Criminal Procedure
A federal officer had probable cause to believe that a woman had participated in a bank robbery. Two days after the robbery, the woman checked into a local hotel. When the woman left her room for the evening, the hotel manager opened the hotel room so that the officer could enter the room and look inside. The officer did not find any of the stolen money but did see, lying open on the bed, the woman's diary. The diary contained an entry describing the woman's involvement in the robbing the bank.
The woman was charged in federal court with bank robbery. She has moved to suppress the diary.
Should the court suppress the diary?
Yes, because the officer had no warrant.
A small commercial airplane crashed in State A. The passengers and pilot, all citizens of State B, were killed in the crash. The airline that owned and operated the airplane is incorporated and has its maintenance facilities and principal place of business in State C.
One day before the statute of limitations on their claims would have run, the estates of the pilot and each of the passengers filed a wrongful death action against the airline in federal court in State A. The airline was served one week later and wants to prevent the State A federal court from hearing the action.
Which of the following motions is most likely to accomplish the airline's goal?
A motion to transfer the action to a federal court in State C.
A federal court may transfer an action to any other district in which it might have been brought "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice" [28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a)]. Out of the available choices, a motion to transfer to State C is most likely to avoid the federal court in State A.
A driver negligently ran into a pedestrian who was walking along a road. The pedestrian sustained an injury to his knee, causing it to buckle from time to time. Several months later, the pedestrian sustained an injury to his shoulder when his knee buckled, causing him to fall down a flight of stairs. The pedestrian then brought an action against the driver for the injuries to his knee and shoulder.
In his action against the driver, for which of his injuries may the pedestrian recover damages?
For the injuries to his knee and shoulder, if the jury finds that the pedestrian's fall down a flight of stairs was a normal consequence of his original injury.
A landowner executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey his land to a friend. The landowner handed the instrument to the friend, saying, "This is yours, but please do not record it until after I am dead. Otherwise, it will cause me no end of trouble with my relatives." Two days later, the landowner asked the friend to return the deed to him because he had decided that he should devise the land to the friend by will rather than by deed. The friend said that he would destroy the deed and a day or so later falsely told the landowner that the deed had been destroyed. Six months ago, the landowner, who had never executed a will, died intestate, survived by a daughter as his sole heir. The day after the landowner's death, the friend recorded the deed from him. As soon as the daughter discovered this recording and the friend's claim to the land, she brought an appropriate action against the friend to quiet title to the land.
For whom should the court hold?
The friend, because the deed was delivered to him.
A deed must be delivered to be valid. Delivery is a question of intent. The words of the landowner included "This is yours," showing the necessary intent to strip himself of dominion and control and to immediately transfer the title. In addition, handing the deed to the friend raises a rebuttable presumption of delivery. Recording the deed is not required to transfer title, and thus the request not to record the document until later is irrelevant so long as delivery was made.
A buyer sent a signed letter to a seller that stated: "Ship 100 boxes of nails at $3 per box, the price quoted in your circular." The seller mailed the buyer a signed form acknowledgment that agreed to the buyer's terms and stated on the reverse side: "Disputes regarding quality shall be arbitrated." The buyer did not reply to the seller's acknowledgment, and the seller shipped the nails. When the buyer received the nails, it found their quality to be unsatisfactory and sued the seller for breach of warranty. The seller has asked an attorney whether the parties' contract requires arbitration of the buyer's claim.
What is the best advice the attorney can provide?
A contract was formed when the seller mailed its acknowledgment, and the court must decide whether the arbitration term should be excluded as a material alteration of the contract.
This is a "battle of the forms" question under UCC 2-207, applicable in a contract for the sale of goods. The battle of the forms occurs when a buyer places an order (the offer) and the seller's acceptance form contains terms which differ from the buyer's order or are not addressed in the order at all. The seller's nonconforming acceptance will operate as an effective acceptance of the offer, forming a valid and enforceable contract. Once the contract is formed, the next step is to determine the effect of the new or additional terms. Between merchants, additional terms in the seller's acceptance become part of the contract unless: (1) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (2) the offeror objects to the additional terms within a reasonable time after receiving notice of them; or (3) the additional terms would materially alter the contract. Here, the seller accepted the buyer's offer, but added the arbitration term. This formed a contract, but the issue is whether the additional arbitration term became part of the contract. Because the buyer did not limit acceptance or object to the arbitration term, the issue comes down to whether a court will find it to be a material alteration of the deal (if so, it is excluded; if not, it is included). (A) is wrong because this contract was formed by express manifestations, not by conduct. (B) is a possible answer, but it presumes to conclude that the arbitration term was immaterial, whereas (C) more precisely leaves this issue to the court (which might conclude it was material). (D) is wrong because it is the common law answer, whereby a nonconforming acceptance operates as a counteroffer. However, this contract involved the sale of goods (nails), and UCC 2-207 applies to change this common law result.
A federal grand jury was investigating a corporation whose tanker ship had spilled crude oil into environmentally sensitive waters. The grand jury issued a subpoena requiring the corporation to produce all emails and internal documents regarding the corporation's knowledge of the risks of an oil spill. The corporation objected, citing its Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Can the subpoena be enforced?
Yes, because a corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege.
A bakery incorporated and headquartered in State A had a dispute with a mill incorporated and headquartered in State B over the quality of the flour the mill had delivered to the bakery. The bakery sued the mill in a federal court in State A for breach of contract, seeking $100,000 in damages.
The contract between the bakery and the mill contained a clause designating State B courts as the sole venue for litigating disputes arising under the contract. Under precedent of the highest court in State A, forum-selection clauses are unenforceable as against public policy; under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, such clauses are enforceable.
The mill has moved to transfer the case to a federal court in State B, citing the forum-selection clause in the parties' contract and asserting the facts that the flour was produced in State B and that the majority of likely witnesses are in State B.
Is the court likely to grant the mill's motion?
Yes, because federal law governs transfers of venue, and it would be more convenient for the witnesses and parties to litigate the claim in State B.
Federal law governs transfers of venue. If an action is brought in a particular venue, a federal court may transfer the action to any other district in which it might have been brought "for the convenience of parties and witness, in the interest of justice" [28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a)]. While federal courts usually enforce valid forum-selection clauses, the federal court sitting in State A would follow the law of State A and find that the forum-selection clause is unenforceable as against public policy. However, because the majority of witnesses are in State B and the bakery could have sued the mill in State B as a State B citizen, it would be proper for the federal court to transfer the claim to State B.
A hotel employed a carefully selected independent contractor to rebuild its swimming pool. The hotel continued to operate while the pool was being rebuilt. The contract between the hotel and the contractor required the contractor to indemnify the hotel for any liability arising from the contractor's negligent acts. A guest of the hotel fell into the excavation, which the contractor had negligently left unguarded.
In an action by the guest against the hotel to recover for his injuries, what would be the most likely outcome?
Liability, because the hotel had a nondelegable duty to the guest to keep a safe premises.
Ordinarily, someone who hires an independent contractor would not be vicariously liable for the contractor's negligence. However, a landowner who holds his land open to the public has a nondelegable duty to keep the premises safe for business visitors. Such a landowner is liable for any negligence that causes a guest to be injured by unsafe conditions on the premises, even the negligence of an independent contractor.
A man owned a large tract of land that had frontage on a public highway. The land had no access to any other road.
Fifteen years ago, the man conveyed the rear half of the land to a woman and at the same time conveyed an express easement to the woman that provided access from her land across his retained land to the public highway.
The woman used the easement until she reconveyed the land back to the man 10 years ago. The deed to the man made no reference to the easement.
Five years ago, the man again conveyed the rear half of the land, this time to an investor in a deed that made no reference to any easement to the public highway.
Recently, the man told the investor that he could no longer cross the man's land for access to the public highway. A neighbor has told the investor that he can use her land for access to another public road "for a price."
The investor has sued the man for the right to cross the man's land to the public highway.
For whom will the court likely decide?
The investor, because an easement will be implied.
The express easement granted to the woman was terminated by merger when she reconveyed her land to the man, who again became the common owner of both tracts. The man then conveyed the rear half of the land to the investor, whose land is now landlocked. An easement by necessity is implied for the benefit of the landlocked parcel at the moment of severance of the common ownership.
On March 15, in a signed written contract, a manufacturer agreed to sell 40,000 pens at $1 each to a retailer, delivery to be made in two equal installments on April 1 and May 1. The contract was silent as to the time of payment, but on March 25 the two parties orally agreed that the entire purchase price was to be paid on delivery of the second installment.
On April 1, the manufacturer delivered 20,000 pens, and the retailer accepted them. The manufacturer then demanded payment of $20,000. When the retailer refused to make the payment, the manufacturer sued the retailer for breach of contract. In its defense, the retailer proffered evidence of the March 25 oral agreement.
Is the manufacturer likely to succeed in its action?
No, because the March 25 oral agreement was an effective modification of the written contract.
The parties are free to modify their contract after initial formation, which they have done here to add the payment deadline.
Police officers had probable cause to believe that a man had committed a series of armed bank robberies with an accomplice.
The officers obtained a valid arrest warrant for the man and went to his house to arrest him.The knocked on the door, identified themselves as police officers and stated that they had a warrant. Getting no response, the officers entered the house. After the officers called the man's name several times and again identified themselves as police officers, the man emerged from the basement and was arrested. The officers went into the basement to look for the accomplice. They opened a closet door and found cocaine in plain view. They did not find the accomplice.
The man was indicted for cocain possession. He has moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Fourt Amendment.
Should the court grant the motion to suppress?
No, the officers discovered the cocain during a lawful protective sweep of the house looking for the man's accomplice.
Plaintiff, a State A corporation, has sued Defendant, an individual, in State B state court. Defendant was served at his home in State B. The suit, based on State E law, sought money damages. The suit contended that Defendant breached a contract to convey a piece of State E real estate to Plaintiff, thereby depriving Plaintiff of the benefit of his bargain. The terms of the contract were negotiated face-to-face in State C by Plaintiff’s CEO and by Defendant; the next day, after a final document had been created, the document was signed by Defendant while he was in State D. No activities connected with the contract occurred in State B.
Defendant has timely moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction over him. State B’s statute governing jurisdiction permits the exercise of jurisdiction “to the full extent allowed under the United States Constitution.” Should the State B court grant Defendant’s motion?
No, because the state in which a defendant resides may exercise general jurisdiction
regardless of the nature of the cause of action.
The personnel director of an investment company told a job applicant during an interview that the company was worth millions of dollars and that the company's portfolio would triple in the next several months. The applicant was very excited about the company's prospects and accepted an offer to work for the company. Two days later, the applicant read in the newspaper that the investment company had filed for bankruptcy reorganization. As a result of reading this news, the applicant suffered severe emotional distress, but he immediately found another comparable position.
Is the applicant likely to prevail in an action for negligent misrepresentation?
No, because the applicant did not suffer any physical injury or pecuniary loss.
The situations in which a plaintiff can recover after suffering only emotional distress as a consequence of a defendant's negligence are limited, and this is not one of them. Recovery for negligent misrepresentation is usually limited to pecuniary loss unless it involves a risk of physical harm. In this case, the applicant found a comparable position promptly, so he suffered no harm from the personnel director's misrepresentation other than his emotional distress.
A credit card company obtained and properly filed a judgment against a man after he failed to pay a $10,000 debt. A statute in the jurisdiction provides as follows: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered." Two years later, the man purchased land for $200,000. He made a down payment of $20,000 and borrowed the remaining $180,000 from a bank. The bank loan was secured by a mortgage on the land. Immediately after the closing, the deed to the man was recorded first, and the bank's mortgage was recorded second. Five months later, the man defaulted on the mortgage loan and the bank initiated judicial foreclosure proceedings. After receiving notice of the proceedings, the credit card company filed a motion to have its judgment lien declared to be the first lien on the land.
Is the credit card company's motion likely to be granted?
No, because the bank's mortgage secured a loan used to purchase the land.
The bank's mortgage is a purchase-money mortgage, meaning that the funds the bank advanced were used to purchase the land. A purchase-money mortgage executed at the same time as the purchase of the real property encumbered takes precedence over any other claim or lien, including a previously filed judgment lien. Therefore, the bank's purchase-money mortgage takes precedence over the credit card company's judgment lien.
A buyer sent a seller an offer to buy 50 tons of cotton of a specified quality. The offer contained no terms except those specifying the amount and quality of the cotton. The seller then sent an acknowledgment by fax. The acknowledgment repeated the terms of the buyer's offer and stated that shipment would occur within five days. Among 12 printed terms on the acknowledgment was a statement that any dispute about the cotton's quality would be submitted to arbitration. Neither the buyer nor the seller said anything further about arbitration. The seller shipped the cotton, and it was accepted by the buyer. A dispute arose between the buyer and the seller as to the quality of the cotton, and the seller asserted that the dispute had to be submitted to arbitration. The buyer instead sued the seller in court.
In that suit, which of the following arguments best supports the seller's position that the buyer must submit the dispute to arbitration?
The provision for arbitration did not materially alter the parties' contract.
Because the buyer's offer was silent as to arbitration, the arbitration provision in the seller's acknowledgment should be characterized as an additional term. Under UCC § 2-207(2), an additional term is considered a proposal for addition to the contract. Section 2-207(2) also provides that an additional term becomes a term of the parties' contract unless certain specified circumstances are present. One such circumstance is where an additional term materially alters the parties' contract. Because none of the other circumstances appear applicable here, the arbitration provision will be considered a term of the contract if the seller can successfully argue that the provision did not materially alter the parties' contract.
A police officer stopped a driver who had run a red light. Upon approaching the car, the officer noticed a strong odor of alcohol and immediately asked whether the driver had been drinking. The driver admitted having had several alcoholic drinks that evening.
The driver, charged with driving while intoxicated, moved to suppress the officer's testimony regarding the driver's statement about his drinking. The driver argued that the officer had elicited the statement without providing the requisite Miranda warnings. The prosecutor has responded that the statement should be allowed in the prosecution's case-in-chief or, at a minimum, should be allowed as impeachment in the event the driver testifies and denies drinking.
How should the court rule regarding the driver's statement admitting his drinking?
The statement should be allowed, because the driver was not in custody for Miranda purposes when the admission was made.
Miranda prohibits use in the prosecution case in chief of any statement obtained by police as a result of custodial interrogation unless the police obtained a valid waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of an attorney prior to eliciting the statement. Any statement made during custodial interrogation that is not preceded by a Miranda warning and waiver is considered presumptively coerced in violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. But the Miranda warning and waiver requirement do not apply to questioning outside of custodial situation. Custody is formal arrest or a situation that would lead a reasonable person in the suspect's position to believe their freedom was deprived to a degree analogous to formal arrest. Accordingly the Supreme Court has held that traffic stop questioning and Terry stops are not custody because they are by their nature brief and do not indicate to a reasonable person "a trip to the station to get booked." This means Miranda has no applicability to such questioning and therefore this incriminating statement did not violate the Miranda rule and is admissible.
A woman brought suit in State A federal district court against the company she worked for, claiming that it had failed to promote her on account of her gender, in violation of a federal employment-discrimination statute. The woman is a citizen of State A; the
company is a corporation incorporated in State B, with its headquarters in State C and with most of its employees working at the office in State A where the woman works. The relief sought by the suit consisted solely of $46,000 in back pay.
Two months after the company timely filed its answer, and while discovery was still pending, the company made a motion to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Will the federal court grant the motion?
No, because the woman’s claim arises under federal law.
A customer fell and injured himself when he slipped on a banana peel while shopping at a grocery store. The banana peel was fresh and unblemished except for a mark made by the heel of the customer's shoe. In an action brought by the customer against the store, these are the only facts in evidence.
Should the trial judge permit the case to go to the jury?
No, because there is not a reasonable basis for inferring that the store knew or should have known of the banana peel.
While the store had a duty to the customer, the fact that the banana had no blemishes besides the mark left by the customer's heel, there is no reasonable basis to believe that the store knew or should have known about the banana peel. This means that they did not breach their duty to the customer.
A man owned land. He took out a loan that was secured by a mortgage on the land. The man had personal liability on the loan.
The man sold the land to a purchaser, who expressly assumed the mortgage debt. The purchaser failed to make two installment payments. To prevent default and foreclosure, the man paid the overdue installments. After making the payments, the man sued the purchaser for reimbursement.
Will the man be likely to prevail?
Yes, because the law of suretyship permits the man to seek reimbursement.
The man, as the mortgagor, had personal liability for the loan. The purchaser assumed the mortgage debt. As soon as the man paid an overdue installment, he acquired the right to seek reimbursement under the law of suretyship.
A lawn service company agreed in writing to purchase from a supplier all of its requirements for lawn care products during the next calendar year. In the writing, the supplier agreed to fulfill those requirements and to give the company a 10% discount off its published prices, but it reserved the right to increase the published prices during the year. After the parties had performed under the agreement for three months, the supplier notified the company that it would no longer give the company the 10% discount off the published prices.
Does the company have a viable claim against the supplier for breach of contract?
Yes, because the company's agreement to buy all of its lawn care products from the supplier made the agreement enforceable.
The parties entered into an enforceable requirements contract under UCC § 2-306. Although the terms of the parties' agreement granted the supplier the discretion to increase the published prices during the year, the contract did not grant the supplier the right to discontinue the promised 10% discount off the published prices. The supplier's refusal to give the company the 10% discount was a breach of the contract's agreed-upon terms.
Police, who had probable cause to arrest a man for a series of armed robberies, obtained a warrant to arrest him. At 6 a.m. they surreptitiously entered the man’s house and, with guns drawn, went to the man’s bedroom, where they awakened him. Startled, the man asked, “What’s going on?” and an officer replied, “We’ve got you now.” Another officer immediately asked the man if he had committed a particular robbery, and the man said that he had. The police then informed him that he was under arrest and ordered him to get dressed.
Charged with robbery, the man has moved to suppress the use of his statement as evidence.
What is the man’s best argument for granting his motion?
The police did not give the man his proper Miranda warnings.
A doctor loaned his neighbor his motorcycle so the neighbor could make a good impression for a first date. The neighbor and the doctor were citizens of State A who worked in that state. The neighbor told the doctor that he was going to only drive the motorcycle locally. The neighbor and his date were having so much fun that they decided to go to a casino in State Y. The neighbor became involved in a traffic accident with a student while driving in State Y. The student brought an action against the doctor in the proper U.S. District Court in State Y for personal injuries and property damages in the amount of $85,000. A State Y statute permits an action against the owner of a motor vehicle where he/she loaned the car to the person who was driving it when the incident occurred.
If the doctor makes a motion to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, will the court grant the motion?
Yes, because the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him would probably violate due process.
In the absence of a traditional basis for obtaining personal jurisdiction, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state citizen must be consistent with due process (i.e., the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum as to not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice). Because the doctor could not foresee being haled into State Y (the neighbor had misrepresented to the doctor that his trip would terminate in State A), and apparently has no other contacts with State Y, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the doctor would probably violate due process.
During a comprehensive evaluation of an adult patient's psychiatric condition, a psychiatrist failed to diagnose the patient's suicidal state. One day after the misdiagnosis, the patient committed suicide. The patient's father, immediately after being told of his son's suicide, suffered severe emotional distress, which resulted in a stroke. The patient's father was not present at the patient's appointment with the psychiatrist, nor did he witness the suicide. The father has brought an action against the psychiatrist to recover for his severe emotional distress and the resulting stroke.
Is the father likely to prevail?
No, because the psychiatrist's professional duty did not extend to the harms suffered by the patient's father.
A landowner borrowed $100,000 from a lender and executed a valid mortgage on a commercial tract of land to secure the debt. The lender promptly recorded the mortgage. A year later, the landowner conveyed the same tract to a developer by a deed that expressly stated that the conveyance was subject to the mortgage to the lender and that the grantee expressly assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage obligation as part of the consideration for the purchase. The mortgage was properly described in the deed, and the deed was properly executed by the landowner; however, because there was no provision or place in the deed for the developer to sign, he did not do so. The developer promptly recorded the deed. The developer made the monthly mortgage payments of principal and interest for six payments but then stopped payments and defaulted on the mortgage obligation. The lender properly instituted foreclosure procedures in accordance with the governing law. After the foreclosure sale, there was a $10,000 deficiency due to the lender. Both the landowner and the developer had sufficient assets to pay the deficiency. There is no applicable statute in the jurisdiction other than the statute relating to foreclosure proceedings.
At the appropriate stage of the foreclosure action, which party will the court decide is responsible for payment of the deficiency?
The developer, because he accepted delivery of the deed from the landowner and in so doing accepted the terms and conditions of the deed.
The deed stated that the conveyance was subject to the lender's mortgage and that the grantee expressly assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage obligation as part of the consideration. While the developer did not sign the deed, the developer accepted the deed and recorded it, thereby agreeing to the mortgage assumption. When the developer assumed the mortgage obligation, the developer became personally liable to the lender, and the landowner became merely a surety. The developer, having sufficient assets to pay the deficiency judgment, must do so.
A dry goods retailer telephoned a towel manufacturer and offered to buy for $5 each a minimum of 500 and a maximum of 1,000 large bath towels, to be delivered in 30 days. The manufacturer orally accepted this offer and promptly sent a letter to the retailer, which the retailer received two days later. The letter read: “This confirms our agreement today by telephone to sell you 500 large bath towels for 30-day delivery.” The letter was signed by the manufacturer. Twenty-eight days later, the manufacturer tendered to the retailer 1,000 (not 500) conforming bath towels, all of which the retailer rejected because it had found a better price term from another supplier. Because of a glut in the towel market, the manufacturer cannot resell the towels except at a loss.
In a suit by the manufacturer against the retailer, which of the following will be the probable decision?
Yes, because the stationer had not revoked its offer before April 15.
Although the offer was no longer irrevocable on April 15, it had not been revoked, and was therefore capable of being accepted. UCC § 2-205 allows merchants to make “firm offers,” i.e., offers that are irrevocable for a limited period even without consideration. Section 2-205 says that the period of irrevocability “in no event may . . . exceed three months.” So by April 15, the offer was no longer irrevocable, and the stationer was
therefore free to revoke it.
But the stationer did not in fact revoke. (The revocation could only have occurred if the lawyer had learned that the stationer was no longer sticking to the offer.) Nor did the offer lapse on account of the passage of time, because the circumstances indicate that a “reasonable time for acceptance” was any time during the following year. There is no other event that caused the offer to terminate. Consequently, the lawyer’s fax was a valid acceptance.