Amphib Fundamentals
Organization/C2
Intel/Log/Fires
in Amphib Ops
Amphib Planning
Amphib Concepts/Maritime Operating Environment
100

This failed amphibious assault in WWI highlighted many challenges such as the
-lack of doctrine or training;
-dealing with naval mines;
-difficulty in achieving surprise;
-Command and Control/Integration.

Gallipoli

100

An amphibious force formed for a specific mission is codified in this document.

Initiating Directive

100

An intelligence challenge specifically related to the nature of amphibious operations is _____(ID one of the nine challenges)

Limited assets in planning; Initial reliance on National and Theater assets; Multiple/distinct intel staffs; more dimensions to consider; collection impacts on surprise; dispersion of intel staffs; connectivity & bandwidth; transition of intel ashore; diminished Amphib Recon capabilities.

100

CATF and CLF are coequal for planning. Any differences between commanders that cannot be resolved are referred to ______. 

Common superior

100

Future military operations are expected to largely be conducted in those land and sea areas that are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea, known as the ________.

Littorals

200

Marine visionary between the world wars who sought to resolve challenges for amphib ops.

Major "Pete" Ellis, USMC

200

This force, drawn from within the AF and other supporting elements, typically precedes the AF to conduct necessary pre-assault actions and is usually disestablished upon arrive of the AF in the AOA.

Amphibious Advanced Force

200

Fires personnel from the ATF and LF jointly operate this afloat agency/organization to plan, coordinate and control supporting fires during amphibious operations.

SACC

200

Planning that simultaneously takes place in multiple levels of a chain of command is known as _____ Planning.

Concurrent 

200

Adversary strategies for defending against an amphibious assault could take the form of a Naval Defense, a Ground Defense at the Water's Edge, or this land based approach.

Mobile Ground Defense

300

Limited effectiveness against a well-entrenched enemy and lack of accurate hydrographic information were key lessons learned from this early WWII amphib assault.

Tarawa (Betio)

300

Regardless of the selected command relationship between CATF and CLF in execution, doctrinally they are _____ in planning.

Coequal

300

As ground-based fires assets are not typically available to support the landing force's ship to shore movement, heavy reliance is typically placed on ____ and ____ capabilites.

OAS 

NSFS

300

The landing plan for an amphibious operation is tightly coupled and requires a high degree of ______ planning.

Detailed

300

Managing this in the Emerging Maritime Operating Environment will be critical in dealing with the idea that “To be detected is to be targeted is to be killed.” 

Signature

400

The US Navy performs the following 5 essential functions.

sea control, power projection, deterrence, maritime security, and all domain access.

400

Options for amphibious force command relationships are wide ranging, however the preferred CATF/CLF relationship is __________.

Supported-Supporting

400

Landing force logistics in amphibious operations is conducted through these two ad hoc organizations.

TACLOG

Landing Force Support Party

400

For amphibious operations, the AF commanders must view operations from the perspective of a “single naval battle” (an approach that focuses on the integration of all elements of sea control and naval power projection into a cohesive whole). This defines what "tenet" of amphibious planning?

Unity of Effort

400

Complicating or denying access to maritime regions or freedom of action within those regions utilizing long range precision sensors, weapons, and other technology is commonly referred to as ______.

Anti-access/area denial (A2AD)

500

2 Parts:

1. Of these five types of amphib operations_____

2. This type is most frequently executed ______

1. Amphib Raid, Demonstration, Assault, Withdrawal, Support to CR and other operations

2. Support to CR and other operations

500

The nature of amphibious operations results in these organizational adjustments of the landing force from its baseline administrative structure:

Organization for ______

Organization for ______

Organization for ______

Mission Ashore

Landing

Embarkation

500

This is a capability envisioned by the Operational Maneuver from the Sea concept that would sustain an amphibious operation seeking to minimize the logistics footprint ashore.

Seabasing

500

The method of entry, landing areas, landing beaches, and landing force objectives are examples of this type of amphibious planning decision.

Supporting decision

500

This naval concept placed renewed emphasis on fighting for and gaining sea control, to include employing sea-based and land-based Marine Corps capabilities in support of the sea control fight.

Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE)

Supporting ideas: CWC, Integrated naval staffs, LCGs, Increasing capabilities, force on force littoral exercises