Davenport (1998)
Dream vs. Nightmare
Davenport (1998): Key Executive Decisions
Grainger & McKay (2015)
Aral et al. (2024)
100

What is the “dream” of enterprise systems?

Seamless integration of information and processes across the company (one integrated system / shared data).

100

Who does Davenport say is best equipped to mediate between technology imperatives and business imperatives?

General managers / top management (not IT alone).

100

What is “resistance to change” in ERP implementation?

Pushback from employees/units against new processes and systems that disrupt routines, roles, or control.

100

What does IES stand for?

Integrated Enterprise Systems.

200

According to Davenport, the biggest ERP failures are mainly what type of problems: technical or business?

Business problems (misalignment, organizational/process issues), not primarily technical coding issues.

200

Before implementation, what scope decision does Davenport say managers must make about ERP modules/functions?

Decide whether to implement across all functions or only selected modules appropriate to the business.

200

Why can resistance to ERP be rational?

ERP can genuinely create workload, reduce local fit, slow operations, shift power, or introduce risks—so objections can be reasonable.

200

In this paper, what are the three defining features of an “agile” IES implementation strategy?

Simple (fewer initial modules), quick (faster connection to complementary systems like CRM/SCM), flexible (continued adoption/adding modules over time).

300

What does Davenport mean when he says an enterprise system “imposes its own logic” on a company?

The system forces standardized ways of working and influences strategy, organization, roles, and culture.

300

What is the “commonality vs variability” decision in global ERP rollouts?

Decide what should be standardized across the whole organization vs what should be allowed to vary locally for responsiveness/regulations.

300

Give one example of a practice used in the case to improve implementation success (a “success move”).

Examples include: business simulations before go-live; strong stakeholder kickoff/alignment; relationship/trust-building; reducing customization (“vanilla” approach).

300

What is “module foundation”?

The number/scope of modules implemented at the initial ERP go-live (initial system footprint).

400

Why can ERP push companies toward “generic processes,” and why is that risky?

Vendors embed “best practices” that standardize processes; this can erase unique processes that create competitive advantage.

400

Why does Davenport argue major customization is difficult or impractical, and what does that often force companies to do?

ERP complexity makes major modifications costly and risky; companies often must adapt/rework business processes to fit the system.

400

Why can the same ERP succeed in one unit/country but fail in another?

Differences in local context: stakeholder buy-in, trust, leadership support, readiness, training, politics, and whether local concerns are addressed.

400

What is “sequential connection”?

The timing gap between ERP go-live and when complementary systems (e.g., CRM/SCM) are connected/implemented.


500

What are the two bad outcomes Davenport warns about when “system logic” conflicts with “business logic”?

Either (1) the implementation fails with disruption and wasted money, or (2) it succeeds but weakens competitive advantage and hurts the business.

500

Name two key questions Davenport says leaders should answer before committing to ERP.

  • How will ERP strengthen competitive advantage?

  • How might it erode competitive advantage?

  • What will be the impact on organization and culture?

  • Do we need ERP enterprise-wide or only certain modules?

  • Rollout globally or by region/unit first?

  • What should be common company-wide vs allowed to vary?

500

According to the case dynamics, what happens when local concerns aren’t listened to and implementation feels imposed?

Cooperation breaks down, resistance intensifies, conflict increases, and the rollout becomes much more likely to fail.

500

According to the paper’s logic and findings, what combination is associated with higher returns?

Fewer modules initially, quicker connection to complementary systems, and continued adoption/expansion over time.

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