous three misdemeanor convictions in the last five years for possession of the same type of prescription drugs without a prescription.
Should the court allow the prosecutor to ask about the defendant's previous convictions?
A. No, because the convictions are inadmissible character evidence.
B. No, because the convictions were misdemeanors.
C. Yes, to impeach the defendant's character for truthfulness.
D. Yes, to show that the defendant knew the prescription drugs were not an over-the-counter medication.
D. Yes, to show that the defendant knew the prescription drugs were not an over-the-counter medication.
Evidence that a criminal defendant previously committed a similar crime or bad act is inadmissible character evidence if it is offered to show the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime. But that evidence may be admissible for other relevant, noncharacter purposes—e.g., proving absence of mistake.
A farmer filed an action in federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction seeking damages attributable to a malfunctioning irrigation system of which four different defendants had participated in the design, manufacture, and installation. The farmer advanced three alternative theories of liability against the defendants: breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligence.
Prior to trial, the court required the parties to submit requests for jury instructions. Each party submitted such instructions. Prior to the close of evidence, the court held a charge conference to discuss the form of the verdict and related jury instructions. Due to the number of defendants and variety of theories of liability against each, the court determined that a special-verdict form would be used.
After the close of evidence, the defendants requested additional jury instructions because they were concerned that the special-verdict form failed to clearly indicate that, if the jury found for the farmer, the farmer was limited to a single recovery of his damages.
Should the court permit the defendants' request for these instructions?
A. No, because a court may, but is not required to, permit a party to request specific jury instructions.
B. No, because the court had provided the defendants with the opportunity to submit jury-instruction requests.
C. Yes, because the conference was held before the close of evidence.
D. Yes, because the defendants could not reasonably have anticipated the need for such instructions prior to seeing the special-verdict form.
D. Yes, because the defendants could not reasonably have anticipated the need for such instructions prior to seeing the special-verdict form.
A party may request jury instructions before or at the close of evidence unless the court sets an earlier, reasonable deadline. Even after the close of evidence, a party can request instructions (1) on issues that could not reasonably have been anticipated by the deadline or (2) with the court's permission.
A defendant was charged with theft of a motor vehicle and convicted primarily on an identification of the perpetrator by the individual who purchased the stolen automobile from the defendant. The police did not reveal to the prosecutor that the buyer was serving as a paid police informant with regard to traffic in stolen vehicles. Since the prosecutor was unaware of this information, the prosecutor did not reveal it to the defendant's attorney. The defendant's attorney did not make a discovery request of the prosecutor for evidence favorable to the defendant. Subsequently, upon learning of the buyer's role as a paid police informant, the defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that the prosecution's failure to reveal such information violated the defendant's due process rights.
Among the following, which is the strongest argument that the state can make to uphold the defendant's conviction?
D. The defendant was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure of the information.
While, under the Brady rule, a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose to the defendant any material evidence favorable to the defendant, nondisclosure of such evidence does not violate the defendant's due process rights unless the failure to disclose causes prejudice against the defendant (i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that the defendant's conviction or sentence would have been different had the suppressed evidence been disclosed to the defendant). Since the buyer's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime was key to the defendant's conviction, the failure to disclose evidence that called into question the validity of that identification could arguably constitute prejudice.
A state enacted an intestacy statute that provided marital children with full inheritance rights from both parents. Under the statute, nonmarital children were permitted to inherit only through their mothers. The underlying purposes of the statute were to promote family relations and establish an accurate and efficient method of disposing of property at death.
The father of a nonmarital child recently died intestate. The nonmarital child brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute.
Which of the following most accurately states the appropriate standard of review for the court?
A
The court must determine whether the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving an important government interest.
B
The court must determine whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
C
The court must determine whether the statute is substantially related to an important government interest.
D
The court must determine whether the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
C. The court must determine whether the statute is substantially related to an important government interest.
A state statute that treats similarly situated persons differently may be challenged under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.* The statute will be deemed constitutional only if there is adequate justification for the alleged discrimination. A statute that discriminates based on gender or legitimacy (i.e., quasi-suspect classes) is presumptively invalid unless it survives intermediate scrutiny. This standard of review requires that the government prove that the statute is substantially related to an important government interest.
On November 1, the owner of a yacht posted a flyer at a local coffee shop reading, "Yacht for Sale: Make me an offer!" The flyer also included the owner's phone number. A buyer called the owner on November 3 to ask how much the owner wanted for the yacht. The owner said, "Well, I'd hate to part with it for less than $55,000, but if you can pay me $50,000 by November 20, I'd sell it to you. I'll hold onto the yacht for you until then." Elated, the buyer took steps to obtain a loan by November 20. On November 15, a second buyer called the owner and offered to buy the yacht for $60,000. The owner immediately accepted, and the second buyer picked up the yacht the next day. On November 20, having obtained a loan, the first buyer visited the owner with a check for $50,000. The first buyer then learned the owner had already sold the yacht.
Can the first buyer bring a successful suit against the owner for breach of contract?
Answers:
D. Yes, because the owner's offer to the first buyer was still outstanding on November 20.
An offer can be accepted at any time before the offer is revoked. The offeror can revoke the offer by manifesting an intent not to enter into the proposed contract. This can occur in two ways:
expressly – when the offeror communicates the revocation directly to the offeree
constructively – when the offeree acquires reliable information that the offeror has taken definite action inconsistent with the offer
Here, the owner offered to sell the yacht to the first buyer and then sold the yacht to a second buyer. However, the owner never revoked the offer made to the first buyer, and the first buyer did not otherwise learn of the sale prior to accepting the offer.* Therefore, a valid contract was formed when the first buyer accepted the offer on November 20, and the first buyer can bring a successful suit against the owner for breach of contract.
A defendant was charged with murder for allegedly striking his wife repeatedly in the head with a blunt object. While testifying, the defendant claimed that an intruder had murdered his wife in the middle of the night. The defendant then called a witness to the stand who testified that, in his opinion, the defendant was a truthful person. The prosecutor objected to the witness's testimony.
Should the witness's testimony be admitted?
A. No, because truthfulness is not a pertinent character trait in a murder prosecution.
B. No, because truthfulness may only be supported by reputation testimony.
C. Yes, because the defendant may present evidence of his good character.
D. Yes, because the testimony is relevant to the defendant's argument.
A. No, because truthfulness is not a pertinent character trait in a murder prosecution.
Under FRE 404, a criminal defendant may offer evidence of his/her good character when that trait is pertinent to the charged crime. For example, evidence of a defendant's peacefulness is admissible when the defendant is charged with a violent crime. But truthfulness is not pertinent to violent crimes like murder, so evidence of this trait should not be admitted on this basis
A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against a defendant in federal district court. The plaintiff asserted a debt-collection claim to recover $30,000 for a past-due amount on a personal loan made by the plaintiff to the defendant. In addition, the plaintiff's complaint asserted a negligence claim to recover $50,000 for his personal injuries and damage to an antique glass globe that he was carrying when he fell down a flight of stairs at the defendant's home. The defendant has challenged the joinder of these claims in a single action. The plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states.
Is the defendant's challenge valid?
A. No, because the claims may be joined in a single action.
B. No, because the plaintiff is required to join all claims he has against the defendant in this action.
C. Yes, because business and personal claims cannot be joined in the same action.
D. Yes, because the debt-collection claim and the negligence claim are unrelated.
A. No, because the claims may be joined in a single action.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 18 allows a party to join (i.e., add) as many claims as it has against an opposing party in a single lawsuit. But like all disputes in federal court, a suit involving multiple joined claims must satisfy subject-matter jurisdiction. This can be established through either:
federal-question jurisdiction – when a claim arises under the U.S. Constitution, a federal treaty, or a federal law (not seen here) or
diversity jurisdiction – when the opposing parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
If subject-matter jurisdiction is based on diversity jurisdiction, then a party may aggregate (i.e., combine) all claims to be joined against a single opposing party to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement—even if those claims are unrelated
An indigent defendant was tried for misdemeanor assault. The defendant did not request a lawyer be appointed to represent him and the court did not appoint one. The crime carries a maximum punishment of one year in prison and a $2,000 fine. The defendant was found guilty and the court imposed only a fine on the defendant. Has the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel been violated?
A. No, because the court only imposed a fine on the defendant.
The Sixth Amendment provides a constitutional right to counsel in any case in which the defendant is sentenced to incarceration, even if that sentence is suspended. Here, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because he was not sentenced to imprisonment, but rather required to pay a fine.
Concerned with the proliferation of signs about upcoming events and the failure to remove those signs after the event, a city enacted an ordinance specifying that "all signs concerning upcoming events may not be placed more than 14 days before the event and must be removed within 7 days after the event; no more than 10 signs per event are allowed on city property."
A social organization wants to display signs about its monthly dinner, which is held to attract new members, in greater number and for a longer period than permitted by the ordinance. The organization has filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Of the following, by which standard will this ordinance be judged?
A. It must be narrowly tailored to further a significant government interest and leave open alternative channels of communication.
B. It must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
C. It must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
D. It must not have a negative impact on the organization's freedom of assembly.
B. It must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
The First Amendment free speech clause protects the right to freely communicate and receive information and ideas. To ensure such protection, content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. This means that the government can restrict speech based on what is being said (i.e., its messages or ideas) only if it can prove that the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest—a nearly impossible task.
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid and will only be upheld if they survive strict scrutiny—i.e., if the government proves that the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
Essay ID 5326
A man and a woman were waiting in line at a public park for tickets to attend an outdoor performance of a play. They soon began arguing about sports, and as their conversation became more animated, the man began shouting at the woman and poking her shoulder with his finger. As the man poked harder and harder, the woman responded by punching the man in the nose.
The woman was arrested at the scene and charged with battery.
At trial, the prosecutor intends to elicit the following testimony from an eyewitness who was standing in the line: Before the man arrived, I saw the woman talking to a friend. The friend said to the woman, “You and I have waited so long for these tickets, if anyone annoys us today they will not be seeing this play— they’ll be going to the hospital!” The woman nodded her head and gave the friend a thumbs-up signal. I recognized the woman. I live in her neighborhood, and I probably see her at least twice a week. Every time I see her, she is arguing with people, acting out, and generally causing problems.
Assuming that the eyewitness is permitted to testify for the prosecution, defense counsel plans to
(1) cross-examine the eyewitness about her five-year-old conviction for shoplifting, a crime punishable by a maximum sentence of six months in jail; and
(2) cross-examine the eyewitness about a letter recently written b by the eyewitness to the man saying, “Thanks for 10 years of a great friendship.”
The jurisdiction’s rules governing crimes and affirmative defenses follow common law principles. The evidence rules of the jurisdiction are identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The woman’s friend is unavailable and will not testify at trial.
1. Assuming that the prosecution proves the elements of battery, can the woman establish a common law affirmative defense based on these facts? Explain.
2. What portions of the eyewitness’s testimony, if any, would be admissible? Explain.
3. What portions, if any, of the defense counsel’s cross-examination should the court permit? Explain.
See answer sheet for full answer.
1. The issue is whether the woman can claim self-defense.
The woman can likely establish self-defense as an affirmative defense to battery.
2(a). The issue is whether the eyewitness’s testimony about the friend’s statements and the woman’s response is admissible.
Here, the woman agreed with her friend’s statement about her then present intent to commit an act of violence against "anyone who annoys us today." The woman's agreement is admissible to show that she acted in conformity with that intent.
The friend’s statement is also admissible because it is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, the friend’s statement is offered to provide context for the woman’s response. Thus, the friend’s statement to the woman is not hearsay.
2(b). The issue is whether the eyewitness’s testimony about the woman’s prior behavior in the neighborhood is admissible.
Here, the testimony is relevant to the case because it discusses the woman’s tendency toward violence. However, the statement that the woman is always “... arguing with people, acting out, and generally causing problems,” is being offered to prove that the woman has a propensity towards violence and acted in accordance with that propensity. This character evidence is inadmissible because the woman has not opened the door by offering evidence of her own good character or the man’s bad character.
3(a). The issue with respect to cross-examining the woman on her five-year-old shoplifting conviction is whether shoplifting is a crime of dishonesty or false statement.
Any witness can be impeached by evidence that they have been convicted of a crime that involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment imposed or the prejudicial effect of the evidence. However, conviction for a crime not involving fraud or dishonesty is admissible to impeach only if the crime is punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year. A crime involves dishonesty or false statement if establishing the elements of the crime requires proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement.
Here, the woman’s conviction was punishable by up to six months in jail and therefore is only admissible if it involved a crime of dishonesty or false statement. In most jurisdictions, shoplifting is not a crime of dishonesty because it does not require proof of an act of dishonesty or false statement. Therefore, here, where there is no evidence that the woman’s specific conviction involved dishonesty, the cross-examination should not be allowed.
3(b). The issue is whether the letter can be used to impeach the eyewitness for bias. (10%)
Because a witness may be influenced by his relationship to a party, his interest in testifying, or his interest in the outcome of the case, a witness’s bias or interest is always relevant to the credibility of his testimony. Although the Federal Rules do not expressly require that a party ask the witness about an alleged bias before introducing extrinsic evidence of that bias, many courts require that such a foundation be laid before extrinsic evidence of bias can be introduced.
Here, the eyewitness’s letter to the man acknowledged their 10 years of friendship, which suggests that the eyewitness has an interest in protecting the man. This could affect the credibility of his testimony, and therefore, cross-examination on this issue is relevant and should be allowed.