Civ Pro
A plaintiff, a citizen of Ontario, Canada, sues a defendant, a citizen of State A, on a note for $80,000 in federal court in State A. On what basis does the federal court have subject matter jurisdiction?
A. Diversity of citizenship exists and the amount in controversy is more than $75,000.
B. Federal courts have jurisdiction over all suits involving foreign nationals.
C. The plaintiff consented to jurisdiction by filing suit.
D. The defendant is a citizen of State A.
A.
The federal court has diversity jurisdiction in this case. The diversity statute provides that the federal courts have jurisdiction over civil actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state. . . ." [28 U.S.C. §1332(a)] (B) is an incorrect statement of law. (C) is incorrect. Although the plaintiff has, by filing suit, consented to the court exercising personal jurisdiction over him, he cannot provide the court with subject matter jurisdiction by consent. (D) is incorrect. Here, the citizenship of the defendant is relevant only to determine if diversity exists.
During a football game, a defensive linebacker sacked the other team’s quarterback. After the play, while the officials were lining the ball back up to start the game again, the two players exchanged words and removed their helmets. The quarterback then hit the linebacker in the face with his helmet. Neither player had signed an express consent agreement or express waiver of any sort. Did the quarterback likely commit the tort of battery?
A. No, because the linebacker gave implied consent to physical contact from the other team by playing football.
B. No, because the linebacker sacked the quarterback before the quarterback hit the linebacker.
D.
Answer option D is correct. In the tort-law context, an individual commits battery if the individual: (1) performs an act (2) that is intended to and does bring about (3) physical contact with the victim that is either harmful or offensive. The victim’s valid consent to the contact is an affirmative defense to the tort of battery, even if physical harm resulted from the contact. Valid consent may be either express or implied. Express consent involves an explicit statement of consent to the relevant activity. Consent is implied if the victim makes no express statement consenting to the relevant act, but either: (1) the overall facts and circumstances (especially the victim’s conduct) give a reasonable person in the actor’s position reason to infer the victim’s consent or (2) the law deems consent to have occurred, even if it has not. For example, if the victim knowingly participates in an activity in which physical contact is likely to occur, like contact sports, then the overall facts and circumstances give a reasonable person reason to infer a limited scope of implied consent. Specifically, if the victim participates in playing a contact sport, then the victim’s conduct implies consent to contact that is reasonably and foreseeably incidental to that sport—but only that limited scope of contact.
When courts use the linguistic canons as guides to discern the legislative intent or public meaning of the words, they presume common understandings regarding how people understand written words.
Which of the following is not a presumption that judges make when using linguistic canons?
A. Both the drafter and the interpreter are aware of them, understand them, and correctly use them
B. Legislature carefully considered every word in the statute and included each word for a reason
C. The canons are based on how legal writers are trained to right
D. Legislature thought of and considered every related possibility related to the statute
C
You are a bill. What is the typical order of steps that you must go through to become law?
A. Conference Committee, Referral to one chamber, Introduction to House or Senate, Referral to committees, Back to full House and Senate, President.
B. Referral to committees, Introduction to House or Senate, President, Back to full House and Senate, Referral to one chamber
C. Introduction to House or Senate, Referral to committees, Referral to one chamber, Conference Committee, Back to full House and Senate, President
D.Introduction to House or Senate, President, Back to full House and Senate, Referral to one chamber, Referral to committees
C.
What is the only known bird that can fly backwards?
What are hummingbirds?
A resident of the District of State A properly brought a diversity action in federal court against a resident of the District of State B and a resident of the District of State C for a cause of action that arose from events that occurred in the District of State D. In which judicial districts is venue proper?
A. Only in the District of State B and in the District of State C.
B. Only in the District of State D.
C. Only in the District of State A.
D. In the District of State B, the District of State C, and the District of State D.
B.
Venue is proper only in the District of State D, where the events giving rise to the claim occurred. (A) and (D) are incorrect because venue is not proper in the judicial district of either defendant's residence; the rule states that venue is proper in "a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state." Since the defendants reside in different states, neither of their judicial districts of residence is proper in a single action. (C) is incorrect because State A is not a proper venue because a plaintiff's residence is not a valid basis for fixing venue.
A patient went to a dermatologist to correct acne scarring. During the procedure, while the patient was sedated, the dermatologist decided to remove a large and rather ugly mole from the patient’s face without asking the patient if she wanted the mole removed. The dermatologist assumed that the patient would be pleased, and a reasonable person would have been happy to have the mole removed. However it turned out that the patient liked the mole and, when she recovered from the sedation, she was unhappy to find that the dermatologist had removed it.
If the patient wishes to sue the dermatologist for battery, is she likely to prevail?
B. No, because consent will be implied since the patient was sedated.
C
The patient likely has a valid claim against the dermatologist for battery because, even if it was true that a reasonable person would not have objected to the mole removal, the reasonable person standard only applies to contact that is claimed to be offensive but not harmful. A contact is harmful when it involves a physical injury, and here, where there was a surgical cutting by a doctor, the patient could prove harm because it was done without her consent. While the patient did consent to contact by the dermatologist, it was for the purpose of the acne procedure, and the mole removal exceeded the scope of that consent. Answer option A is incorrect because it is the scope of the plaintiff’s consent—here, the patient’s consent—that is at issue in a battery claim. The issue of what a reasonable person would have consented to under the circumstances is irrelevant, although a plaintiff’s consent is only considered “informed” if the plaintiff received all the information that a reasonable person would want before making the decision. Answer option B is incorrect because, while consent is implied by law in some cases where a plaintiff is unconscious, such cases arise only in emergency situations where there is no time to obtain consent. Here, the removal of the mole is not such an emergency. Answer option D is incorrect because the relevant inquiry on the dermatologist’s intent is whether the dermatologist intended to remove the mole, not whether the dermatologist intended the outcome or circumstance that the patient would be pleased. Such good intentions are irrelevant to the elements of battery.
As a part of a fraternity prank, a fraternity member grabbed a fraternity pledge, forced him into a closet, and locked the closet door. The fraternity member only intended to hold the pledge against his will for about an hour. He did not intend for the pledge to sustain any injuries, although he recognized that the pledge might sustain a few bruises if he tried to force the door open by banging on it or throwing his weight against it. The pledge did briefly bang on the door and try to force the door open, and he pleaded to be released. Unbeknownst to the fraternity member, the pledge suffered from claustrophobia. While in the closet, he had a panic attack, passed out, and hit his head, sustaining a severe concussion. He also experienced post-traumatic stress following the incident. The pledge filed a lawsuit against the fraternity member based on the intentional tort of false imprisonment.
Assuming the fraternity pledge can prevail on the merits of his case against the fraternity member, for which injuries, if any, is the fraternity pledge likely to recover damages?
D
The fraternity member is liable for the bruises, the concussion, and the post-traumatic stress. Assuming the pledge wins the case on the merits, the fraternity member is responsible for all of the injuries he caused to the pledge, even though he did not intend them, and even though some of them occurred due to the particular sensitivities of the pledge, because a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. Therefore, answer options A, B, and C are incorrect.
Judges historically have used 'purpose' in which of the following ways?
A. To resolve ambiguity.
B. To confirm ordinary meaning.
B. To trump ordinary meaning.
D. All of the above.
E. None of the above.
D.
Koalas can sleep for up to __ hours a day.
What is 22?
The plaintiff corporation is incorporated in State A and has its principal place of business in State B. The defendant corporation is incorporated and has its principal place of business in State C. The defendant corporation only does business in State A, State B, State C, and State D, and it has properly registered and/or appointed an agent for service of process only in those states. The cause of action is based on a breach of contract that was to be performed in State D, which has a long arm statute authorizing jurisdiction in such cases. In which of these states may the plaintiff corporation bring its action?
A. In State C only, because that is the only state in which the defendant corporation is "at home."
B. In State D only, because that is where the cause of action arose and is thus the only proper venue.
C. In States A or B only, because those are the only two states in which the plaintiff corporation resides for venue purposes.
D. In States A, B, C, or D, because those states have personal jurisdiction and proper venue.
D.
In a diversity case, the federal court is required to analyze the personal jurisdiction question as if it were a state court sitting in the particular state. General personal jurisdiction (that is, jurisdiction over all causes of action) is generally allowed when the defendant is "at home" in the state or has registered to do business in the state. To be "at home" in a state, a defendant corporation must be incorporated in the state or have its principal place of business in the state. Thus, the defendant corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction is State C (where it is "at home") and States A, B, and D (where it has registered and does significant business). Venue would also be proper in those states because the defendant corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the action in those states. For specific jurisdiction (that is, jurisdiction for the instant cause of action only), it must be determined whether the state has a long arm statute authorizing jurisdiction and whether the statute is constitutional, asking whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the jurisdiction such that the exercise of jurisdiction over him would be fair and reasonable. Here, State D has an applicable long arm statute that authorizes jurisdiction in breach of contract cases where the contract called for performance in the state. This type of provision is an uncontroversial provision that routinely has been held to be constitutional. Thus, specific personal jurisdiction also exists in State D, and venue would be proper both because a substantial part of the cause of action arose in State D and because the defendant corporation resides therein for venue purposes, as explained. (A) is incorrect because, although the defendant corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in State C, it is also subject to specific jurisdiction in the other states, as explained above. (B) is incorrect because venue also may be based on the defendant's residence for venue purposes. (C) is incorrect because venue is based on where the events giving rise to the cause of action took place or where the defendant (not the plaintiff) resides for venue purposes.
A skier invited her friend to vacation with her at her ski chalet. The skier had a fur coat hanging in a closet, and one day, the friend was cold and put the coat on. The friend then went to find the skier to ask permission to wear the coat, but the skier had gone out to run an errand. When the skier returned, she was furious that the friend was wearing the coat, and the friend removed it and returned it to the skier.
If the skier brings an action against the friend for trespass to chattel, is the friend likely to be found liable for this tort?
D. No, because the friend did not dispossess the skier of the coat and did no damage to it.
D.
nswer option D is correct. A person may be found liable for trespass to chattels by intentionally taking an action that either (1) dispossesses another of personal property that the other rightfully possesses, or (2) meddles with such property, but in this case usually only if the meddling results in actual harm to a legally protected interest of the rightful possessor (such as impairing the property’s usefulness or value; or depriving the rightful possessor of the use of the property for a substantial time). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (1965) provides that a trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another. Section 218, however, goes on to state that a person can only be liable to the possessor of chattel for a commission of trespass to chattels where (a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel; (b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value; (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time; or (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest. Here, the friend wore the coat only for a short time, never took it out of the skier’s chalet, and returned it to the skier when she returned from her errand. This use of the coat is unlikely to amount to the kind of dominion and control over a chattel that is found in either a dispossession or a deprivation of the use of the coat for a substantial time. Furthermore, although the friend did intermeddle with the skier’s rights, there is no indication in the facts that the coat was damaged or otherwise impaired in its condition, quality or value. Accordingly, answer option D is correct. Answer option A is incorrect because an intention to simply intermeddle, without meeting the other elements of the tort, does not suffice to impose liability on the friend. Answer option B is incorrect because even though it is true that the use of the coat was unprivileged, this is not enough, in itself, to give rise to liability where, as here, there was no dispossession, substantial deprivation of the rightful possessor’s use, or impairment to the coat. Finally, answer option C is incorrect because the intent required for trespass to chattels is not the intent to steal or damage the property, but the intent to use the property in some way that results in a dispossession or interference with the owner’s rights. Indeed trespass to chattels may be found where a defendant mistakenly thought that the property was his own. Nevertheless, as stated above, an intentional intermeddling, without more, does not render the friend liable.
A court has the power to exercise jurisdiction over property that is located within its borders and to enter an order that binds everyone in the world with respect to the future disposition of that property.
What is this type of jurisdiction called?
What is In Rem?
The linguistic canon that identifies the statutory material that judges can legitimately look at to discern meaning, including the entire act and other statues with similar purposes, is known as:
A. Ejusdem Generis
B. In Pari Materia
C. Expressio Unius Est Exlusio Alterius
D. Stare Decisis
B.
_________ were first invented for childbirth.
What are chainsaws?
It was developed in Scotland in the late 18th Century to help aid and speed up the process of symphysiotomy (widening the pubic cartilage) and removal of disease-laden bone during childbirth. It wasn’t until the start of the 20th Century that we started using chainsaws for woodchopping.
Three years ago a woman’s husband abandoned her and their home in State A and moved to State B, where he is now a citizen. The woman now files against her husband for divorce in federal court in State A, seeking a property settlement valued at $200,000. The husband moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Will the court grant the husband’s motion?
A. No, because diversity of citizenship is present and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
B. No, if State A has a long arm statute granting personal jurisdiction over the husband.
C. Yes, if the husband moves to State A after suit is filed.
D. Yes, because federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over domestic relations cases.
D. The court will grant the husband’s motion. Even if diversity and the minimum amount in controversy are present, the federal district courts will not exercise jurisdiction over domestic relations or probate proceedings. For this reason, (A) is incorrect. (B) is incorrect because, even if State A has a statute granting personal jurisdiction over the husband, that statute would not confer subject matterjurisdiction over the case. (C) is incorrect. Citizenship is determined at the time suit is filed; thus, the husband is a citizen of State B.
A woman loaned her car to a friend to use for a few days while his car was in the shop for repairs. When the friend’s car was repaired, he let his neighbor borrow the woman’s car instead of returning it to the woman. Without telling the friend, the neighbor took the woman’s car on a cross-country road trip. The day after the neighbor left for the trip, the woman discovered that the friend had gotten his car repaired and asked him for her car back. She was furious when he told her that he had lent the car to his neighbor. The neighbor eventually returned the car to the friend, who then attempted to return the car to the woman. The woman refused to accept the car even though it was undamaged, and sued the friend for conversion of the car.
Which of the following would be the most likely result of this suit?
A. The woman will not recover for conversion.
B. The woman cannot recover for conversion, but can recover for trespass to chattel.
C. The woman will recover the rental value of the car for the 900-mile trip.
D. The woman will recover the fair market value of the car from the friend.
D.
The woman most likely will recover the fair market value of the car. The tort of conversion does not require that the defendant damage the chattel or permanently deprive the owner of the chattel. All that is required is that defendant’s volitional conduct result in a serious invasion of the chattel interest of another in some manner. In this case the friend could be considered the bailee of the woman’s car. A bailee is liable to the owner for conversion if the bailee uses the chattel in such a manner as to constitute a material breach of the bailment agreement. A substantial interference with the woman’s possession, such as is shown by the facts in this question, would constitute a material breach. Hence (A) and (B) are wrong, because the woman could recover for conversion, and (D) is correct rather than (C) because (D) states the correct measure of damages.
A parent took her seventeen-year-old daughter to the doctor for a physical before starting college. While the parent was out of the room, the doctor asked the daughter if she was up to date on all her immunizations. The daughter said she still needed one booster shot, which the college she planned to attend required. The daughter signed a consent form that fully described the risks posed by the booster shot, including the risk of an adverse allergic reaction. The doctor then injected the shot. The daughter suffered a severe allergic reaction to the shot. The parent consulted an attorney about bringing an action for the tort of battery against the doctor.
Does the doctor likely have a valid consent defense to a claim for the tort of battery?
A Yes, because the daughter signed a consent form that fully described the risks of the shot.
D.
The tort of battery arises if the actor intentionally inflicts harmful or offensive physical contact on the victim. Battery is intentional, in turn, if either (1) the actor’s conscious object is to inflict harmful or offensive contact or (2) the actor is substantially certain that her actions will cause such contact, even if that contact is not her conscious objective.
A battery victim’s valid consent operates as an affirmative defense to battery, even if physical harm resulted from the contact. Valid consent may be either express or implied. Express consent involves an explicit statement that the victim agrees, or consents, to the defendant’s activity. The consent must be: (1) informed; (2) voluntary; and (3) given by a person with the legal capacity to consent.
First, consent is informed if the victim knows everything a reasonable person would need or want to know in order to make an informed decision about whether to give consent—including the nature of the risk and the type of harm the victim might suffer. Second, consent is voluntary if it is a product of the victim’s volition, procured without duress, coercion, or undue influence—but not necessarily free from pressure or persuasion.
Third, consent must be given by a person with the legal capacity to consent. Minors and incompetents cannot usually give valid consent, nor arguably can those who are under the influence of drugs that significantly affect their capacity to make critical judgments. Some jurisdictions permit older minors, such as those around 16 or 17 years old, to make their own medical decisions without input from their parents. Very young minors, though, need their parents’ consent for medical procedures such as the vaccination here.
What factors approach would a functionalist judge use?
A. Balancing the type of power being exercised with the power the branch has been assigned
B. Balancing the competing power interest of the branch with the pragmatic need for innovation
C. Balancing the pragmatic need for innovation with the power the branch has been assigned
D. Balancing the competing power interest with what the Constitution regards as the function of the branch
B.
What are the four categories of taste?
sweet, sour, salty, and bitter
A homeowner hired an out-of-state artist to design a chandelier for his home. When the chandelier later shattered and injured the homeowner, the homeowner sued the artist in state court in the homeowner’s state. The artist moved for dismissal, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her.
Assuming that the court has already decided that there is a statute in the forum state that provides a valid basis for jurisdiction over the artist, which of the following best describes an additional issue that the court must address to rule on the artist’s motion, if anything?
C. Whether requiring the artist to defend the lawsuit in the forum state would infringe on her federal due process rights.
C.
To rule on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court engages in a two-part analysis. First, the court looks to the laws of the forum state to determine whether there is a statutory basis for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Second, the court must decide whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a manner consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state such that it would be fair to force the defendant to defend a lawsuit there. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This standard has become known as the minimum-contacts test.
Here, the court has already completed the first part of the analysis: the statutory question. Therefore, the remaining issue before the court is whether requiring the artist to defend the lawsuit in the homeowner’s state would be in keeping with the artist’s due process rights.
Answer option A is incorrect because it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, who has the burden of proving the defendant’s minimum contacts.
Answer option B is incorrect because the court examines the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not the defendant’s contacts with the plaintiff.
Answer option D is incorrect because the statutory finding, by itself, is not enough. A statutory basis for personal jurisdiction is only the first part of the process. Any exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must also comply with the federal constitutional requirements set out in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This means the court must also apply the minimum-contacts test.
A cyclist was riding on a sidewalk when someone in a parked car suddenly opened the door of the car into her path. She swerved to avoid the car door and rode onto a landowner’s property, damaging some plastic lawn ornaments of waterfowl placed in his front yard.
In a suit by the landowner against the cyclist for the damage to his lawn ornaments, what is the likely result?
A. The cyclist is liable because she had no privilege to enter onto the landowner’s property.
B. Whether the cyclist is liable depends on whether she was exercising due care.Whether the cyclist is liable depends on whether she was exercising due care.
C. The cyclist is liable for the damage to the lawn ornaments even though her entry was privileged.
D. The cyclist is not liable for the damage to the lawn ornaments because her entry was privileged.
C
The cyclist is liable for damage to the lawn ornaments even though she had a privilege to enter the landowner’s yard. Pursuant to the privilege of necessity, a person may interfere with property of another where it is reasonably and apparently necessary to avoid threatened injury from a natural or other force and where the threatened injury is substantially more serious than the invasion that seeks to avert it. In cases of private necessity (where the act is solely to benefit a limited number of people rather than the public as a whole) the defense is qualified, so that the actor must pay for any injury she causes. The cyclist was faced with serious injury from being struck by the car door opening. Apparently the only way to avoid this injury was to swerve onto the landowner’s yard. The threatened injury to the cyclist was substantially more serious than the cyclist’s entry onto the landowner’s yard. Thus, the cyclist was privileged to enter the yard. However, because this is a private necessity situation, she will be required to pay for the damage she caused to the lawn ornaments. (A) correctly states that the cyclist is liable for the damage, but incorrectly states that she was not privileged to enter upon the landowner’s land. On the other hand, (D) is incorrect because it concludes that the cyclist’s privilege absolves her of liability for the damage she caused, which is not true in private necessity cases. (B) is incorrect because the cyclist’s exercise of due care is irrelevant. The landowner will be proceeding against the cyclist on a theory of intentional tort (either trespass or conversion). Due care is a concept that is applicable to a negligence action, but is not relevant to an action sounding in intentional tort. Therefore, the cyclist’s liability is unaffected by whether she was exercising due care.
Assume that the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet rendered the Erie decision. An Arizona man was injured by an air conditioning unit. The man filed a diversity action against the unit’s manufacturer in federal court in Texas. Under Texas choice-of-law rules, Texas law would apply to the case since the manufacturer’s headquarters were in Texas. A Texas statute spoke directly to an important issue in the case, but there was no controlling federal statute or constitutional law.
What law should the court use in deciding the issue?
What is Texas Law?
Even before Erie, federal courts would follow a state statute concerning an issue if no federal statute or constitutional law controlled. See Wright, et. al., 19 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. Section 4502 (2d ed.). Here, since Texas law has a statute directly on point, the federal court would follow that statute
A state statute, enacted to protect children at pools during the summer, provides that "children cannot be left unattended on floats in a recreational area."
What would a purposivist likely focus on when interpreting the statutory language?
A. A purposivist would look only at the text, as a way to promote more careful drafting by the legislature.
B. Like Justice Scalia, a purposivist would look primarily at the intent of the original drafters.
C. By going beyond the text, a purposivist would seek to further the purpose of the statute, which is to protect children from drowning.
D. Whether porpoises are also entitled to be in the area.
C.
Humans spend approximately __ years of their lives dreaming
What is 6?