Dual Process Theory
What are Kahneman and Tversky's System 1 and System 2? Compare and contrast the two systems.
System 1 is fast, automatic, intuitive, and emotional; it operates unconsciously and is responsible for quick judgments.
System 2 is slow, deliberate, logical, and analytical; it requires conscious effort and attention.
While System 1 handles everyday intuitive decisions efficiently, System 2 monitors and sometimes corrects System 1’s errors when more reasoning is needed.
Explain the availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment heuristics. Give an example of each.
Availability: Judging likelihood by how easily examples come to mind (e.g., fearing plane crashes because they’re memorable).
Representativeness: Judging probability by similarity to a stereotype (e.g., assuming a quiet person is a librarian).
Anchoring & Adjustment: Relying too heavily on an initial value when making estimates (e.g., guessing a product’s price based on the first number seen).
Explain the difference between the moral rationalism Haidt criticizes and the social intuitionism he defends.
Moral rationalism claims moral judgments stem from conscious reasoning. Haidt’s social intuitionism argues they arise first from quick, automatic intuitions, and reasoning mainly serves to justify those intuitions socially after the fact.
What is “The Action Problem” — for whom is it supposed to be a problem and why?
The Action Problem questions how moral reasoning leads to moral action. It’s a problem for rationalists, because if reasoning alone drives morality, why do people often fail to act on moral principles? Haidt argues emotions better explain moral motivation.
In what sense does Haidt argue that our moral intuitions are both innate and enculturated?
They’re innate in that humans possess evolved emotional foundations for morality (e.g., fairness, care, loyalty). They’re enculturated because each culture shapes, emphasizes, or interprets these foundations differently through social learning.
Give at least two examples where we use each system.
System 1: Instinctively braking when a ball rolls into the street; quickly judging someone’s emotion by their facial expression.
System 2: Solving a complex math problem, comparing loan interest rates, or planning a vacation budget.
Which system uses such heuristics? How might they mislead us?
Heuristics are products of System 1. They simplify decision-making but can lead to systematic biases, such as overestimating risks, ignoring base rates, or being influenced by irrelevant information.
What is “social” about social intuitionism and what is “intuitionist” about it?
It’s social because moral reasoning occurs through interpersonal dialogue, persuasion, and reputation management.
It’s intuitionist because the core of moral judgment arises from gut feelings rather than deliberate reasoning.
How does Haidt use recent findings regarding psychopaths to support his claim that moral emotions better explain moral behavior than moral reasoning does?
Psychopaths often have normal reasoning but lack moral emotions like empathy and guilt. Their moral deficits suggest that emotion, not reasoning, is crucial for moral behavior, supporting Haidt’s intuitionist stance.
Describe at least one of the “three related processes by which cultures modify, enhance, or suppress the emergence of moral intuitions”, according to Haidt.
Example: Cultural Learning — societies teach moral norms through stories, rituals, and reinforcement, which can amplify or dampen innate moral intuitions (e.g., collectivist cultures emphasizing loyalty and respect over individual fairness).
What kind of system is Humean custom? Why?
Humean custom is a System 1 process. It relies on habitual, automatic associations formed through experience rather than conscious reasoning. Hume argued that much of human belief and action stems from custom and sentiment, not rational deduction.
Is System 1 always unreliable? Explain.
No. System 1 is efficient and adaptive in familiar contexts where quick judgments are advantageous. It becomes unreliable mainly in unfamiliar, abstract, or statistical problems where intuition can conflict with logic.
Use an example to describe the phenomenon of “moral dumbfounding” and explain how Haidt thinks it supports intuitionism over rationalism. How is such dumbfounding similar to and/or different from the phenomenon of confabulation?
Example: People often judge consensual incest as wrong but struggle to explain why. This “moral dumbfounding” shows that moral judgments are driven by emotion-based intuitions, not conscious reasoning, which is often post-hoc.
Moral dumbfounding and confabulation are parallel psychological phenomena: both expose the limits of conscious reasoning and the dominance of intuitive or unconscious processes.
However, moral dumbfounding is typically emotion-driven and moral-specific, while confabulation is a general cognitive phenomenon of creating false but sincere explanations for one’s own behavior or thoughts.
Using an example, describe at least one way in which Haidt claims that his social intuitionism is “more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology”.
For instance, studies in neuroscience show moral judgment activates emotional brain regions (amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex), aligning with Haidt’s model. Rationalist theories can’t easily explain this emotional primacy.
How do evolutionary and cultural explanations of moral intuition complement each other?
Evolution provides universal moral foundations shaped by natural selection, while culture fine-tunes and diversifies them, allowing flexible adaptation to social environments.
Which kind of system is involved Humean judgments concerning the relations of ideas?
Those judgments involve System 2, since reasoning about relations of ideas—such as mathematics or logic—requires deliberate, analytical thought and conscious reflection.
Why is it wise to worry about the unreliability of System 1?
Because we often trust our intuitions even when they’re biased or wrong. Being aware of System 1’s limitations helps prevent overconfidence, stereotyping, and reasoning errors in high-stakes or complex decisions.
Does Haidt think moral reasoning is entirely impotent? Explain.
No. Haidt argues reasoning can influence judgments, but usually indirectly—by triggering new intuitions through social interaction, dialogue, or reflection, rather than through detached logic.
Explain how and why Haidt thinks his own social intuitionism is ultimately able to integrate and unify both the rationalist and sentimentalist traditions.
Haidt sees intuitionism as bridging both: emotions drive moral judgment (sentimentalism), but reasoning refines and communicates those judgments (rationalism). Together they form an interactive system rather than opposing forces.
How does Haidt’s model explain moral diversity across societies?
Different cultures prioritize distinct moral foundations (e.g., purity vs. fairness). These variations emerge from cultural narratives shaping which innate intuitions are expressed most strongly.
In what ways might System 1 and System 2 interact dynamically rather than operating independently?
System 1 often generates initial impressions or intuitions, which System 2 can endorse, modify, or override. In practice, they interact continuously: System 1 provides efficiency, while System 2 provides accuracy and correction when needed. Most real-world judgments involve both systems operating together.
Why can System 2 never fully protect us from the unreliable nature of System 1?
System 2 is limited in capacity, slow, and often lazy. It tends to accept intuitive judgments unless explicitly motivated to intervene. Because most judgments occur automatically, System 1’s influence can’t be fully eliminated—only monitored or mitigated.
In what sense is Haidt minimizing the influence or relevance of moral reasoning for moral judgment?
He minimizes reasoning’s causal role—it rarely produces judgments on its own—but acknowledges its social role in persuasion and group coordination. Moral reasoning serves communication more than discovery of moral truth.
How might Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model be interpreted through the lens of Dual Process Theory? Does it rely on System 1 and System 2 distinctions, or does it go beyond them?
Haidt’s model aligns closely with Dual Process Theory: moral intuitions correspond to System 1 (automatic, affective), and moral reasoning corresponds to System 2 (controlled, reflective). However, Haidt goes further by emphasizing that reasoning is often socially motivated and post hoc, not just a slow corrective process. Thus, the SIM extends dual-process ideas into the moral and social domains.
What implications does Haidt’s dual view of biology and culture have for moral education or policy?
It suggests moral education should engage emotional intuitions, not just reasoning, and respect cultural pluralism while building shared moral understanding across diverse moral foundations.