Domestic Constraints & Public Opinion
This level of analysis looks inside the state rather than at the international system to explain foreign policy behavior.
The Second Image
This decision-making model is associated with the phrase "one actor, one decision, one goal."
Rational Policy Model
This is the term for the cognitive shortcuts leaders use to process complex info under time pressure and uncertainty.
Heuristics
This is the core empirical finding of the democratic peace.
Democracies rarely go to war with EACH OTHER.
*Note - not that democracies are more peaceful. They fight plenty - but they fight autocracies!
This is the most constrained authoritarian regime type.
Machine
This short-term surge in public approval for leaders at the onset of a crisis gives executives maximum political autonomy, but rarely lasts.
Rally around the flag effect
This phrase is associated with the bureaucratic politics model that captures how an actor's institutional position shapes their policy preferences.
"Where you stand depends on where you sit."
This bias causes leaders to take bigger risks when they feel they are losing than when they feel they are winning.
Prospect theory
Name the two main explanations for why the democratic peace holds.
1. Normative - shared norms of peaceful conflict resolution, shared values
2. Structural - democratic institutions slow the path to war
Name the two dimensions that define our authoritarian regime typology
Personalist/non-personalist (how constrained the leader is)
And civilian / military
The Almond-Lippmann consensus made three (3) core claims about public opinion. Name them.
1. It is volatile/mood-driven
2. It lacks structure/coherence
3. It has little to no actual impact on foreign policy
This is the core reason why two leaders who both prefer cooperation can still fail to reach an agreement.
Their win-sets do not overlap -- domestic constraints make the deal politically impossible for one or both to pass at home.
A policymaker assumes a rival state is moving troops to the border because they are inherently aggressive. Which cognitive bias is this?
Fundamental attribution error
Attributing behavior to character rather than circumstances - makes compromise harder, escalation risk increases.
Democracy promotion can take many forms. Give at least two (2) examples of tools states use to promote democracy abroad.
Soft: election monitoring, funding civil society, training judges/lawyers
Middle: conditional aid tied to democratic reforms
Hard: sanctions, regime change by military force
This is the key distinction between national security and regime security
National security = protecting the country
Regime security = protecting the leader and the system that keeps them in power
Leaders and media can shape public willingness to support military action through how they describe a situation or adversary. What is this called and give a real-world example.
Framing - the way an adversary/situation is characterized influences whether the public sees military action as justified or necessary.
Examples - describing leader as 'brutal dictator', framing conflict as humanitarian crisis, etc. MANY examples!
The organizational process model argues that govts don't start from scratch when a crisis hits. What do they do instead and why does it matter?
They default to existing SOPs and institutional routines.
Limits flexibility - available options shaped by what orgs are already prepared to do, not just what leaders prefer.
Define availability bias and give a real-world example.
Judging probability based on how easily examples come to mind. Vivid, recent events dominate risk perception.
Ex. post-9/11 terrorist threat perception / many others!
A country just held its first democratic election but has no independent courts, no free press, and weak political institutions. What might we predict about this country's behavior in the near term?
Likely to be more conflict-prone
Transitioning democracies are more war-prone due to weak institutions, rising nationalism, leaders who may use conflict to drum up domestic support.
In non-personalist regimes, what functions as a check on reckless foreign policy that personalist regimes lack?
Elites who bear real costs of failures can push back on or remove the leader. People who can tell the leader NO.
The rational public thesis directly challenges the Almond-Lippmann consensus. What is the core argument and what real-world evidence supports it?
The public does not need to be experts - they use heuristics to respond to real-world signals.
Evidence: Vietnam War/other wars - support declines gradually, in proportion to rising costs and casualties.
Not wild, irrational swings.
Using the bureaucratic politics model, how would we explain Kennedy's decision to blockade rather than airstrike during the Cuban Missile Crisis?
Blockade was negotiated compromise.
Key advisers had very different perspectives based on their institutional positions, outcome reflected bargaining among them, not a single strategic calculation.
Individual leader psychology matters more in some situations than others. Under what conditions do a leader's personal biases and perceptions have the greatest influence on foreign policy outcomes? Name at least 2.
When institutional constraints are weakest - authority is highly centralized
Crisis conditions
Unfamiliar events
Ambiguous/uncertain information - perception fills in the gaps.
Kant anticipated the democratic peace over 200 years ago. What three (3) conditions did he argue were necessary for lasting peace?
1. Republican governance with constitutional constraints
2. A voluntary federation of republics
3. Universal rights for individuals regardless of where they are from
Using at least one historical example, explain why external pressure often backfires when used against personalist leaders pursuing nuclear weapons.
It reinforces the regime security logic. Confirms that without deterrence, the leader is vulnerable to removal. Ex. Gaddafi, North Korea.