Some Common Heuristics
Cognitive Biases
Prospect Theory
Fighting Self-Control Problems with Precommitments
Experimental Evidence for Fairness
100

Catching a Baseball with the Gaze

when baseball players lock their eyes on the ball and then adjust their position accordingly 

100

Confirmation Bias

the human tendency to pay attention only to information that agrees with one’s preconceptions

100

Losses and Shrinking Packages

people see the world in terms of gains and losses relative to the status quo situations that they are used to

100

Hiding the Alarm Clock

If you understand that your future self is not going to want to cooperate, you can take steps to prevent that future self from flaking out

100

The Dictator Game: 

The Rules 

In the game, two people interact anonymously. One of them is randomly designated as the “dictator.” It is his job to split an amount of money that is put up for that purpose by the researcher running the game

200

Riding a Bicycle with the Steering Heuristic

steer in the direction you are falling

200

Self-Serving Bias

the tendency to attribute their successes to personal effort or personal character traits while at the same time attributing any failures to factors that were out of their control

200

Framing Effects and Advertising

people evaluate situations in terms of gains and losses, their decision making can be very sensitive to the mental frame of mind

200

Automatic Payroll Deductions

Precommitment strategies have also been used to help future selves save more

200

The Dictator Game:

How Players Behave

Experimenters have found that only one-third of dictators keep all of the money for themselves. The other two-thirds show substantial generosity.

300

Guesstimating Ranks with the Recognition Heuristic

by employing the recognition heuristic, which says to assume that if one option is more easily recognized, it is probably more important or more highly ranked

300

Overconfidence Effect

the tendency to be overly confident about how likely their judgments and opinions are to be correct

300

Anchoring and Credit Card Bills

irrelevant information can anchor subsequent valuations is not fully understood and credit card companies have figured this out (they use anchoring to increase their profits by showing very small minimum-payment amounts on borrowers’ monthly credit card statements). 

300

Salary Smoothing

School teachers and college professors often have the choice of having their annual salaries paid out over 9 larger monthly installments (to match the length of the school year) or 12 smaller monthly installments (to match the length of the calendar year)

300

The Dictator Game:

Implications for Fairness

First, the majority of people appear to be genuinely concerned about being fair to other people.

Second, generosity varies quite widely.

400

Interpreting Depth with the Shadow Heuristic

The brain processes light with a heuristic that assumes that light always comes from above

400

Hindsight Bias

when they retroactively believe that they were able to predict past events

400

Mental Accounting and Overpriced Warranties

people arbitrarily put certain options into totally separate “mental accounts” that they dealt with without any thought to options outside of those accounts (as an example of where this suboptimal tendency leads, consider the extended warranties offered by big electronic stores whenever customers purchase expensive products like plasma TVs) 

400

Early Withdrawal Penalties

Sometimes, one cognitive bias can be used to offset another. Retirement accounts that have early-withdrawal penalties are a good example

400

The Ultimatum Game:

The Rules

At the start of the experiment, one of the players is randomly assigned to be “the proposer” while the other player is randomly assigned to be “the responder.” The game begins with the proposer proposing a split. As in the dictator game, the proposed split can range anywhere from suggesting that all the money go to the proposer to suggesting that all the money go to the responder. The responder examines the proposed split and decides whether to accept it or reject it. If she accepts it, the split is made and both players are immediately paid their shares by the researcher. But if the responder rejects the proposed split, neither player gets anything.

500

The Implications of Hardwired Heuristics

  1. It may be very difficult for people to alter detrimental behaviors or routines even after you point out what they’re doing wrong.

  2. People may be easy prey for those who understand their hardwired tendencies.

  3. If you want people to make a positive behavioral change, it might be helpful to see if you can put them in a situation where a heuristic will kick in and subconsciously lead them toward the desired outcome.

500

Availability Heuristic

causes people to base their estimates about the likelihood of an event not on objective facts but on whether or not similar events come to mind quickly 

As an example, you are five times more likely to die of stomach cancer than be murdered, but most people rate the likelihood of being murdered as much higher. They do this because they have many vivid memories of both real and fictional murders but almost no recollections whatsoever of anyone dying of stomach cancer.

500

The Endowment Effect and Market Transactions

the tendency that people have to put a higher valuation on anything that they currently possess (are endowed with) than on identical items that they do not own but might purchase 

For instance, if we show a person a new coffee mug and ask him what the maximum amount is that he would pay to buy it, he might say $10. But if we then give the mug to him so that he now owns it, and we then ask how much we would have to pay him to buy it back, he will very likely report. a much higher value—say, $15. 

500

Weight-Loss Competitions

the prospect of losing the competition can be a great motivator because loss aversion applies just as much to future selves as to present selves

500

The Ultimatum Game:

How Players Behave

The first behavior that stands out is the splits proposed by proposers in the ultimatum game are much more equal on average than the splits imposed by dictators in the dictator game.

The second behavior that stands out is the decisiveness, and emotional intensity with which responders reject offers that they consider unfair.

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