Nagel
Definition of Ethical Pluralism
What is there is an irreducible plurality of features that determine right/wrong?
What are the 2 Kantian ideals O’Neill discusses?
Not to use others
Treat others as persons
Conceptual and volitional inconsistency
Conceptual inconsistency = there’s an internal inconsistency within the agent’s maxim: the maxim expresses an impossible aspiration; the maxim tries to achieve incompatible aims; there’s no way to successfully enact the maxim.
Volitional inconsistency = there is an inconsistency either between 1) the specific intentions or 2) the specific intentions and the maxim the agent adopts when rationally willing (intending) the maxim. A volitional inconsistency MUST violate one of the 5 principles of rational intending.
DEFINITIONS
Categorical Imperative; Sense 1: rules apply to you whether you want them to or not; can’t escape it by changing your desires/ends. Ex. etiquette.
Categorical Imperative; Sense 2: the fact that a moral rule applies to you necessarily gives you reasons to follow it.
intrinsic mrat and extrinsic mrat
Moral rationalism = necessarily, if someone is morally obligated to do X, they have a reason to do X.
Intrinsic moral rationalism = moral obligations necessarily and intrinsically provide the agents who are under them a good reason to follow them.
Extrinsic moral rationalism = moral obligations necessarily but extrinsically provide agents who are under them a good reason to follow them. Ex. I have reason to do X because I am obligated to and because I necessarily/always have some other desire/self-interest to be moral.
Nagel's 5 sources of obligations
what are
Special obligations= obligations to people or institutions ex. Family
General rights= rights to liberty, free speech, non-interference, etc
General utility = utilitarian idea of producing the most good
Perfectionist ends = intrinsic value from completion of project itself, doesn't matter who does it– ex. Scientific discovery, artistic creation
Private commitments= you learning/completing a project, ex. piano -playing, pie baking
B. What is O’Neill’s preferred account of (1) not using others? How does it avoid the problems of the other 3 options?
Possible Consent = agent needs the possibility to consent/dissent to fundamental elements of what is proposed
Avoids actual consent’s problem of being potentially unfree,
Can’t override dissent like you can for hypothetical.
What are the 2 classic objections to Kant’s formula of Universal Law?
For any action, it is really easy to find some maxim that will pass the test.
Just make the maxim super specific to your situation: ex. I intend to murder people named Max who want my job.
Kant’s ethics is heteronomous (actions determined by some outside influence like desires/inclinations).
It seems like we must appeal to an agent’s desires to generate action-guiding principles: like murder may be wrong because you don’t want to be killed yourself.
hyp. imperative sense 1 and 2
Hypothetical Imperative; Sense 1: the rule applies to you only if you want some end; if you change your desires/ends the rule no longer applies.
Hypothetical Imperative; Sense 2: you only have a reason to follow the rule when it satisfies your ends/desires.
How does Shafer-Landau frame/respond to Foot’s Argument from Analogy?
Foot claims morality is analogous to etiquette: it is CI(1) and HI(2).
S-L Reply: this is a disanalogy– moral rules necessarily apply, but etiquette might not apply (ex. It changes as you move locations).
williams' response to nagel
C. What are the 2 cases which always preclude the possibility of consent (and therefore always preclude not using others)?
Deception: not possible to consent because the initiator is hiding fundamental info for you so you cannot possibly consent to fundamental elements.
Coercion: not possible to consent because you don't have a choice to avert/modify the action.
what are the 5 priniples of rational intending
You intend all necessary and some sufficient means to your end.
Ex. If I intend to eat healthily (end) I must also intend to eat some healthy foods (sufficient) even though no one food in particular makes up a healthy diet (necessary).
You seek to make such means to your end available when they are not.
Ex. If I intend (end) to help bring about a social revolution, I must seek to bring about the revolution or else I could claim my ends and do absolutely nothing because there is no revolution at present.
You intend all necessary and some sufficient components of what is willed/intended.
Ex. It seems in some situations some specific intentions are not just means to meet an end, but in fact are constitutive of the end. For example, if I intend to be kind this = showing kindness in deed, word and action. They are the sam because the intention is built from its components.
Your specific intentions must be mutually consistent.
Ex. If I intend generosity by giving all of my friends the exclusive use of all my possessions, my specific intentions of 1) everyone having my possessions and 2) that possession being exclusive would be rationally inconsistent, as no ones use would be exclusive.
The foreseeable results of your specific intention are consistent with the underlying maxim.
Ex. I cannot rationally claim to intend the well-being of a child and deny them a life-saving operation (the foreseeable results of which would be conducive to the child’s well-being) on the grounds that the surgery would be painful.
What is Foot’s account of rationality, and how does it help her respond to the Kantian/set up the 2nd stage of her argument?
Irrationality = acting in such a way that you defeat your purposes.
For Foot, it is not irrational to do the wrong thing if you do not care about morality/morality is not one of your ends. You have a reason to do something when it fulfills your end/you want to. Ex. you can be villainous and not be irrational.
Second stage of argument: moral rules are NOT Categorical (sense 2), they are hypothetical (sense 2). On her account of rationality, you only have a reason to follow the rule when it satisfies your ends/desires.
What are the problems with Intrinsic Moral Rationalism?
Objection: there are no intrinsically reason-giving facts. It seems metaphysically weird that a bare fact can give you reason by itself to do anything.
D. What is O’Neill’s reading of Kant’s ideals? !!!!!IMPORTANT!!!!!!
Not acting on maxims that preempt consent/dissent (not using) (respect)
In some cases, more might need to be done like acting on maxims that share other’s ends (treating as persons) (love)
what is the UT
O’Neill’s UT: only act on that maxim that the agent can at the same time will as a universal law: to universalize your maxim without contradiction, you have to see if you can: 1) rationally intend both the maxim and 2) that everyone has the maxim without inconsistency.
How would foot respond to williams and how would he respond to her
Would agree with Williams’ critiques of moral theory (Kantianism especially) in the sense of morality being your motivation/reason-giving force. Thinks Kantianism misidentifies human nature.
Would disagree with Williams’ critique of everything being filtered through morality always being a problem. She thinks if morality satisfies your particular desires, you are rational in your devotion to morality. Even if you’re filtering everything through, if that satisfies your desires, you’re rational. Williams would still see the filtering still as an issue (he thinks it makes us robotic).
How does Shafer-Landau reply (Partners in Crime) (2)?
Other areas of thought accept intrinsically reason giving (normative) facts.
Epistemology: it seems the bare existence of truths necessarily and intrinsically gives us reason to believe they are true ex. A spherical earth.
Foot’s own anti-rationalism also relies on intrinsically reason-giving facts. The fact that saving a child satisfies my desires/interests necessarily and intrinsically gives me reason to save the child.
E. Be sure to know one example of how we can fail to not use others/treat them as persons in intimate relationships versus the workplace.
Ex. relationship: giving too much space– not not helping your partner achieve their ends by offering no support! (fails at 2)
Ex. work: Must work to live: dissent isn’t possible, coercion (fails at 1)
give an example of volitional inconsistency and an example of conceptual inconsistency failing UT
jury decides