Main Conclusions
What are Nisbett and Wilson’s "three main conclusions"? How do they argue for each of these in their paper?
1. Subjects very often cannot report accurately on the effects of stimuli on higher-order inference based responses.
2. When reporting on the effects of stimuli, subjects typically do not interrogate their memories of their cognitive processes. Instead, they base their reports on implicit a priori theories about the causal connection between stimulus and response.
3. Subjective reports about higher mental processes are sometimes correct, but even when correct, this is not due to direct introspective awareness. Instead, it is due to the accidental correct employment of a prior causal theory.
What is the thesis of first-person authority with respect to experience? Belief? Mental processes? Memory? Justification of our beliefs? Rational choice?
First-person authority is the idea that individuals have privileged, authoritative access to their own mental states—what they believe, feel, or intend. It underpins epistemic models where introspection provides immediate, non-inferential justification for self-ascriptions of belief or thought.
On Nisbett and Wilson's account, how do we in fact answer questions like: “Why did you vote republican?” (or most any other question about our mental processes, motivations for decision, etc.)? Why are our answers often wrong? Why are our answers sometimes right?
According to Nisbett and Wilson, we answer such “why” questions by inferring plausible causes from cultural theories, social norms, or salient features of the situation—not by accessing actual mental processes.
Our answers are often wrong because the true causes are unconscious and inaccessible.
They are sometimes right when the inferred explanation happens to match the real causal process—typically in simple, conscious decisions or when introspection concerns directly accessible experiences (e.g., “I felt angry”).
Describe one of the experiments that involves cognitive dissonance and how it works in the experiment.
Festinger & Carlsmith (1959): Participants performed a boring task, then were paid $1 or $20 to say it was fun. Those paid $1 later reported enjoying it more—reducing dissonance between lying and low reward by changing their attitude. Illustrates rationalization of inconsistent cognitions.
What implications would their first main conclusion have for empirical psychology and the social sciences more generally if it is true? What might be the implications for knowledge as true justified belief? What might be the implications for rational choice?
If introspection is unreliable, then self-reports (a key data source in psychology) are epistemically weak. Knowledge based on introspection isn’t “justified” in the epistemic sense, undermining classical accounts of rational choice and belief formation. It suggests that rational agents may not have transparent access to their own reasons, complicating models of decision-making and self-knowledge.
What are the implication of Nisbett's and Wilson's argument for first-person authority? What specifically does the Maier (1931) experiment tell us about first-person authority with respect to the processes of problem solving?
Their findings challenge first-person authority, showing that people can be mistaken about their own mental causes. The Maier experiment demonstrates unconscious problem-solving—participants used environmental cues (swinging rope) without awareness. Thus, people often rationalize behavior guided by nonconscious cues.
What does it mean when Nisbett and Wilson claim that we are unaware of our mental processes and unaware that we are unaware? Give at least five concrete examples of each of these two phenomena from the experiments we have considered.
It means we lack introspective access to how our thoughts and actions are produced, and we mistakenly believe we do have such access—a “double ignorance.”
Examples:
Maier (1931): Subjects solved the rope problem after an unconscious cue but denied being influenced.
Nisbett & Schachter (1966): Participants misattributed shock tolerance to a placebo pill.
Ocean–Moon–Tide (1977): Priming by words affected detergent choice, but people denied any influence.
Nightgowns/Stockings (1977): Chose rightmost item due to position, claimed “better quality.”
Latane & Darley (1970): Bystanders denied situational effects on helping behavior.
Describe one experiment that Nisbett and Wilson discuss that involves confabulation and explain the sense it which it does.
Nightgowns/Stockings Study: Participants chose rightmost item due to position bias but confabulated reasons like “quality” or “color.” Shows that people create causal explanations inconsistent with actual influences—classic confabulation.
Describe each of the following experiments and the conclusions that Nisbett and Wilson draw from it: (a) Bem and McConnell (1970), (b) Goethals and Reckman (1973), (c) Nisbett and Schachter (1966), (d) Maier (1931), (e) Latane and Darley (1970), (f) Nisbett and Wilson Ocean-Moon Tide Experiment (1977), and (g) Nisbett and Wilson Nightgowns and Stockings Experiment (1977).
Bem & McConnell (1970): Attitude change following counterattitudinal essay writing—participants unaware of dissonance’s role.
Goethals & Reckman (1973): Busing.
Nisbett & Schachter (1966): Participants attributed reduced shock pain to a placebo pill.
Maier (1931): Problem-solving insights influenced unconsciously by experimenter’s hints; subjects unaware of cue’s influence.
Latane & Darley (1970): Diffusion of responsibility in emergencies—participants unaware of situational inhibition of helping.
Ocean–Moon–Tide: Word priming influenced detergent choice; participants denied the influence.
Nightgowns/Stockings: Participants showed right-side bias but justified choice with quality differences.
Each shows that people invent plausible explanations inconsistent with actual causal determinants.
Did Descartes rely on first-person authority in any of his conclusions? Explain. Did Hume? Explain.
Descartes: Yes—his cogito (“I think, therefore I am”) assumes infallible introspective awareness of thought.
Hume: Partially; though he used introspection to study the mind, he emphasized that introspection reveals only fleeting impressions, not enduring selves—undermining absolute first-person authority.
Do you believe that the evidence presented by Nisbett and Wilson allows for a convincing argument that we do not know how our beliefs and values are formed? Explain. If they are right, what might this mean for rational justification and choice?
Yes. The evidence consistently shows that our beliefs and values are shaped by unconscious factors we can’t report.
If that’s true, rational justification and choice become limited—we may act and reason based on hidden influences while sincerely believing our choices are fully rational or self-determined.
How is confabulation connected to the sort of misattributions of the causes of our mental states discussed by Wilson and by Nisbett?
Both involve fabricating plausible explanations for behavior or feeling when true causes are inaccessible. Confabulation is the verbal expression of such misattribution—believing one’s own explanatory fiction.
Do you believe that such experiments justify Nisbett's and Wilson's conclusions? Explain.
Yes, the breadth and consistency of evidence across domains (perception, decision, problem-solving) make a compelling case that verbal reports about cognitive causes are often unreliable. However, they may overgeneralize—people can accurately introspect some experiences (e.g., pain intensity, imagery). Thus, the conclusion should be qualified: introspection is limited, not wholly invalid.
What features of Hume's psychology might be rendered problematic by experimental findings we have considered? Explain
Hume’s introspective “science of mind” assumes accurate introspection of impressions and associations. Experimental findings undermine this by showing that mental causation and inference are often opaque—suggesting Hume’s method rests on unreliable access to mental mechanisms.
Why don't people know that they are confabulating when they are?
Because confabulation feels introspectively genuine. The cognitive system automatically produces coherent self-narratives, and there’s no internal feedback mechanism indicating inaccuracy.
How might the phenomena of optical illusions, change blindness, basketball/moon-walking bear, memory inflation and distortion, reports of cell phone use, and the phenomena of choice blindness and choice blindness blindness provide Nisbett and Wilson with a further evidence in support of their conclusions?
These phenomena demonstrate that perceptual and cognitive processes can be systematically misleading. People confidently report perceptions or memories that contradict objective reality, showing that awareness of internal processes is constructed and fallible. Such illusions reinforce the idea that self-knowledge is often inferential rather than directly introspective.
Why might the violation of first-person authority pose a problem for our having knowledge at all (as true rationally justified belief)?
If we can’t reliably know our own beliefs or reasons, then justification for belief may collapse. Knowledge requires awareness of grounds for belief; if those grounds are inaccessible or confabulated, rational justification becomes unstable.