Its Personal (jurisdiction)
Alice sued Katarina in State A for breach of contract. Katarina resided in State A and Alice resided in State B. Alice’s only contact with State A was her contract with Katarina. Katarina moved to dismiss Alice’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because Alice was not a resident of State A.
Is a court likely to grant Katarina’s motion on this basis?
D
In general, personal-jurisdiction analysis focuses on whether a court has jurisdiction over a particular defendant, not a particular plaintiff. By choosing to file suit in a court within a particular forum state, a plaintiff consents to that court exercising personal jurisdiction over him or her. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938); Wright & Miller, 4 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1067.3 (4th ed. & West Nov. 2018) (observing that, except for representative proceedings like shareholder derivative suits, a plaintiff chooses the forum and therefore the court’s jurisdiction over him is based on consent). Therefore, the court is not likely to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff, who does not reside in State A. The court here would not analyze the plaintiff’s minimum contacts with State A, because the plaintiff’s consent provides sufficient constitutional basis for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff. Answer options A, B, and C are necessarily incorrect for these same reasons.
Aria, furious at her neighbor, Ben, for constantly parking in front of her house, decides to play a prank. She rigs a complex system involving a garden hose, a sprinkler, and a motion-activated Christmas decoration of a screaming ghost. Her plan is to scare Ben when he walks by at night. However, the motion sensor malfunctions and triggers the ghost and sprinkler while Ben is inside his house. The sudden noise and water spraying against his bedroom window cause Ben to jolt awake, stumble out of bed in the dark, and trip over his cat, breaking his leg. Furthermore, the water from the sprinkler, due to an unusual gust of wind, is blown onto a nearby power line, causing it to short circuit and start a small fire. The fire spreads to Ben's detached garage, destroying his classic car collection. Ben sues Aria for negligence, seeking damages for his broken leg and the destroyed cars. Which of the following statements BEST describes the likely outcome regarding Aria's liability for the fire damage to Ben's garage?
A) Aria is liable for the fire damage because her intentional act of setting up the prank was the "but for" cause of the fire, even though the specific sequence of events was unforeseeable.
B) Aria is liable for the fire damage because the "eggshell skull" doctrine applies, and she is responsible for the full extent of Ben's injuries, including the unforeseeable property damage.
C) Aria is not liable for the fire damage because the fire, while a result of her actions, was a superseding and intervening event that was not reasonably foreseeable.
D) Aria is liable for the fire damage because her actions were the proximate cause of the fire, as the general type of harm (property damage) was foreseeable, even if the precise manner in which it occurred was not.
E) Aria is not liable for the fire damage because Ben's contributory negligence in leaving flammable materials in his garage was the proximate cause of the fire.
C Aria is not liable for the fire damage because the fire, while a result of her actions, was a superseding and intervening event that was not reasonably foreseeable.
Explanation: This question focuses on proximate cause and foreseeability. While Aria's prank set in motion a chain of events, the fire was a highly unusual and unforeseeable consequence of her actions. The wind blowing the water onto the power line was a superseding and intervening event that broke the chain of proximate causation. A (but for cause) is incorrect; "but for" causation is necessary but not sufficient for proximate cause. B (eggshell skull) is incorrect; the eggshell skull doctrine applies to the extent of foreseeable injuries to a person, not to unforeseeable types of damage. D (general type of harm) is incorrect; while some property damage might be foreseeable from a prank, this specific type of damage (a fire caused by a chain of highly unusual events) was not. E (contributory negligence) is a red herring; even if Ben was negligent, it wouldn't make Aria liable for an unforeseeable consequence of her initial act.
.
Olly conveys Redacre to "Ally for life, remainder to all of John Joe's children who graduate from high school." John Joe presently has three children, two having graduated from Pine Valley High School and one who is 15 year old freshman. The remainder to John Joe's children is
A. Valid because John Joe can serve as a measuring life
B. Valid because Ally can serve as a measuring life
C. Valid because Olly can serve as a measuring life
D. All of the above
E. Invalid.
E
The class will close when Amanda dies because that is when John Joe's children interest must be ready to vest.
Everyone could die before the last kid graduate's high school. Especially because John Joe could have another kid the day before Ally dies.
Jones Corp sends Smith a two-page contract to sign for the sale of 1,000 widgets. The contract appears complete on its face and contains a merger clause stating "this writing represents the complete and final agreement between the parties." Before signing, Smith and Jones' CEO had extensively discussed delivery timing over email, with Jones' CEO promising "guaranteed delivery within 2 weeks." This timing requirement was not included in the final written contract. After signing, delivery takes 4 weeks, causing problems for Smith's business. Smith wants to introduce the email evidence in a lawsuit against Jones Corp.
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 216, which best describes the likely outcome?
A) The email evidence will be admissible because § 216(1) allows evidence of prior agreements if they would naturally have been included in a separate agreement.
B) The email evidence will be inadmissible because § 216(1) bars evidence of prior agreements where the writing appears complete and contains a merger clause.
C) The email evidence will be admissible because § 216(2)(b) allows evidence of prior agreements that do not contradict the writing, and nothing in the contract specifies a delivery timeline.
D) The email evidence will be inadmissible because § 216(2)(a) bars evidence that would contradict an integrated agreement, and the merger clause makes this agreement completely integrated.
D
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153, a unilateral mistake can make a contract voidable if two conditions are met: (1) enforcement would be unconscionable, and (2) the non-mistaken party had reason to know of the mistake or caused the mistake. Here, both elements are satisfied:
makes this agreement completely integrated.
In general, the law imposes no such duty that an individual must act affirmatively for the benefit of others. However, courts have carved out various exceptions to this rule, which require that D take affirmative (and careful) steps to aid P in certain circumstances. These include situations in which of the following:
A. D's act created the peril;
B. A special relationship mandates affirmative assistance (e.g., parent-child, common carrier-patron, contractual relation, etc.); and
C. D has undertaken to act for P's benefit (i.e., D has promised or begun giving assistance, especially where this dissuaded others from helping P).
D. All of the above
D
All of the above.
Explanation: this was a flashcard question that I turned into a multiple choice by adding letter D
Mr. Skywalker, a resident of Idaho, sues (in Idaho) a large online retailer, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas. Mr. Skywalker alleges he was injured by a defective product purchased from the retailer's website. The product was manufactured by a third-party company in Georgia. The retailer's website is accessible worldwide, and it ships products to all 50 states. While the retailer does not have any physical stores or employees in Idaho, it has engaged in the following activities in Idaho:
Mr. Skywalker's injury occurred in Idaho after the product, shipped directly from Texas, malfunctioned. Which of the following statements most accurately reflects whether specific personal jurisdiction exists over the retailer in Idaho?
(A) Specific jurisdiction exists because the retailer's website is accessible in Idaho, and Mr. Skywalker's injury arose from a product purchased through the website. The retailer's nationwide shipping and online presence are sufficient for jurisdiction in any state.
(B) Specific jurisdiction exists because the retailer has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Idaho by engaging in targeted advertising, providing customer service, partnering with affiliate marketers, and collecting consumer data within Idaho.
(C) Specific jurisdiction does not exist because, while the retailer's activities in Idaho are substantial, they do not constitute physical presence or direct sales within the state, which are necessary for establishing specific jurisdiction. The fact that the injury occurred in Idaho is not sufficient, by itself.
(D) Specific jurisdiction exists because the retailer's activities in Idaho, while not involving physical presence, are specifically directed at residents of Idaho and are directly related to Mr. Skywalker's cause of action, thus satisfying the requirements for specific jurisdiction. The targeted advertising and affiliate marketing, when coupled with the injury occurring in the state, establish sufficient contact.
(D)
Explanation: This question explores the nuances of "purposeful availment" in the context of online businesses.
Why other options are incorrect:
Tina, a pleasure boat operator, does not have a working radio on board her tug to warn her of approaching storms. The cost of the radio is $100, and most tug operators equip their tugs with such radios. The failure to have working radios increases the risk of injury to passengers by 5 percent per year. The average pleasure boat injury imposes $30,000 in damages. Tina’s boat gets into an accident that would have been prevented if Tina had had a working radio on board. Her passenger Uma suffers serious personal injuries totaling $50,000 and sues for negligence. Tina asks the judge for an order preventing the jury from hearing evidence about industry practice regarding radios. How should the judge rule?
A. Exclude the evidence as inadmissible because custom can never be admitted into trial to prove breach.
B. Exclude the evidence because there is ample evidence of breach under a balancing test.
C. Allow the evidence in because a jury is not bound by strict mathematical balancing in determining breach.
D. Allow the evidence in because the plaintiff also has evidence of balancing to present to the jury.
C
Under the rule set forth in the famous T.J. Hooper case, the general rule regarding custom in negligence cases is that such evidence is admissible and probative on the question of breach, but not dispositive. This is true regardless of whether there is other evidence of breach, such as the balancing evidence presented in this question. Choices A and B are incorrect because they incorrectly state that evidence of custom is inadmissible to prove breach. Choice D is wrong because in order to present custom evidence, it does not matter whether there is also evidence of balancing. Choice C presents the correct choice: A jury can consider the evidence of custom and need not be bound by any calculation under a balancing test in determining breach.
An insurance company issued an owner’s title insurance policy to the buyer of a tract of land. When the policy was issued, the land was subject to a properly recorded easement allowing a neighbor to cross the property to access an adjacent lake.
Is the easement likely to be covered by the policy?
B
Like other kinds of insurance policies, title insurance policies include exclusions and exceptions that limit coverage. Exclusions are categories of risk that the policy will not cover. Typical exclusions include title defects created by the insured, or title defects known to the insured but not known to the insurer and not reflected in the public records. Exceptions, on the other hand, are encumbrances or title defects specific to the property and disclosed by the public record, such as easements, mortgages, leases, and liens. These exceptions will be identified in the policy and excepted from coverage. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Dahlmann, 715 N.W.2d 609 (Wisc. 2006); Ronald G. Russell, Understanding the Title Insurance Policy, 21 Prac. Real Est. Law., no. 3, 2005 at 17. Here, the easement was a matter of public record, because it had been properly recorded when the policy was issued. Therefore, the easement is likely to be listed as an exception that is not covered by the policy.
Answer option A is incorrect. As explained under answer option B, the easement here is not likely to be an exclusion, because exclusions are entire types or categories of uninsured title risks. Instead, the easement is more likely to be listed as a specific exception to the policy, and answer option B is the better choice.
Answer option C is incorrect. As explained under answer option B, a recorded easement is likely to be identified and listed as an exception to the policy. Thus, it is unlikely that the recorded easement here would be covered by the policy.
Answer option D is incorrect. As explained under answer option B, a recorded easement is likely to be identified and listed as an exception to the policy. Thus, the recorded easement here is unlikely to be covered, even though it does potentially reduce the value of the property.
A woman owned a plot of fallow farmland. She entered into an oral agreement with a farmer on the following terms: The farmer would immediately take possession of the land and start farming it. The farmer would pay 25 percent of his earnings from the sale of his crops to the woman until he had paid enough to pay off the purchase price, at which point he would own the land. The parties anticipated that it would take three years of harvests for the farmer to earn enough to pay for the property. The farmer moved onto the land and immediately installed an irrigation system and built a farmhouse. After six months, the woman told the farmer that she had changed her mind and did not want to continue with the agreement to purchase the land. The woman said her lawyer had advised her that the oral agreement was not enforceable under the statute of frauds.
Is the advice of the woman’s lawyer correct?
B
The statute of frauds forbids the enforcement of a contract unless it is set down in a signed writing. There are six classes of contracts that fall within the statute of frauds: (1) marriage contracts, (2) contracts that cannot be performed within one year, (3) land contracts, (4) executor-administrator contracts, (5) contracts for the sale of goods priced $500 or more, and (6) suretyship contracts. For land contracts, an exception to the statute of frauds exists if the injured party, that is, the party seeking to enforce the contract, has incurred a detriment by making significant repairs or improvements to the land. This exception is an equitable rule and sometimes called the part-performance doctrine. Typically, some combination of possession and making repairs or improvements to the land by the party seeking to enforce the contract renders the contract enforceable despite its noncompliance with the statute of frauds. Partial performance by the party seeking to avoid performing under the contract does not take the contract outside the statute of frauds.
Here, the contract between the woman and the farmer is for the sale of land and is generally subject to the statute of frauds. The farmer, in addition to possessing the land, made significant improvements to the land, including installing an irrigation system and building a farmhouse. Therefore, the part-performance exception to the statute of frauds applies, and a court would likely enforce the contract even though it is oral. For this reason, the advice from the woman’s lawyer is incorrect.
Answer option A is incorrect. Taking possession of property, without more, does not take an oral contract outside the statute of frauds for purposes of the part-performance exception. Rather, some combination of possession and significant improvements or repairs typically satisfies the exception. The fact that the farmer took possession of the land, without more, therefore likely does not take the contract outside the statute of frauds. As such, the farmer’s possession alone does not render the advice from the woman’s lawyer incorrect.
Answer option C is incorrect. Performance of the contract within one year was possible. The parties anticipated that it likely would take three years of harvests for the farmer to earn enough to pay for the property in full, but if the harvests had been especially good, full payment could have been made within a year. The statute of frauds only requires a writing when it is impossible, not merely unlikely or unexpected, to fully perform the contract within one year. As such, the anticipated duration of the contract does not render the advice from the woman’s lawyer incorrect.
Answer option D is incorrect. Although in general, contracts transferring an interest in land are subject to the statute of frauds, here, the part-performance exception applies. The part-performance exception enforces a contract for the sale of land, even though it does not comply with the statute of frauds, if the party seeking enforcement has possessed the land and made significant repairs or improvements. Here, the farmer possessed the land and made significant improvements to the land, including installing an irrigation system and building a farmhouse. Therefore, the part-performance exception to the statute of frauds applies, and a court would likely enforce the contract even though it is oral. For this reason, the advice from the woman’s lawyer is incorrect.
A motorcyclist wanted to sue a truck driver for personal injuries arising out of a car accident that had occurred in State A. The motorcyclist was domiciled in State B, while the truck driver was domiciled in State C. The motorcyclist wanted to file his complaint in federal district court in State B.
Which long-arm statute or statutes should the motorcyclist’s lawyer consult first to determine if the motorcyclist’s preferred court may exercise specific in personam jurisdiction over the truck driver?
A. State A’s.
B. State B’s.
C. State C’s.
D. State A’s and State B’s.
B
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is subject to personal jurisdiction in the state where the federal court is located. The long-arm statute of the forum state determines whether, and under what circumstances, courts located in the forum state may exercise specific in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
Here, the motorcyclist wants to sue in federal court in State B. Therefore, the motorcyclist’s lawyer should consult State B’s long-arm statute first. If the State B long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the truck driver, then federal courts in State B may also exercise personal jurisdiction over the truck driver, provided that doing so is consistent with due process. Answer options A, C, and D are necessarily incorrect for this same reason.
Emily sues a foreign corporation in federal court. The corporation is incorporated in Country X, has its principal place of business in Country Y, and conducts substantial business in State Z. Emily attempts to serve the corporation by sending the summons and complaint via international courier to the corporation's principal place of business in Country Y. The corporation's managing director in Country Y receives the documents but refuses to acknowledge service, claiming the corporation is not subject to jurisdiction in the forum state. Emma then attempts service by delivering the documents to a registered agent the corporation has appointed in State Z. Which of the following is the most accurate statement regarding the validity of service?
(A) Service is valid because Emma attempted service at the corporation's principal place of business, which is a permissible method of service under Rule 4(h)(1). The managing director's refusal to acknowledge service is irrelevant.
(B) Service is valid because the corporation is subject to jurisdiction in State Z due to its substantial business activities there, and service upon its registered agent in State Z is a proper method of service under Rule 4(h)(1).
(C) Service is not valid because, while the corporation may be subject to jurisdiction in State Z, the initial attempt at service in Country Y was improper, and the managing director's refusal to acknowledge service invalidates that attempt.
(D) Service is not valid unless the plaintiff also complies with the Hague Convention, as the corporation is a foreign entity and the initial attempt at service was made internationally. Service upon the registered agent is insufficient without first attempting service according to treaty.
B
This question tests understanding of how to serve foreign corporations and the interplay between Rule 4 and jurisdictional considerations. While the initial attempt at service in Country Y might be problematic (depending on the specific rules for service in that country and whether the managing director was authorized to accept service), the crucial point is that the corporation appointed a registered agent in State Z. Service on a registered agent is a standard and valid method of serving a corporation under Rule 4(h)(1), especially if the corporation is subject to jurisdiction in that state.
Playing with Fire. Jonah is a seven-year-old who is always getting into trouble. The police had been to his house a few times to talk to Jonah about his dangerous activities and to warn him to be more careful. His parents and teachers consider him very immature and not all that bright. IQ tests confirmed he was of below-average intelligence. One day Jonah was playing with a book of matches that he found in his kitchen. He took the matches to an open field, which was full of dry hay thanks to a recent drought. Jonah was lighting the matches and seeing how long he could hold them without dropping them. His friend Ken told him that it was probably not a good idea to play with matches there because he could start a fire in the field. Jonah replied that he’d chance it. Sure enough, one of Jonah’s matches lit the hay on fire, and the spreading blaze burned down the nearby house of Lois. Lois sued Jonah for negligence. In considering whether Jonah’s conduct constituted a breach under the negligence tort:
A. A jury may consider the fact that Jonah was of below-average intelligence and consider that the police had talked with Jonah in the past about being more careful.
B. A jury may consider the fact that Jonah was of below-average intelligence but may not consider that the police had talked to Jonah in the past about being more careful.
C. A jury may not consider the fact that Jonah was of below-average intelligence but may consider that the police had talked to Jonah in the past about being more careful.
D. A jury may not consider the fact that Jonah was of below-average intelligence, nor may it consider that the police had talked to Jonah in the past about being more careful.
A
In considering a child’s negligence (when the child is over five years of age and is not engaged in an adult activity), a jury should evaluate the child’s reasonable care, taking into account the child’s age, intelligence, and experience. The fact that Jonah was of below-average intelligence is relevant to this question, obviously. This means we can eliminate Choices C and D, which state that the jury could not consider this fact. The issue of the police talking to Jonah to tell him to be more careful goes to the question of Jonah’s experience, and therefore it is relevant as well. Choice A is correct and Choice B is therefore wrong. Note that Jonah could be liable in some jurisdictions for starting a fire under principles of strict liability, but the question asked you about breach under the tort of negligence.
A buyer purchased a house from a seller, who had one son and one daughter. Unbeknownst to the buyer, at the time of the sale, an illness had rendered the seller incapable of making decisions for himself. The seller’s son, who did not have legally valid power of attorney, forged the seller’s signature on the deed. The son had no permission or other authorization to sign on the seller’s behalf. The buyer was unaware of the forgery. The buyer paid value, recorded the deed, and began using the house as his sole residence. The son and daughter commenced protracted litigation with one another over the seller’s care and his assets. After eight years, during which the seller remained mentally incapacitated, the court concluded that the daughter should be the seller’s legal guardian and should manage his assets on his behalf. The daughter immediately sued the buyer on the seller’s behalf, seeking to eject the buyer from the house. The statutory period for adverse possession was seven years.
Who now holds title to the house?
C.
ct. Forgery occurs if a deed is made, altered, completed, or signed by someone other than the grantor, and without the grantor’s authorization. A forged signature is perhaps the most common example. A forged deed is void, i.e., it conveys no interest whatsoever in the property, even to a grantee who is unaware of the forgery. Here, the son forged the deed by placing the seller’s signature on the deed without power of attorney and without the seller’s authorization. The deed therefore was void and conveyed no interest to the buyer. Accordingly, the seller still holds title to the house.
Answer option A is incorrect. Forgery occurs if a deed is made, altered, completed, or signed by someone other than the grantor, and without the grantor’s authorization. A forged signature is perhaps the most common example. A forged deed is void, i.e., it conveys no interest whatsoever in the property, even to a grantee who is unaware of the forgery. Recording is a process by which someone places a document reflecting a property interest in the appropriate public records. Among other functions, recording provides public notice of the property interest. However, recording does not validate an otherwise invalid interest. For example, recording a forged deed does not cure the forgery.
Here, the buyer took the property under a forged deed. That deed was void and conveyed no interest to the buyer. The act of recording did not cure the forgery and therefore did not validate the buyer’s property interest. Thus, the seller still holds title to the house.
Answer option B is incorrect. Adverse possession occurs when someone enters and uses another’s property in a manner that is continuous, hostile to the true owner’s interests (i.e., without the true owner’s permission), open and notorious, and exclusive, all for the statutory period required for adverse possession. When these elements are satisfied, title passes to the adverse possessor. The statutory period for adverse possession is tolled, or paused, if the property’s true owner is under some legal disability when the adverse possessor first enters the property. Mental incapacity is one form of legal disability. Forgery occurs if a deed is made, altered, completed, or signed by someone other than the grantor, and without the grantor’s authorization. A forged signature is perhaps the most common example. A forged deed is void, i.e., it conveys no interest whatsoever in the property, even to a grantee who is unaware of the forgery.
Here, the buyer’s occupancy of the house satisfied most of the elements of adverse possession. The occupancy was open and notorious, because the buyer apparently made no effort to hide the fact that he was living in the house. The occupancy was hostile because the buyer took possession under a forged deed, which conveyed no property interest and therefore did not convey the seller’s permission to enter the house. The occupancy was continuous, because the buyer lived in the house as his sole residence. And the occupancy evidently was exclusive, because the facts do not state that anyone else lived in the house. Nonetheless, the seven-year statutory period was tolled throughout the buyer’s occupancy, because the seller was mentally incapacitated when the buyer first entered the property. Therefore, the buyer did not acquire the house by adverse possession. Instead, because the buyer took under a forged deed, the seller still holds title to the house.
Answer option D is incorrect. Forgery occurs if a deed is made, altered, completed, or signed by someone other than the grantor, and without the grantor’s authorization. A forged signature is perhaps the most common example. A forged deed is void, i.e., it conveys no interest whatsoever in the property, even to a grantee who is unaware of the forgery. By contrast, some deeds are voidable, not void. A void deed is valid as between the grantor and grantee unless the grantor, or someone acting on the grantor’s behalf, chooses to void it. One example of a voidable deed is a deed obtained by fraud in the inducement. This type of fraud occurs when a grantor knows he is signing a deed but is induced to do so in reliance on some intentional, material misrepresentation of fact.
Here, the seller did not act based on any inducements, nor did he himself sign the deed or authorize the son to do so. Instead, the son forged the deed. Therefore, the deed was void, not voidable, and the seller still holds title to the house. Moreover, even if the deed were voidable, the daughter, as the seller’s legal guardian, could likely void the deed on the seller’s behalf and recover the house for the seller.
Key takeaway
The statutory period for adverse possession is tolled, or paused, if the property’s true owner is under some legal disability when the adverse possessor first enters the property.
True or False:
Billups University, a college, owns premises which have no toilet or plumbing facilities or heating equipment. In negotiate a lease to Earl Inc. for use of the premises as a radio station, Billups orally agrees to permit the use of facilities in an adjacent building and to provide heat. The parties subsequently execute a written lease agreement which makes no mention of facilities or heat. The question whether the written lease was adopted as a completely integrated agreement is to be decided on the basis of all relevant evidence of the prior and contemporaneous conduct and language.
True.
See page 210 of the Restatement, Illustration 1.
The parents of nine-year-old Bob know that he has recently committed aggressive and physically-harmful acts to two neighborhood children, but the parents have never disciplined Bob or even spoken to him about the need to be nice. At a time when Bob's parents aren't home, Bob invites his little neighbor pal, Jimmy, over for peanut butter and jelly. When the boys finish their sandwiches, they go into the backyard to play in Bob's 40-foot-high tree fort. Jimmy slips, and Bob catches his arm as he is falling. Jimmy dangles and cries for help. Bob gets an evil look in his eyes and asks, “If I let go, do you think you could fly?” Macaulay then drops Jimmy, injuring him. Are Bob's parents liable to Jimmy for negligence?
A. No, because Bob is too young to understand the consequences of his action to let go of Jimmy.
B Yes, Bob's parents were on notice that Bob liked to hurt other children. They therefore had an obligation to take reasonable steps to protect neighboring children who might be hurt
C No, Bob's parents were not home and therefore did not have notice of the situation. They therefore had no obligation to take reasonable steps to protect neighboring children who might be hurt.
D Yes, because Bob is their child, therefore they are responsible for his actions.
Yes. Nonfeasance (omission to act) may be tortious where it occurs in the context of a special relationship, such as parent-child. Parents have a duty to protect others from their child if they know or should know that the child has vicious propensities. See Rest. 2d §316 (imposing on parents the duty to take reasonable efforts to control their child, where the parent “knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control”).
Bob's parents were on notice that Bob liked to hurt other children. They therefore had an obligation to take reasonable steps to protect neighboring children who might be hurt (e.g., by trying to reform Macaulay or by not letting him play with other kids). Because they didn't take those steps, they're liable to a child who was foreseeably injured by the same sort of conduct as to which they were on notice.
Peter sues two defendants in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Anthony is properly served within the forum state. TJ is served within 100 miles of the federal courthouse, but outside the forum state. TJ has no contacts with the forum state. Which of the following is the most accurate statement regarding personal jurisdiction over TJ?
(A) Personal jurisdiction is proper over Defendant TJ because he was served within the 100-mile bulge, regardless of his lack of contacts with the forum state.
(B) Personal jurisdiction is not proper over TJ because, despite the 100-mile bulge, he lacks sufficient contacts with the forum state to satisfy due process.
(C) Personal jurisdiction over TJ depends on whether Anthony is also subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum state. If Anthony is properly subject to jurisdiction there, then so is TJ under the supplemental jurisdiction rules.
(D) Personal jurisdiction over TJ is proper under the 100-mile bulge rule, but only if the claims against TJ arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claims against Anthony.
B
This question highlights that the 100-mile bulge rule is a service rule, not a blanket grant of jurisdiction. While it allows for service on parties within that zone, it doesn't eliminate the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts with the forum state for personal jurisdiction. Just being close to the courthouse isn't enough if the defendant has no connection to the state.
James, an eighth-grader, brought his parent’s gun to school (he made sure it was not loaded) for show-and-tell. As he was showing the gun to his friend Amy in the hallway, another child bumped into James, and he dropped the gun. It landed on Amy’s foot, breaking three of her toes. Amy sues James for negligence. The jurisdiction uses the Third Restatement’s test for proximate cause, and James argues that Amy should lose her case because she cannot prove proximate cause.
A. James should lose on this point because his conduct was close in time and space to Amy’s injury.
B. James should lose on this point because his conduct was a foreseeable type of harm stemming from his negligence.
C. James should lose on this point because but for his bringing the gun to school, the injury never would have happened.
D. James should win on this point because his conduct resulted in an unforeseeable type of harm stemming from his negligence.
D
Again, let’s start off by eliminating the clearly wrong answers here. Choice A is wrong because it applies the directness test, which is not the “harm within the risk” test of the Third Restatement. (The Restatement, by the way, refers to the test as the “risk standard.”) Choice C is wrong because it sets out the standard for actual causation, not proximate causation. So this brings us to Choices B and D. Choice D is the better answer here. The foreseeable danger of bringing a gun to a school is that someone might get shot (or at least pistol-whipped); it is not that the gun would fall on someone’s foot and break a few toes. One way to see this is to imagine that James was carrying a geometry book rather than a gun. It is not negligent to carry such a book, even though there is a risk it could fall and break someone’s toes. The risk of a gun falling and breaking toes is not a risk that makes the activity negligent.
Olivia owned Greenacre in fee simple. On January 5, 2023, Olivia entered into a valid, written contract to sell Greenacre to Arthur. The contract was not recorded. On February 1, 2023, Olivia, without Arthur's knowledge, granted a mortgage on Greenacre to First Bank. First Bank promptly recorded the mortgage on February 2, 2023. On February 15, 2023, Olivia conveyed Greenacre by deed to Beatrice for valuable consideration. Beatrice had no actual knowledge of the contract with Arthur or the mortgage to First Bank, but a reasonable inspection of the property would have revealed Arthur's ongoing landscaping improvements. Beatrice recorded her deed on February 16, 2023. On March 1, 2023, Arthur recorded his contract.
Jurisdiction Alpha follows a race-notice recording statute.
Which of the following parties holds superior title or interest in Greenacre?
(A) Arthur holds fee simple title, free of the mortgage.
(B) Beatrice holds fee simple title, subject to the mortgage held by First Bank.
(C) First Bank holds a valid mortgage, and Arthur holds equitable title subject to the mortgage.
(D) First Bank holds a valid mortgage, and Beatrice holds fee simple title subject to the mortgage.
D First Bank holds a valid mortgage, and Beatrice holds fee simple title subject to the mortgage.
Here's a breakdown:
A fine-art auction house sent its standard written agreement to a prospective consignor who had inquired about selling her drawings at auction. The agreement was 12 pages long and was labeled “Completely Integrated.” Under the terms of the standard written agreement, “if, in the auction house’s best judgment, a consigned work should be reframed and/or remounted in order to be presented more favorably at auction, the consignor authorizes the auction house to reframe or remount the work at the consignor’s expense, to be deducted from the auction proceeds.” The consignor signed and returned the agreement. Three weeks later, the consignor met with the auction-house director about finalizing auction details. The consignor expressed concern about possible framing costs. The director replied that the auction house had not yet decided whether to reframe the consignor’s drawings. The consignor asked the director to give her a call first to obtain her permission if any framing costs would exceed $400, and the director agreed. The director never called. Two weeks later, the consignor received a check from the auction sale. The check was accompanied by a statement that indicated the check was for her auction proceeds, less $800 for reframing costs. The auction house had not sought the consignor’s permission for reframing. The consignor sued for breach of contract. The consignor sought to introduce evidence from the meeting that, should framing costs exceed $400, the auction house was obligated to obtain the consignor’s permission before proceeding.
Is a court likely to admit evidence of the consignor’s conversation about requiring the consignor’s permission for framing costs over $400?
D No, because the conversation contradicts the written agreement’s terms.
B
A partially integrated agreement is a final but incomplete statement of the parties’ intent regarding the contract’s subject matter. The parol-evidence rule excludes extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations that are inconsistent with a partially integrated agreement. Accordingly, a court may use extrinsic evidence to add consistent terms to a partially integrated agreement, but not to contradict the agreement. In contrast, a completely integrated agreement is a complete and final statement of the parties’ intent. The parol-evidence rule excludes extrinsic evidence of all prior or contemporaneous agreements that are within the scope of a completely integrated agreement. Accordingly, a court may not use extrinsic evidence to supplement or contradict a completely integrated agreement. Regardless of whether an agreement is partially or completely integrated, extrinsic evidence arises prior to or contemporaneous with the agreement. Evidence arising after the agreement is not barred by the parol-evidence rule.
Here, the standard written agreement is 12 pages long and labeled as completely integrated. However, the consignor’s conversation with the auction-house director about calling first if reframing costs exceeded $400 occurred three weeks after the parties formed their agreement. The conversation was not an oral agreement prior or contemporaneous to the standard written agreement. Because the conversation occurred after the agreement formed, it is not extrinsic evidence barred by the parol-evidence rule. Therefore, a court is likely to admit evidence of the consignor’s conversation about requiring the consignor’s permission for framing costs over $400.
Note that the conversation and any agreement arising from it would likely be treated as a modification to the parties’ contract. Because the contract is for the auction house’s services in selling the drawings, the modification requires fresh consideration on both sides in order to be enforceable, unless an exception applies. The auction house is promising to do something new, namely, to call the consignor and obtain permission if reframing costs exceed $400. To enforce the modification, the consignor would likely argue that her contractual duties are similarly altered, because the modification implicitly requires her to promise not to withhold permission unreasonably.
Answer option A is incorrect for several reasons. First, as explained above, because the conversation about approving framing costs over $400 occurred after the agreement formed, the parol-evidence rule does not apply. The agreement’s status as completely or partially integrated is therefore irrelevant. Second, arguably, the agreement here is completely integrated, not partially integrated. The agreement is 12 pages long and labels itself as completely integrated. No facts support a conclusion that the agreement is partially integrated. Third, even if the agreement were partially integrated, it expressly and thoroughly addresses the subject of reframing costs and how they will be handled. So, if the parol-evidence rule applied, a court would not likely conclude that a party could supplement the agreement with additional terms about reframing.
Answer option C is incorrect. Although the agreement here is likely completely integrated, the parol-evidence rule does not bar admission of the conversation about framing costs. The conversation is not extrinsic evidence that arose prior to or contemporaneous with the agreement. Rather, the conversation occurred after the agreement was made. Therefore, a court is likely to admit evidence of the consignor’s conversation about requiring the consignor’s permission for framing costs over $400.
Answer option D is incorrect. The parol-evidence rule does not bar admission of the conversation about framing costs. The conversation is not extrinsic evidence that arose prior to or contemporaneous with the agreement. Rather, the conversation occurred after the agreement was made. Therefore, a court is likely to admit the conversation regardless of whether it contradicts express terms of the parties’ written agreement.
Note that, if the parol-evidence rule did apply, the auction house would have a strong argument that the conversation contradicts the written agreement. The written agreement places no limits on the auction house’s ability to reframe the drawings and charge the consignor for those expenses. In contrast, the conversation limits the auction house’s rights, by requiring it to seek the consignor’s permission for framing costs greater than $400.
Bob Berry the train conductor is driving his train through Sugar Notch Borough. The speed limit is 40 mph. Berry is driving at 60 mph. The borough has negligently allowed trees to grow along the train tracks. One of the trees fell a few moments before Berry’s train arrived, and Berry crashed into the tree, causing the train to derail. Experts agree that if Berry had been driving the speed limit, he likely would have been able to stop before hitting the tree. Berry sues Sugar Notch Borough for negligence. The borough concedes it was negligent but argues that Berry’s damages should be reduced because of Berry’s comparative negligence, which it plans to prove through negligence per se. Berry responds by claiming that any violation of the statute was not a proximate cause of his injury.
How should the court rule on Berry’s argument?
A. The court should accept the argument because the accident could just as easily have happened if the train were going at 40 mph.
B. The court should accept the argument because there is no question that Berry violated the statute.
C. The court should accept the argument because Sugar Notch Borough’s tolerance of the trees, not Berry’s conduct, caused the plaintiff’s injury.
D. The court should reject the argument.
D
This question, a variation on the last question, includes this important change in the facts: rather than the tree falling on Berry’s train, the tree falls before the train’s arrival, and Berry crashes into it. The most important risk of speeding is that you won’t be able to stop fast enough to avoid a collision, and here that’s what happened. The experts agree that if Berry had been going the speed limit, he would have had time to stop. Because the harm that occurred was within the risk of what made the speeding negligent, the court should reject Berry’s proximate cause argument. Thus, Choice D is correct and Choice A is not. Choice C is wrong because it sets out the standard for actual causation, not proximate causation.
Nathaniel sued an individual defendant, Ben in federal district court in State A. Nathaniel planned to arrange for the Ben to be served personally. Ben was a citizen of State B. A pre-complaint investigation revealed that Ben also owned a vacation home in State C and was spending time there when Nathaniel filed his complaint. The pre-complaint investigation also revealed that Ben planned to remain in State C for approximately six months.
Which state’s or states’ laws should the Nathaniel's lawyer research to learn the applicable rules for serving the defendant?
C
In determining which state’s rules are a source of applicable laws for service, a plaintiff may choose either: (1) the state within which the complaint is filed or (2) the state within which service is actually made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Here, Nathaniel filed the complaint in State A, so the law of state A is a source of applicable rules for serving Ben. Nathaniel plans to arrange to have Ben served personally, so service will occur in the state where Ben is present, namely, State C. Therefore, the Nathaniel’s lawyer should research the laws of State A (where the complaint is filed) and State C (where service will actually be made).
Answer option A is incorrect because on these facts, the plaintiff may select from the laws of State A or State C in determining the correct procedures for serving the defendant. In selecting which state’s laws to follow in serving the defendant, the plaintiff’s lawyer should research both, to determine if one state’s procedures are more advantageous for the plaintiff than the other’s.
Answer options B and D are incorrect because State B would not be a source of applicable rules for serving the defendant here, because the complaint was not filed in State B and service will not occur in State B.
Jack, a 14-year-old boy, and two of his friends sneak onto Ingrid’s property, which has access to a cliff at the beach. Ingrid has posted ‘‘no trespassing’’ posters all over her property. Jack jumps off the cliff and breaks his back. He sues Ingrid for negligence. Ingrid argues that the case cannot go forward because she owes Jack no duty. The jurisdiction has replaced the traditional approach to landowner liability with the dichotomy approach, and it recognizes the attractive nuisance doctrine of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
How should the court rule on Ingrid’s argument?
A. The court should reject Ingrid’s argument, under the attractive nuisance doctrine.
B. The court should reject Ingrid’s argument because a duty is owed to trespassers under the dichotomy approach.
C. The court should reject Ingrid’s argument because Jack is a foreseeable plaintiff and she was engaged in risk creation, unless there is a compelling policy reason not to impose such a duty.
D. The court should accept Ingrid’s argument.
D
Under the dichotomy, both licensees and invitees are treated to the normal duty rules. Trespassers continue to be governed by the willful and wanton misconduct approach. For this reason, Choice B is incorrect. Choice C is incorrect because it states the Rowland approach, which rejects the trichotomy and dichotomy approaches.
So the question comes down to Choice A or Choice D, and application of the attractive nuisance doctrine. Though the jurisdiction recognizes the doctrine as set forth in the Restatement, it cannot help Jack here. This is a natural condition on the land, a cliff, and not an artificial one. Also, arguably a 14-year-old can appreciate the risk of jumping off a cliff into the ocean. The correct answer is Choice D. Ingrid should win on her motion to have the case dismissed on grounds that she owes Jack no duty.
A farmer owned a valuable piece of farmland. An investor lied to the farmer that the county government would soon be doubling property taxes, decreasing the commercial value of the farmland from $1,000,000 to $200,000. As a result, the farmer agreed to sell his property to the investor for $300,000. The investor recorded the deed and then sold the property, the fair market value of which was still $1,000,000, to a woman for $500,000. The woman recorded the deed. The farmer then learned that the investor had lied to him and sued the woman to recover his property. The woman contended that she was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice who was entitled to keep the property.
How will the court likely rule?
C
Fraud gives rise to two types of title: void and voidable. Void title is no title at all. Voidable title is good in the hands of the immediate grantee until the grantor sues to have it set aside. If the grantee transfers voidable title to a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice, then the voidable title ripens into good title and the grantor is without recourse against the purchaser. McCoy v. Love, 382 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1979). Fraud in the execution conveys void title. Fraud in the execution occurs when the grantor is deceived into signing something that he did not understand to be a deed. Fraud in the inducement conveys voidable title. Fraud in the inducement occurs when the grantor knowingly signed a deed, with the intent to transfer title to the grantee, but was deceived or tricked into doing so. Id.
Here, the farmer conveyed voidable title to the investor. The farmer understood that he was selling his property to the investor but was tricked into doing so by the investor’s lies. The investor’s voidable title then ripened into good title when he conveyed the property to the woman for valuable consideration. Therefore, the farmer has no recourse against the woman, who is entitled to keep the property.
Answer option A is incorrect because the woman is still a bona fide purchaser for value even though the amount that she paid for the property was well below its fair market price. Some courts require only nominal consideration while others require substantial consideration for a grantee to be considered a purchaser. Anderson v. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1989). However, even courts that require substantial consideration do not require the amount paid to be equal in value to the property. Therefore, the woman’s payment of $500,000 qualifies as substantial consideration.
Answer option B is incorrect because the investor obtained the property through fraud in the inducement, not fraud in the execution. Therefore, the investor obtained voidable, rather than void, title.
Answer option D is incorrect because recording a deed does not serve to validate a real estate transfer. Recording serves only to put other parties on record notice. A party who obtains a deed through forgery or fraud in the execution cannot validate title merely by recording.
Jones Corp sends Smith a two-page contract to sign for the sale of 1,000 widgets. The contract appears complete on its face and contains a merger clause stating "this writing represents the complete and final agreement between the parties." Before signing, Smith and Jones' CEO had extensively discussed delivery timing over email, with Jones' CEO promising "guaranteed delivery within 2 weeks." This timing requirement was not included in the final written contract. After signing, delivery takes 4 weeks, causing problems for Smith's business. Smith wants to introduce the email evidence in a lawsuit against Jones Corp.
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 216, which best describes the likely outcome?
A) The email evidence will be admissible because § 216(1) allows evidence of prior agreements if they would naturally have been included in a separate agreement.
B) The email evidence will be inadmissible because § 216(1) bars evidence of prior agreements where the writing appears complete and contains a merger clause.
C) The email evidence will be admissible because § 216(2)(b) allows evidence of prior agreements that do not contradict the writing, and nothing in the contract specifies a delivery timeline.
D) The email evidence will be inadmissible because § 216(2)(a) bars evidence that would contradict an integrated agreement, and the merger clause makes this agreement completely integrated.
Answer: B
Explanation: Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 216(1), evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements is not admissible to contradict a binding integrated agreement. Here, the contract contains a merger clause explicitly stating it is the complete agreement, making it a completely integrated agreement. The presence of a merger clause, combined with the contract appearing complete on its face, strongly suggests complete integration. As delivery timing would naturally be included in such a contract, evidence of prior agreements about timing cannot be admitted to supplement the integrated writing. While C might seem plausible because the contract doesn't specify timing, § 216's bar on evidence for completely integrated agreements applies regardless of whether the prior term contradicts or supplements the writing.
Anya is a skilled rock climber. She regularly climbs at a local indoor climbing gym. One day, while climbing a challenging route, a hold she is relying on unexpectedly breaks free from the wall, causing her to fall and sustain injuries. The climbing gym had inspected the holds that morning and found no visible defects. However, it is later discovered that the hold that broke had a small, internal flaw that was undetectable by visual inspection. Anya sues the climbing gym for negligence. Which of the following BEST represents the MOST LIKELY outcome of the case?
A) Anya will likely win because the climbing gym has a duty to ensure the safety of its patrons.
B) Anya will likely win because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
C) Anya will likely lose because the climbing gym exercised reasonable care in inspecting the holds.
D) Anya will likely lose because she assumed the risk of injury inherent in rock climbing.
Answer: C) Anya will likely lose because the climbing gym exercised reasonable care in inspecting the holds.
Explanation: This question explores the nuances of negligence and the concept of reasonable care. While the climbing gym has a duty to its patrons (A), that duty is to exercise reasonable care, not to guarantee absolute safety. The gym inspected the holds, which is a reasonable precaution. The internal flaw was undetectable by reasonable means. Therefore, the gym likely met its duty of care. Res ipsa loquitur (B) is unlikely to apply here, as the accident doesn't necessarily imply negligence on the gym's part – climbing holds can break even with proper maintenance. Assumption of risk (D) is a factor, but not the primary reason for the likely outcome. While climbers assume some inherent risks, they don't assume the risk of negligence by the gym.