Competency
Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960)
Having a basic knowledge of one’s charges is NOT sufficient for competency to stand trial
“whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he had a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)
Indigent defendants are guaranteed psychiatric assistance under the Sixth Amendment for the purpose of an insanity defense, or for mitigating circumstances in a capital case
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010)
Silence does not imply someone is invoking their Miranda rights, and such an invocation must be made unambiguously
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)
“Clear and convincing” IS the burden of proof for civil commitment
Coble v. Texas, 330 S.W.3d 254 (2010)
Expert testimony on violence risk assessment CAN be reliable; however, experts who testify regarding VRA must be prepared to provide evidence that such testimony meets Daubert standards of admissibility (i.e., prepared to discuss research, base rates, etc.)
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996)
Preponderance of the evidence IS the appropriate standard for determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial
American Law Institute Model Penal Code 1962
A standard for legal insanity that serves as a compromise between the strict M'Naghten Rule
Under the MPC standard, a defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct "if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
Convictions obtained through brutality and violence are INCONSISTENT with the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966)
Individuals being released from prison CANNOT be civilly committed without a jury determination of commitment
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)
Psychiatric experts CAN testify to predictions of future dangerousness, which is considered relevant evidence for sentencing hearings. The expert need not rely on personal examination and can instead provide responses to hypothetical questions.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)
A judge SHOULD interrupt criminal proceedings if a defendant appears to be incompetent
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006)
A defendant does NOT have a 14th Amendment due process right to present expert evidence about his mental state, outside of an insanity plea, to counter the prosecution’s evidence of criminal intent.
Colorado v. Connelly, 497 U.S. 157 (1986)
To find a confession involuntary, there needs to be coercive police activity (it is required)
Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F. 2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976)
A constitutional right to privacy DOES NOT afford absolute constitutional protection for psychotherapist-patient communication
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002)
The ruling in Kansas v. Hendricks DOES NOT require the state to prove that a dangerous individual is completely unable to control their behavior.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)
Information gathered as part of a pretrial psychiatric evaluation is NOT admissible during sentencing
Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
M’Naghten Rule is too narrow, and modern criteria should[DF1] also adopt whether or not the criminal act was the product of a mental disease or defect.
Also shifts the burden to the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)
The Constitution permits evidence on the conditions under which a confession is obtained (think totality of the circumstances)
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (1972)
A physician CAN be held liable for malpractice if they fail to disclose rare but severe risks inherent in a medical procedure
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
The procedure for civil commitment established by the Kansas SVP Act DOES NOT violate principles of due process, double jeopardy, or ex post facto.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
A defendant CANNOT be committed indefinitely if they are found incompetent to proceed and unrestorable
Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (1976)
Insanity defendants CANNOT preclude prosecution from calling expert witnesses who may have been retained by the defense.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)
Miranda and its children govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts (NOT the standard of “voluntary”) – Miranda is a constitutionally-supported right against coerced self-incrimination
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)
Prisoners DO have a constitutional right to treatment
Lipari v. Sears Roebuck, 497 F.Supp. 185 (1980)
Psychiatrists’ s duty to protect third parties DOES extend to foreseeable, but unidentified, third parties. (Duty to warn + duty to protect -> duty to warn and possibly civilly commit someone)