FRCP
12(b)(6)
Failure to state a claim
It allows a defendant to seek dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a legally valid claim, even if all facts alleged are true.
Courts use the Iqbal/Twombly two-step test: ignore conclusory statements, and determine whether the remaining facts state a plausible claim for relief.
For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporate entity is domiciled in both the state that it is incorporated in and any state in which it conducts business
False. Answer: For the purposes of jurisdiction, a corporate entity is domiciled in both the state that it is incorporated in and its principal place of business.
What does Rule 8(a) require in a complaint?
It requires a short and plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction, the claim showing entitlement to relief, and a demand for relief sought. The pleading must state a plausible claim, not just legal conclusions.
What is the relationship between the holdings of Daimler and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation, SA v. Brown?
Daimler v. Bauman narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction set out in Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown by clarifying that a corporation is only subject to general jurisdiction in a forum where it is “essentially at home.”
While Goodyear suggested that “continuous and systematic” contacts might be sufficient, Daimler held that even substantial sales in a forum state (California, in Daimler) do not make a corporation “at home” unless it is incorporated or has its principal place of business there. Daimler rejected the notion that subsidiaries' contacts can automatically be imputed to the parent.
Andre (A) sued Ella (E) for trademark infringement in federal court. The E answered the complaint, denying all allegations and asserting a counterclaim against the A. Four days later, A moved to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Twenty days after, A filed her motion to dismiss and while the motion was still pending, the E amended his counterclaim without leave of court.
Is Ella's amendment proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
Answer: Yes, because it was filed within 21 days of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. Here, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
The plaintiff's motion is one of the three types of motions under Rule 15(a)(1)(B) that start the clock on the defendant’s 21-day period to amend as a matter of course. See FRCP 15(a)(1)(B); see also FRCP 15, advisory committee’s notes (2009).
Because the defendant filed an amendment within 21 days of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the amendment is proper.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provides that a party may amend its pleading "once as a matter of course" before trial within either:
(1) 21 days after serving it, or
(2) if the pleading sought to be amended is one that requires the opposing party's response, then 21 days after the responsive pleading is served or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
Generally, a motion that attacks and challenges a pleading is not a "responsive pleading" as defined under Rule 7.
However, Rule 15 names three types of pre-answer motions that are treated like responsive pleadings, which will mark the beginning of the 21-day period during which the opposing party has the right to amend: (1) a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b); (2) a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e); and (3) a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). See FRCP 15(a)(1)(B).
8(b)
A defendant may provide a response to a plaintiff's complaint by either filing a pre-answer motion to dismiss or by filing an answer. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 8(b)(1)(A), (c)(1); 12(b).
The answer must either be a general denial of all allegations in the complaint, or it must respond to each paragraph and allegation asserted in the complaint by admitting it, denying it, or stating that the defendant "lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of [it]." See FRCP 8(b).
Permissive counterclaims must either have independent grounds of federal jurisdiction or fall into U.S.C. § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction.
What are the three contexts in which Principal Place of Business (PPB) applies? (Bonus points for rule or case references)
Answer:
1) Personal jurisdiction (Daimler–where a corporation will be subject to general jurisdiction in the state where it has its PPB.
2) venue (U.S.C.§ 1391(c):Defendant corporation resides in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the action; plaintiff corporation resides only in its principal place of business).
3) federal diversity jurisdiction (Hertz Corp v. Friend– a corporation’s principal place of business is the state where its “officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities).
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court emphasized “purposeful availment” and fair play. Compare this approach with the Court’s reasoning in Hanson v. Denckla. How did the Court build on or distinguish the notion of unilateral activity in Hanson?
In Burger King v. Rudzewicz (1985), the Court emphasized purposeful availment, holding that a defendant deliberately reaching into a forum (via contract negotiation, long-term relationship, etc.) can justify personal jurisdiction. In Hanson v. Denckla (1958), by contrast, the Court held that a defendant must purposefully avail itself of the forum; unilateral activity by a third party is insufficient. Burger King distinguished Hanson by showing that Rudzewicz directly reached out to a Florida corporation, whereas in Hanson, the defendant never directed conduct toward Florida.
Nesh (N) loses a fraud claim in Case 1 against Juliette (J). In a second, unrelated case, Holland (H) (a stranger to the first case) sues N for a different claim but wants to preclude N from relitigating whether N committed fraud. Can H use offensive non-mutual issue preclusion?
Answer:
Possibly — but only if Parklane Hosiery v. Shore factors support it:
N had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in Case 1.
There are no prior inconsistent verdicts.
It would not be unfair or inefficient to allow H to benefit from preclusion.
Courts are cautious with offensive non-mutual issue preclusion, and may deny it if H could have joined Case 1 or if the stakes were lower in the first case.
12(b)(3)
Improper Venue--A defendant may file a motion to dismiss if the venue is legally improper. If granted, the case may be dismissed or transferred under § 1406.
The Calder Effects Test requires only that the defendant's conduct be tortious and cause harm in the forum state to establish personal jurisdiction.
False: It also requires that the conduct be intentionally aimed at the forum.
What are the procedural rules for dismissing personal jurisdiction? (hint- there’s at least 3)
12(b)(2)--> Pre-answer motion to dismiss for no personal jurisdiction or (6) frivolous claim (no relief granted)
Special appearance (State courts only) → Go to court, not consent and reject jurisdiction (see Int. Shoe).
In the answer, jurisdictional defense→ Requires litigation. FRCP 12 (h)(1)
Can also Rule 8(Affirmative Defense): If not filing a pre-answer motion, state the lack of personal jurisdiction clearly as a defense in the answer to comply with requirement to assert defenses and avoid waiver under Rule 12(h)(1)
Compare the reasoning in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.. How did the Court in Ford modify or clarify the foreseeability and causation analysis central to World-Wide Volkswagen?
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana clarified World-Wide Volkswagen by softening the causation requirement for specific jurisdiction. While World-Wide emphasized foreseeability of product mobility alone is insufficient to establish contact and required purposeful availment, Ford held that specific jurisdiction does not require a strict causal link. It is enough that the claim "relates to" the defendant’s forum activities—here, Ford
Laura (L) has a chain of cat cafes known as Paws and Coffee (P&C). P&C is incorporated in St. Louis, MO (because L is still a law student residing there) and has locations in California, New York, Massachusetts, and Delaware. During the school year, L (as CEO) makes business decisions and directs the company’s operations from the MO headquarters, but during the winter and summer breaks, L operates in P&C’s CA office. Where does P&C have citizenship?
Answer: Paws and Coffee only has corporate citizenship in Missouri (whomp whomp) because even though it operates in other states (CA, NY, MA, DE) and has a physical office in California, its nerve center is in Missouri, and that is its sole principal place of business for jurisdictional purposes. (see Hertz Corp v. Friend–A corporation's principal place of business is “where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.”). L’s direction of business in CA is only seasonal and temporary, not the core of the business’s control and coordination that occurs for the majority of the year.
13(a)
Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue: Under FRCP 12(b)(3), a defendant can ask the court to dismiss a case on the ground that the venue, or location where the case was filed, is not proper according to the rules.
Procedure: The defendant files a motion, essentially a formal request, arguing that the case should not proceed in the current court because it doesn't meet the legal requirements for venue.
Timing: This motion must be made before responding to the complaint or including it as part of the defendant’s initial response. If not, the defendant may waive the right to contest the venue.
Cordero v. Voltaire is a key case illustrating the preclusion consequences of failing to assert a compulsory counterclaim.
Under Grable & Sons, a state-law claim with an embedded federal issue will always support federal question jurisdiction.
False: The federal issue must be necessary, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution without disrupting the federal-state balance. Gunn built on this rule to clarify that not all state-law claims involving federal issues warrant federal jurisdiction. It emphasized the necessity of the federal issue being substantial in a systemic sense and the importance of respecting the balance between federal and state courts.
What are the main differences between attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine? (Whoever gets the most wins).
Answer:
Scope and Protection:
(Attorney Client) Protects the communications between the client and their attorney. Only communications made for the purpose of legal advice. Covers verbal and written communications, not necessarily the underlying facts.
(WPD) Broad range of materials, not limited to communications, but anything prepared in anticipation of litigation. Covers documents, tangible things, and sometimes intangible things (such as mental impressions) prepared for litigation.
Duration:
(Attorney Client) Indefinite—>The privilege generally lasts forever, even after the death of the client.
(WPD) Case-Specific→ The protection generally lasts as long as the litigation is ongoing but can be revisited by the court if there is a substantial need.
Exceptions:
(Attorney Client) Crime-Fraud Exception: Does not apply to communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud.Waiver: Can be waived if the client discloses the confidential communication to a third party.
(WPD) Substantial Need: The party seeking discovery shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case. Undue Hardship: The party cannot, without undue hardship, obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. Generally, materials containing an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories are given greater protection and are only discoverable in rare circumstances.
Rule:
(Attorney Client) FRCP 26 (5)(a), See Upjohn v. U.S. (1981)
(WPD) FRCP 26 (b)(3), See Hickman v. Taylor
Purpose:
(Attorney Client) Encourages open and honest communication between clients and their attorneys—> ensuring the client can provide all relevant information without fear of disclosure.
(WPD) Ensures that attorneys can prepare their cases without undue interference—> preserving the privacy of their litigation strategies and preparations
Status:
(Attorney Client) Privilege cannot be overcome by need.
(WPD) Legal protection, but not privilege
How does the Court’s use of the “sliding scale” approach in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court relate to its treatment of specific jurisdiction in International Shoe? Was the Court consistent with its earlier jurisprudence, or did BMS signal a significant departure?
The California Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb used a “sliding scale” approach to specific jurisdiction, relaxing the relatedness requirement if the defendant had extensive forum contacts. SCOTUS rejected this in BMS, holding that specific jurisdiction demands a direct connection between the forum contacts and each plaintiff’s claim. This was a departure from the flexible International Shoe test and signaled a stricter approach to specific jurisdiction, particularly in mass tort and multi-plaintiff contexts.
Sam’s oil company incorporated in Omaha, NE has its principal place of business in MO. It drills for oil in several eastern European countries. One of its wells in Latvia malfunctioned, causing an explosion. The explosion severely injured a number of nearby residents and damaged their homes. A number of the injured Latvians filed an action against the oil company in the United States District Court for the District of MO. Nearly all of the relevant witnesses and tangible evidence are in Latvia.
If the oil company wishes to move the case away from the MO, which of the following grounds is likely to prove most successful?
Answer: Dismissal for forum non conveniens.
The ground most likely to be successful is forum non conveniens. Even if the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants, subject matter over the action, and venue is proper, the court has discretion to decline to hear the case in deference to a court in another country if it determines that the other country provides a substantially more efficient, convenient, and fair forum.
Here, the court might make that determination since the key evidence is in Latvia and since a trial in State B would require extensive translation.
14
Rule 14 allows a defendant to bring in a third-party who may be liable for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim. The third-party claim must be derivative, not just a shift in blame.
See Amchem v. Windsor
Once a case is settled in State court, it cannot be reheard or appealed to any federal court.
False: Under the U.S.C. § 1257, a case argued in State court that involves a Constitutional issue that could change the outcome of the case, can be appealed to the Supreme Court. This is because SCOTUS has appellate jurisdiction. (i.e. State court in a defamation case says the 1st Amendment isn’t a defense→ Defendant appeals to SCOTUS saying that it is a defense)
What is the test for a court to grant preliminary injunctive relief?
Answer: As a threshold matter, a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must demonstrate:
Some likelihood of succeeding on the merits
That it has “no adequate remedy at law” and will suffer “irreparable harm” if preliminary relief is denied
(If party meets thresholds 1 and 2) the irreparable harm the non-moving party will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing the harm against the harm to the moving party if relief is denied.
The public interest–meaning consequences of granting or denying the injunction to non-parties.
(see Abbott Labs v. Mead Johnson & Co.)
Compare the supplemental jurisdiction analysis in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs and Owen Equipment v. Kroger. How do they reflect the tension between efficiency and federalism in determining when state claims can piggyback on federal ones?
Gibbs established that federal courts have discretion to hear state law claims when they arise from a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim.
Owen Equipment v. Kroger limited this discretion in diversity cases by emphasizing the need to preserve complete diversity. Together, they reflect a tension: Gibbs promotes judicial economy, while Owen protects federalism and statutory limits. The codification in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 follows Owen by prohibiting supplemental jurisdiction that would destroy diversity.
Holland (H) (a resident of Alabama) and Juliette (J) (a resident of Virginia), are involved in a car accident in Missouri. H is pretty upset because she just got her car fixed, so she hastily files a suit in Missouri state court and serves J notice in-person after their Civil Procedure class. J, does not like the laws of MO and would much rather deal things out over the summer in VA (because finals).
What can J do to move the case to VA, if at all (assuming J has not yet answered the complaint)?
Answer: J cannot move her case to VA for multiple reasons. First, MO has personal jurisdiction over J because she was served in-person in MO (Burnham v. Superior Court): transient jurisdiction is valid) and the accident occurred in MO, thus supporting specific jurisdiction (see Ford Motor Co., affiliation between D’s activities (driving in MO) and the claim (damages for negligent driving).
Second, the venue is proper as the accident took place in MO and both parties reside there for school (U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2)).
Finally, removal will not be possible because even if J argues for removal to federal court via diversity jurisdiction, the venue would still be in MO not VA. J’s only option would be to file a motion to dismiss for Non Conveniens, arguing that VA is the more appropriate forum and that MO is inconvenient; but this is likely to fail on the consideration factors (see Piper Aircraft v. Reyno).
19--When is a party required to be joined under Rule 19?
If complete relief cannot be accorded without them or their absence may impair their interests or cause inconsistent obligations. Joint tortfeasors, however, are generally not necessary parties.
A class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) can recover individualized monetary damages so long as the damages are incidental to the injunctive relief sought.
True: Per Wal-Mart v. Dukes, monetary relief must be “incidental” and not require individualized hearings; otherwise, certification under (b)(2) is inappropriate.
When can a party be sanctioned under Rule 37?
A party may be sanctioned for failing to comply with discovery obligations, such as refusing to answer interrogatories or destroying evidence. Sanctions can include orders, fees, or even default judgment.
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, why did the Supreme Court uphold the federal court's jurisdiction even though complete diversity was not present at the time of removal? How does this case create tension with the rule in Mottley?
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis (1996), the Court allowed jurisdiction because complete diversity existed at the time of judgment, even though it did not exist at the time of removal, due to the presence of a non-diverse defendant who was later dismissed.
This creates tension with Mottley, which required jurisdiction to exist on the face of the initial complaint. However, Caterpillar reflects a pragmatic exception, emphasizing finality and efficiency where any jurisdictional defect is cured before final judgment.
Harrison, after graduating from law school buys a nice fancy townhome in D.C. However, shortly after moving in, he realizes he needs to install a new gas stove in the kitchen. So H–for whatever reason–hires Andre, a citizen of CA, and Lucas, a citizen of NY, to fix the wiring in his townhome and install a new gas stove. Unfortunately, A brought the wrong parts for the installation, and while the two were working on the repairs they somehow managed to burn down the townhome. Naturally, H sues L for negligence, seeking $100,000, because he originally started the fire. L files a motion to dismiss the case for failure to join N, alleging that he contributed to the fire by giving him the wrong parts.
How should the court rule?
Answer: Lucas’s motion to dismiss should be denied because A is not a necessary party.
Under Temple v. Synthes Corp., a defendant cannot force dismissal merely by arguing that a potential joint tortfeasor hasn’t been joined. Andre is not a necessary or indispensable party, even if he contributed to the harm. Also, under the tort law in a number of states, any single joint tortfeasor may be liable for the entire wrong, making complete relief for the plaintiff possible. Even if a person is required under 19(a), dismissal only occurs under 19(b) if: That person cannot be joined, and The court finds, in equity and good conscience, that the case cannot proceed in their absence.
Here, there's no suggestion that Andre cannot be joined (e.g., due to subject-matter jurisdiction). But even if that were true, joint tortfeasors are almost never indispensable under 19(b), per Temple.
15--When can a party amend its pleading under Rule 15?
Within 21 days as a matter of course, or later with the court’s permission, which should be freely given when justice so requires. Amendments may “relate back” under Rule 15(c) if tied to original facts.
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must be applied in a diversity case even if it arguably abridges a state-created right, so long as it regulates procedure.
True: Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965): A valid FRCP applies if it "really regulates procedure" and does not violate the Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution, even if it affects state-created rights in outcome.
What does Rule 11 require attorneys to certify when filing a pleading or motion? What are the potential sanctions they could face?
By signing, attorneys certify that to the best of their knowledge, the filing is not for an improper purpose, is legally warranted, and that factual contentions have or will likely have evidentiary support. Violations can lead to sanctions.
Under Rule 11, attorneys may face sanctions such as nonmonetary penalties, fines, or an order to pay the opposing party’s attorney’s fees. The purpose is to deter, not punish, and the court has discretion to impose what is sufficient to prevent repetition.
Fines must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the misconduct. They cannot be excessive or punitive and must be proportionate to the violation.
This case introduced a balancing test that allowed federal courts to apply federal procedural interests, such as the right to a jury, even where the state rule would affect the outcome. (Name the test in your answer)
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative
When state and federal procedural rules conflict, the court should consider:
Whether the state rule is outcome determinative (as under Guaranty Trust v. York),
But even if it is, whether federal interests in maintaining the integrity of the federal system—such as the allocation of power between judge and jury—outweigh the state’s interest in uniformity.
Nesh (N) joins a business venture with Andre (A). N is domiciled in Boston and A is domiciled in Chicago. At some point A and N fall-out and a few months later, A wants to sue N in IL state court for failed venture under breach of k and fraudulent misrepresentation, but A is also angry and petty→ so A serves N notice through Instagram direct messages and posts on his snapchat story (which N follows) that he’s going to sue N. Does this meet the Due Process requirements for notice?
Answer: No, Andre fails to meet service requirements. Under the Mullane rule, notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
As per FRCP 4, the formal procedure for service must be done either through: personal service, service at usual place of abode with someone of suitable age/discretion, delivery to an authorized agent, or another method approved by state law.
A’s service via Instagram and Snapchat does not meet Due Process requirements. Without formal, court-sanctioned service, N is not properly notified, and the case would likely be dismissed for insufficient service of process. Courts might allow service via social media only after traditional methods have failed and only with court permission (see Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku – a rare exception).
Here, A seems motivated by pettiness and did not follow any formal service procedure or seek court approval.
26--What is the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)? Which legal protection can it be used against?
Parties may discover any nonprivileged matter relevant to a claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. Privileged or unduly burdensome material is protected.
Work Product Doctrine, see Hickman v. Taylor
A class representative who has an identical legal interest as the rest of the class but has a minor unrelated conflict in settlement posture can still satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)'s adequacy requirement.
False: Even minor conflicts of interest in settlement posture can disqualify a class representative under Rule 23(a)(4), particularly in (b)(3) actions requiring fairness and independence in negotiation.
Under the Erie Doctrine, what kind of state rules are federal courts most likely to apply?
Federal courts generally apply state rules that are clearly substantive, like statutes of limitations, damages caps, and burdens of proof. These rules directly affect parties’ rights and are not merely procedural.
How did the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal build on Bell Atlantic v. Twombly to reshape federal pleading standards under Rule 8(a)? What are the two prongs of the Iqbal analysis, and how do they affect a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)?
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), affirmed and extended the pleading standard established in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and clarified how federal courts should evaluate complaints under Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6).
Main Contributions of Iqbal:
Two-Pronged Analysis for Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss:
Prong One – Identify and disregard legal conclusions:
Courts must disregard conclusory statements that are not supported by factual content. Merely stating elements of a cause of action or using legal labels (e.g., "discriminated," "violated rights") is not enough.
Prong Two – Assess whether factual allegations plausibly state a claim:
After stripping away the legal conclusions, the court must determine whether the remaining factual content plausibly suggests entitlement to relief. This is a “context-specific” inquiry, requiring judges to use their "judicial experience and common sense."
“Plausibility Standard” (building on Twombly):
A complaint must plead enough facts to raise a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
This is more than mere possibility, but less than probability.
Sam brought a diversity action against Holland in federal court, seeking to recover for injuries caused when Holland's employee, Yitzi crashed a delivery truck into the Sam's car. Sam claimed that the Yitzi was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Holland’s counsel reviewed the employee's time sheets, which indicated that Yitzi was working at the time of the accident. Holland's counsel also interviewed the employee’s manager, Andre, who confirmed that the employee was working at the time of the accident.
Holland therefore admitted in its answer to the complaint that her employee was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Holland included a counterclaim in her answer, asserting that Sam's negligence had instead caused the accident. Sam replied, denying all allegations in Holland's counterclaim. One month after Sam replied but three months prior to the completion of discovery, Holland learned that Yitzi’s manager, Andre, made him leave the shop an hour before the accident but allowed him to drive the delivery truck home. Although Andre had known this all along, he had not reported this during his initial interview with Holland’s counsel because ‘meh’. Upon learning this information, Holland immediately moved for leave to amend her answer in order to deny that the employee had acted in the scope of his employment.
Is the court likely to grant the defendant's motion to amend?
Answer: Yes, because discovery is not yet complete, and the plaintiff will still have time to prepare for her strategy for trial. Also, the amendment was sought in good faith, early in litigation, and with no undue prejudice to the plaintiff. As per rule 15(a)(2) “A party may amend its pleading with the court’s leave, and the court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Rule 15(a) in general allows parties to amend an admission in an answer (Rule (b)(6) with leave of court—which is almost always granted if: It’s early in litigation; There’s no bad faith, and; There’s no prejudice to the opposing party.
This standard is very permissive, particularly early in litigation—as here, where:
The amendment is sought three months before the end of discovery.
The defendant moved to amend promptly after learning new, materially different facts.
There is no evidence of undue delay, bad faith, or prejudice to the plaintiff.
41- What’s the difference between Rule 41(a) and 41(b) dismissals?
Rule 41(a) allows voluntary dismissal (usually without prejudice), while 41(b) allows involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute or follow rules, typically with prejudice.
Under Temple v. Synthes Corp., a federal court must dismiss an action under Rule 19 if the absent party is a joint tortfeasor whose absence would deprive the court of personal jurisdiction and complete relief cannot be afforded in their absence.
False: Temple v. Synthes, 498 U.S. 5 (1990), held that joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties under Rule 19(a). Even if their absence limits complete relief or personal jurisdiction issues exist, Rule 19(b) does not require dismissal solely because a joint tortfeasor is absent
A plaintiff sues a federal agency for discrimination, alleging only that “Defendant intentionally treated Plaintiff differently due to her race” without naming any specific actions, dates, or actors. If the defendant files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, how should the court analyze it under Ashcroft v. Iqbal?
Answer: The court must apply Iqbal’s two-prong test:
Ignore conclusory statements (“intentionally treated...due to race” is likely conclusory).
Evaluate whether remaining factual allegations plausibly support liability.
Since there are no specific facts about conduct, intent, or actors, the complaint likely fails the plausibility standard and will be dismissed.
How does the notice requirements of (b)(2) and (b)(1) class members reconcile with Mullane?
In (b)(1) and (b)(2), due process is satisfied through adequate representation and the indivisible nature of the relief sought.
Nature of the Interests at Risk:
In (b)(1) and (b)(2), class members often seek structural, forward-looking relief (like ending discriminatory policies), not personal money damages.
Because the interests are shared and indivisible, courts have reasoned that individualized procedures aren’t necessary — the outcome affects everyone the same.
Adequate Representation as a Substitute for Notice:
Courts (relying on Hansberry v. Lee and Shutts) say that due process can be satisfied by ensuring “adequate representation” when notice isn’t practical or required.
Adequate representation becomes the procedural safeguard, particularly where opt-outs are impractical or would undermine uniform relief.
Practicality & Policy:
Requiring individualized notice in large injunctive classes (like prison reform or civil rights suits) would be impractical and possibly harmful to enforcement.
So long as class counsel represents the class vigorously, courts allow limited or no notice.
Nesh (MA) and Sam (DE) are sued in New Hampshire federal court for $500,000 in negligence after one of their commercial drones crashes and injures a bystander. The plaintiff is a citizen of New Hampshire. The drone was manufactured by Holland (MA), who was not named in the suit.
Sam files a third-party complaint against Holland under Rule 14, claiming she is liable for contribution. Holland moves to dismiss, arguing that her inclusion destroys complete diversity. Separately, New Hampshire law requires plaintiffs in product liability suits to file a pre-suit expert affidavit. The plaintiff did not file one, arguing it’s a procedural rule that doesn’t apply in federal court.
Can the federal court exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire case?
Should the court apply New Hampshire’s expert affidavit requirement?
1. Can the federal court exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire case?
Yes, the federal court can exercise jurisdiction. The original action is between a New Hampshire plaintiff and Nesh (MA) and Sam (DE)—there is complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Sam’s Rule 14 impleader of Holland (MA) does not destroy diversity, because third-party claims fall under supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a).
Additionally, § 1367(b) only restricts claims by plaintiffs against parties joined under Rule 14; it does not bar defendants from impleading non-diverse third parties.
Thus, even though Holland shares state citizenship with Nesh, the court retains jurisdiction over both the main and third-party claims.
🔹 2. Should the court apply New Hampshire’s expert affidavit requirement?
Yes, the court should apply the New Hampshire statute under Erie v. Tompkins. The affidavit rule functions as a substantive condition on the plaintiff’s right to bring a product liability claim, rather than a mere procedural formality. Under Guaranty Trust v. York, state rules that are outcome-determinative must be applied in diversity cases.
Here, failure to file the affidavit could result in dismissal under state law, making it clearly outcome-determinative. There is no conflicting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing pre-suit expert requirements, so under Erie and Hanna, the state rule applies.
12(g)(2); 12(h)(1)
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provides that if a pre-answer motion asserting any waivable defense is filed, all waivable defenses must be raised in the same motion.
After asserting a waivable defense in a pre-answer motion, a defendant is not permitted to make another pre-answer motion asserting another waivable defense, or to raise another waivable defense in her answer or in any subsequent filing
A court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim in a diversity case even if it does not meet the amount in controversy requirement.
False: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (the supplemental jurisdiction statute), federal courts may hear claims that are part of the same “case or controversy” under Article III — including compulsory counterclaims, even if those claims do not independently meet the amount in controversy requirement in diversity cases.
Importantly, § 1367(b) limits supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases, but it applies only to claims by plaintiffs, not to defendants asserting counterclaims. So it does not bar jurisdiction over a defendant’s compulsory counterclaim that falls short of the $75,000 amount.
Will a federal court apply a state rule requiring service by a specific in-hand method when an FRCP rule allows service by mail?
No. If the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governs, as in Hanna v. Plumer, the Federal Rule controls.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, the Court fractured on the issue of stream-of-commerce theory. Explain the competing approaches to minimum contacts (including concurrence and dissent) and which, if any, controls after McIntyre.
Asahi and McIntyre reflect an unresolved split on minimum contacts and the stream-of-commerce theory. In Asahi, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion required purposeful direction of products at the forum in order to have minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction, while Justice Brennan’s concurrence would allow jurisdiction if a defendant placed products into the stream of commerce with awareness they could reach the forum.
McIntyre did not resolve this tension; the plurality reiterated O’Connor's requirement of specific targeting of the forum state, but no single rationale commanded a majority, leaving the doctrine unsettled.
The plurality held that the fact that McIntyre targeted the U.S. market does not mean that it availed itself of the New Jersey market specifically. McIntyre did not direct any conduct at New Jersey and had no specific intent to target New Jersey—> it was not enough that it knew it would end up in New Jersey.
The concurrence agreed that there was no precedent that a single isolated sale is enough; even under the stream of commerce idea, it is not enough that one or two machines ended up in New Jersey. However they also left the door open for a stream of commerce idea and Brennan’s opinion in Asahi without committing either test. Under either test, the case fails.
Finally the dissent argued that courts must examine the reasonableness and fairness standard when considering cases like this. They argued that McIntyre was targeting U.S. markets but that it was unfair for them to dodge litigation by using distributors. Under the reasonable and fair standard, it is not fair that McIntyre can’t be brought to account for injuries it caused in New Jersey. Also unfair for plaintiffs because makes it extremely difficult for them to bring suit
In a diversity case, Andre (IL citizen) sues Harrison (MO citizen) in federal court for conversion of her Civ Pro outline and plagiarism of using her pre-writes from the outline on the final exam. Harrison answers Andre’s complaint, conceding the conversion claim, but disputing the plagiarism claim. Harrison, in a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), argues that Andre lacks the evidence to prove his answers on the exam weren’t his own and that it was not plausible, since pre-writes weren’t even on the outline. Harrison then decides to implead a third-party defendant Lucas (also a MO citizen) under 14(a); alleging that it was Lucas’s idea to convert Andre’s outline in the first place and thus, he is a joint-tortfeasor who should also be held liable.
Can Harrison succeed in his Rule 12(b)(6) motion against Andre, and is his impleader of Lucas valid in terms of procedural rules and subject-matter jurisdiction?
Subject-Matter jurisdiction: The federal court likely retains subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire action, including Andre’s third-party claim against Lucas under Rule 14(a), despite Lucas being a NY citizen, because:
The impleader is asserted by the defendant, not the plaintiff.
The claim arises from the same transaction/occurrence (conversion of the outline).
§ 1367(b) does not bar this.
§ 1367(b) bars plaintiffs from using supplemental jurisdiction to defeat diversity. It does NOT bar defendants (like Andre) from impleading non-diverse third parties.
However, same transaction can potentially be disputed under Rule 20(a)
Does having an idea make them necessarily apart of the same transaction or occurrence.
Rule 12(b)(6): Andre’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion should likely be denied unless Ella’s complaint is entirely conclusory. She does not need to prove her claim at this stage—just allege a plausible claim supported by non-conclusory facts.
The court must:
Ignore legal conclusions.
Assess factual allegations for plausibility, drawing inferences in plaintiff’s favor.
Andre’s argument on lack of evidence is premature at this stage; Rule 12(b)(6) is not a summary judgment standard.
The court is assessing whether the allegations—assumed true—state a plausible claim.
If Ella pleads facts such as timing, similarity of responses, or circumstantial access to pre-writes, her claim may survive.
Rule 14(a): Andre’s impleader of Lucas is likely improper because:
He has admitted liability (no indemnity or apportionment left to dispute).
He is using Rule 14 to shift blame, not assert derivative liability.
AmChem case→ “It’s their fault, not mine” isn’t good enough for impleader.