Civ Pro Hypotheticals
A Greyhound bus runs off the road in San Antonio and injures 10 passengers, all of whom are citizens of Texas residing in San Antonio. All the passengers are represented by the same San Antonio lawyer. Greyhound is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oregon.
One passenger (plaintiff 1) sues in the federal court in San Antonio against Greyhound. In this federal court, the jury holds that the accident was caused by a defect in the highway and that the bus company was not negligent.
After this judgment was entered, another passenger (plaintiff 2) sues Greyhound in the same federal court.
1. Can Greyhound use the not-negligent ruling from the first suit against plaintiff 2 in the second suit? Explain.
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Assume plaintiff 2 takes her case to trial, and the jury in this case holds that Greyhound’s negligence (not the highway defect) caused the accident.
Now, plaintiff 3 sues in the same federal court claiming damages because of Greyhound’s negligence in causing the accident.
2. Should plaintiff 3 be allowed to use issue preclusion based on the negligence finding in the second suit? Explain.
Parklane Hosiery v. Shore Hypothetical
Question 1. Even though we get into non-mutual issue preclusion, it only becomes a problem when you use it against someone who hasn't had their day in court. Non-mutual issue preclusion nor issue preclusion can apply. Plaintiff 2 is not bound by the non-negligent ruling from the first suit because they haven't had their day in court.
Question 2. Plaintiff 3 can be allowed to use issue preclusion based on the negligence finding in the second suit due to the offensive use of issue preclusion. If Greyhound is found negligent in Plaintiff 2's case, other passengers can sue Greyhound after and not have to prove negligence due to issue preclusion based on Plaintiff 2's case ruling. No barrier to the use of non-mutual issue preclusion, but if it's starting to be used unfairly, the judge can reject it.
The jury held that Mr. Cooper was liable on each of Mr. Trivedi’s three claims, but the jury awarded significant damages only on the hostile work environment claim.
1. Failure to promote – awarded backpay.
2. Retaliation – awarded $1.
3. Hostile environment claim - $700,000 (emotional distress).
The judge upheld every other part of the jury’s award but used remittitur to reduce the $700,000 award.
Assume instead, that the jury awarded $150,000 in emotional distress damages to Mr. Trivedi on his hostile environment claim. This was the estimate given by Mr. Trivedi’s psychiatrist, who testified that Mr. Trivedi had suffered emotional deterioration because of the hostile environment and would require at least a year of treatment.
Mr. Cooper moved for remittitur contending that the emotional distress damage awards in like cases covered a range from $10,000 to no more than $150,000. Mr. Cooper contends that the jury’s award at the high end of that range should be reduced to $10,000.
Argue against remittitur.
Trivedi Hypothetical
Plaintiff has two options:
A federal statute, enacted in 2012, provides a cause of action on behalf of a borrower against a lender who charges interest above the federal maximum. Although the statute clearly establishes this cause of action, it says nothing about the right to a jury trial.
The plaintiff brought this suit in federal court against a bank, and she seeks equitable rescission of the lending contract and monetary relief equal to the overcharged amount. She has also made a demand for a jury trial on all factual issues. In response, the bank has moved to quash that demand because the Seventh Amendment only “preserves” the jury-trial right that existed when it was ratified in 1791. As a result, it contends, the Seventh Amendment does not authorize a right to jury trial when the cause of action was created by a 2012 federal statute.
Argue in opposition to the defendant’s motion.
Curtis v. Loether Hypothetical
The bank's motion to quash should be denied because the 7th Amendment does "preserve" the jury-trial right of the parties, regardless of if it was created by a statutes. As seen in Curtis, it also applies to newer federal statutes.
Mr. Fortenbaugh, as lawyer for the tug owners, searches for weeks trying to find an eyewitness to the sinking of the tug "J.M. Taylor." His efforts discloses that a sea captain witnessed the sinking, but the sea captain rails about the tug’s lack of seaworthiness and states that he believes the tug owners should be liable for all of the injured parties. Mr. Fortenbaugh decides that he will not call the sea captain as a witness, and he tells the tug owners that the captain would be a damaging witness.
The plaintiff's lawyer demands disclosure by the tug owners of the identity of any eyewitness. In response, Mr. Fortenbaugh refuses to disclose the sea captain’s identity contending that such information results from attorney work product.
Argue that the captain’s identity is not work product.
Hickman v. Taylor Hypothetical
It's not work product because work product is only a tangible thing developed in anticipation of litigation.
Billy Badger had worked for 10 years as a stockbroker for Hedge Brokerage, a Delaware corporation with its executive offices in Atlanta, Georgia. In his contract with Hedge, he promised that he would not take another stockbroker job for one year if he left Hedge. In late 2018, however, Mr. Badger quit his job with Hedge and immediately took a job as a stockbroker with Hancock Brokerage, which is incorporated in Delaware but has its executive offices in Houston, Texas. Mr. Badger moved to and established his domicile in Texas. When Mr. Badger changed jobs, he persuaded 50 of his clients at Hedge to enroll as investors with Hancock. These 50 clients have already paid fees of $350,000 to Hancock.
In 2019, Hedge brought a diversity breach of contract action in federal court in Georgia against Mr. Badger. It seeks an injunction preventing him from working for Hancock for one year and an award of $350,000. Mr. Badger had signed a five-year contract with Hancock and believes that if he is enjoined for one year Hancock will sue him for breach of contract. He also has no way to seek the return of the $350,000 from Hancock because it is not a party. He therefore moved to dismiss this suit under Rule 19 in the absence of Hancock.
Argue in favor of the motion to dismiss.
Torrington v. Yost Hypothetical
Motion to dismiss should be granted because Hancock's interest would be impaired.
In a road rage incident, Harper Bozeman ran his pickup truck into the side of a car driven by Ash Wooley. Bozeman was charged with the criminal offense of assault and battery, and the jury in his criminal trial found him guilty because he was shown to have intentionally crashed his truck into Wooley's car. Bozeman was incensed when Wooley drove his car into an intersection blocking Bozeman's truck, and then made a rude hand gesture when Bozeman honked at him.
The criminal trial turned largely on the issue of whether Bozeman had intentionally rammed Wooley's car, and the jury found that he had. This finding was the basis for finding Bozeman guilty of assault and battery.
Shortly after the criminal trial ended, Wooley sued Bozeman for damages to his car and for punitive damages based on his intentional action in crashing into Wooley's car. Bozeman's defense was based on his claim that by pure accident he crashed into Wooley's car because Wooley was driving "in a crazy manner." Wooley responded to this defense by moving for a summary judgment. He claimed that Bozeman was barred from using this defense because of issue preclusion based on the criminal trial in which Bozeman was found guilty of intentionally crashing into Wooley's car.
Bozeman's response to Wooley's motion claimed that Wooley could not use that finding because Wooley was not a party in the criminal proceeding and that criminal decisions cannot be used in a civil proceeding.
Argue in favor of Wooley's motion.
Otherson Hypothetical
Issue preclusion can apply, it's the same issue. (If it goes to a civil suit because it uses the same burden of proof).
Criminal to civil = yes. Civil to criminal = no.
Assume the following was the verdict returned in this case.
Questions
Answer: Yes
Answer: $12 an hour.
Answer: 30
Answer: Yes, on September 26, 1989.
Answer: Yes.
Answer: Yes.
Answer: $35,618.01.
Based on these answers, the jury awarded Turyna damages on both Count 1 and Count 2. Martam did not submit any questions for inclusion in the verdict but now moves for a new trial contending that these questions and answers are inconsistent with Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Argue in support of the verdict.
Turyna v. Martam Hypothetical
Establishes that they have a K. Have damages for BoK and damages for retaliatory discharge. Incomplete (because doesn't doesn't actually grant the BoK damages of $360), but not inconsistent.
The plaintiff filed a breach of contract cause of action in federal court based on diversity. The defendant had agreed to sell her his land but failed to appear at the closing or to perform the contract. As her first remedy, the plaintiff seeks specific performance of the contract. In her complaint, she has also requested damages for the breach if the court fails to grant specific performance.
In a timely fashion, the plaintiff filed a demand for jury trial on all issues in this case. The defendant moved to quash this demand because he contends specific performance is the plaintiff’s primary remedy. He argues that the right to this equitable remedy should be tried first without a jury. Specific performance was developed in the equity courts and is based on an injunctive order. The plaintiff contends that she has also sought common law damages, and that may be the only remedy she obtains. All of the issues leading to the defendant’s liability for breach are common to the specific performance remedy and to the damages remedy.
Argue in opposition to the defendant’s motion.
Dairy Queen v. Wood Hypothetical
Factual issues whether there has been a BoK are central to both claims should be tried by a jury.
Legal claim (BoK) must be determined by a jury first.
Assume Mr. Dean, after being hired to represent Mrs. Gaylard in her potential suit against Oxford Health Care, called Mrs. Taylor and identified himself as a lawyer representing Mrs. Gaylard. When she stated that she should not be discussing how Mrs. Gaylard was burned in her bath, Mr. Dean persisted in asking how this incident occurred.
Mrs. Taylor responded by telling him that she was now represented by a lawyer who had been assigned to her by Oxford. After giving this information to Mr. Dean, she added the address, phone number and email of her lawyer, Susan Bakerfield.
Mr. Dean thanked her for that information but continued asking her questions about the accident. He claimed that he needed her information because she was an eyewitness to the accident and her lawyer was not.
1. Even though a suit had not been filed, what should Ms. Bakersfield have advised Mrs. Taylor to do if she received a call such as this?
2. What should Mr. Dean have done as soon as Mrs. Taylor told him of the representation by Ms. Bakersfield?
Gaylard Hypothetical
Question 1: Not said anything, shut up and hang up.
Question 2: Hung up as well and gone to Ms. Bakersfield.
St. Mary’s University, a Texas corporation, entered a contract with Kraken Construction Company, Inc. (a New Mexico corporation with its executive headquarters in Santa Fe, New Mexico), whereby Kraken was to construct a new 200 room dormitory on the University’s campus. In a separate contract, St. Mary’s contracted with Flatland, Inc. (a Texas corporation with its headquarters in San Antonio), for the construction of a concrete plaza that would be adjacent to the new dormitory.
After several years of conflict, Kraken withdrew its construction crews from the campus and informed St. Mary’s that it would not complete the building. St. Mary’s sued Kraken in federal court in San Antonio seeking $5 million to complete the construction.
In response to this suit, Kraken filed a third-party complaint against Texas Steel, Inc. (a Texas corporation) contending that Texas Steel was liable for some part of Kraken’s liability because it failed to supply the steel it had contracted with Kraken to provide. In addition, Kraken filed a second third-party complaint against Flatland contending that it also had failed to complete its construction and is therefore liable to St. Mary’s.
Both Texas Steel and Flatland have filed separate motions to dismiss Kraken’s third-party complaint against them.
As the Briefing Attorney for the Federal Judge, Advise her whether to grant or deny these motions.
Erkins v. Case Power Hypothetical
The Court should deny Texas Steel's motion to dismiss because they are secondarily liable to Kraken.
However, the Court should grant Flatland's motion to dismiss because their contract was with St. Mary's and not Kraken.
Allan Corman, a citizen of Texas, was injured when the truck driven by Belle Dokes, a citizen of Oklahoma, struck his car in Dallas. As a result of this accident, Mr. Corman brought suit in a Texas state court against Ms. Dokes seeking $1 million in damages for his physical injuries. In a timely manner, Ms. Dokes removed to federal court in Texas. In federal court, however, a jury awarded Mr. Corman an award of $200,000, upon which the court entered judgment
Two months after this judgment in federal court became final, Mr. Corman brought suit in a Texas state court for the $50,000 in damages that Ms. Dokes caused his expensive car. Ms. Dokes filed a motion for summary judgment contending that this claim is foreclosed by application of the doctrine of res judicata. Mr. Corman argued that these two claims require very different evidence and deal with different injuries.
Argue in support of this motion.
RIVER PARK Hypothetical
Transaction test; he should have brought this in the first suit. The first suit was based on Belles's negligence, and that's the transaction that gives rise to both of the claims. The transaction that gives rise to both of the claims is essentially the same, the damages is whatever.
The answer: too bad.
Assume the trial judge included the following statement in his instructions to the jury.
The ski resort owed Hardin the duty of every person to exercise ordinary care in conduct toward others considering all the surrounding circumstances. However, I’m a skier, and it has always been clear to me that one should expect the unexpected when flying down a snow-covered slope. There are trees on all sides of you and bumps because of natural objects that are covered by the snow. One presses the edge of contributory negligence when you add to all the natural risks by deciding to ski through a plume of snow thrown up by a snow-making machine.
Mr. Hardin had objected to this instruction by noting that the judge was adding inaccurate facts to the record, but the judge overruled his objection. Mr. Hardin’s evidence showed that he came around a corner and was surprised by the snow-making machine and its snow plume. He also points out in his appeal that the evidence introduced at trial showed that the slope on which he was injured did not have trees on both sides or bumps and that the snow-making machine threw a plume of wet snow that covered the width of the slope. In other words, one could not ski down the slope without being struck by part of the plume. In adding these personal notes, Mr. Hardin contends the judge introduced his own unsworn but powerful testimony about how the plaintiff was negligent.
Argue that the instructions were erroneous.
Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc. Hypothetical
Don't care about the judge's experience, there's a concern about the direction of the snow-blowing; the judge is tilting the case in one way or another. The judge should be telling the jury: what are the legal issues and how do they apply? The verdict should be deciding how the facts of the case apply to the definitions given to the jury.
The instructions need to be accurate, not specific or general.
A Texas plaintiff sued an Oklahoma defendant for breach of contract in federal court in Texas. Under Texas law, a breach of contract cause of action requires the plaintiff to prove material facts establishing: (1) a valid and enforceable contract, (2) plaintiff performed all of her obligations under the contract, (3) defendant failed to perform, and (4) that its breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
After discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment to establish that it has no liability. In support of its motion, it has reviewed all of the discovery in the case. It attached to its motion an affidavit showing that the plaintiff has neither gathered nor disclosed any evidence to prove she performed all of her obligations under the contract. In response, the plaintiff files an affidavit sworn to by an expert in the business field encompassing this contract. The expert alleges that the plaintiff’s actions satisfied her obligations under the contract and that he will testify to such. The defendant filed no response.
Argue in opposition to the defendant’s motion.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett Hypothetical
There's now evidence that the defendant breached the contract. Plaintiff reviewed all of the discovery (which you are supposed to do for MSJ) and she got the evidence she needed, which consists of an affidavit (acceptable MSJ evidence [admissible testimony to the issue]).
Assume the complaint in the Floyd case indicated that three of the nine representatives of the proposed class were seeking only damages for the violation of their civil rights under the city's stop-and-frisk policy. They allege that because of the city's policy they were physically abused and had their money and watches confiscated. The complaint speculates that at least 10% of the class members would seek damages for similar abuse. The other members (90% of the class) sought only injunctive or declaratory relief based on the unconstitutionality of the policy under which they had been detained.
If you were the judge, would you accept the complaint as it was and give class treatment to the whole of the class? Explain.
Floyd Hypothetical
Probably not, because whenever the individuals are seeking damages they are subject to detail defenses. The other class would otherwise being a damages suit. The difficulties that arise from a class action suit is the damages and the individualized defenses. The numerosity requirement wouldn't outweigh the complications.
Bob Dobbs, domiciled in El Paso, entered a contract with Wayward Homes, Inc., which is incorporated and has its principal place of business in New Mexico. Wayward agreed to construct an expensive home for him in El Paso. As construction neared its end, Mr. Dobbs complained that Wayward had used inferior products in the construction. Mr. Dobbs discovered numerous defects in the home, but Wayward would not make repairs.
Mr. Dobbs sued Wayward for breach of contract in the federal court in El Paso for $500,000, the cost of the home repairs needed. In discussing his suit in an interview with an El Paso TV station, he referred to Wayward as a “corrupt” and an “incompetent” company. The broadcast of this interview played in New Mexico as well as in Texas.
During the discovery phase, the parties met and entered a settlement in which Mr. Dobbs dismissed his claim against Wayward in exchange for its payment to him of $250,000 for his needed repairs. However, after Mr. Dobbs dismissed his suit, Wayward filed a suit in the same federal court seeking $3 million in tort damages for the defamatory comments Mr. Dobbs made in his TV interview. Mr. Dobbs has moved to dismiss this suit.
Argue in favor of this motion.
King v. Blanton Hypothetical
Dobbs's motion to dismiss should be granted because Wayward's defamation claim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as Dobbs's original breach of contract suit (logically related and arise from the basic conflict). The defamation claim should have been raised during the original suit, and cannot be raised now under Rule 13(a). Allowing a new suit would violate the Rule's goal of resolving all related disputes in one proceeding. Therefore, the defamation claim is barred, and Mr. Dobbs's motion to dismiss should be granted.
Ida Blaine brought suit to enforce a covenant that all owners in the Monte Vista section of San Antonio have signed. The covenant bars construction of any visible alterations to a home that are inconsistent with its original design. She sued Mr. Hans Baruch, her next door neighbor, because he had altered the front porch of his Craftsman home according to a design that was inconsistent with this type of structure. The Texas state court decided that the alterations made by Mr. Baruch were not inconsistent with his home’s original design and entered a take-nothing judgment in his favor.
Jack Loman owns a home directly across the street from Ms. Blaine’s and Mr. Baruch’s homes. He has become enraged by the refusal of the court in Ms. Blaine’s suit to hold Mr. Baruch to the Monte Vista restrictions. After consulting with Ms. Blaine, his longtime friend and neighbor, he brought suit in Texas state court arguing that he had standing to enforce the restrictive covenants against Mr. Baruch’s ugly front porch renovations. Mr. Baruch responded by arguing that enough is enough, and he filed a motion for summary judgment in the suit by Mr. Loman. He contends that Mr. Loman has plotted with Ms. Blaine to run him out of the neighborhood. He believes the doctrine of res judicata prevents Mr. Loman’s suit because it raises the same issue, is based on the same claim, arises from the same harm, and will require the court to consider the same evidence as in the Blaine case.
Argue in opposition to his motion for summary judgment.
Taylor v. Sturgell Hypothetical
Valid judgment on the merits, same claim, BUT NOT the same parties. One was not the agent of the other; they may be friends, but they're not agents. Mr. Loman may have a different take on the issue. Mr. Loman's case will go forward UNLESS Mr. Baruch can discover through discovery that Mr. Loman's case was done as a favor for Ms. Blaine.
In the case itself, the clash of evidence arose because of the testimony of three railroad employees riding the nine-car string and Mr. Bainbridge, “then employed by the road.” Assume instead that one of those three brakemen on the nine-car string, Mr. Sackman, was no longer employed by the railroad. At trial, he testified that though he did not see the collision, he heard and felt the crash where he stood at the back of the nine-car string. He also testified that the crash had almost caused him to fall off the nine-car string. Shortly after he righted himself, he saw his car pass over the decedent’s body on the tracks.
The railroad supports its case with the testimony of the other two brakemen on the nine-car string, who testified that no crash happened. In addition, the two brakemen piloting the seven-car string in front of decedent’s two-car string testified they neither heard nor saw any collision between the two-car and the nine-car strings.
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Sackman, the plaintiff supported his testimony with only that of Mr. Bainbridge. Upon the defendant’s motion, the district judge entered judgment for the railroad. The judge thus concluded that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff had proved that a collision of the nine-car string with the two-car string had caused the decedent to fall to his death. The judge cited as justification for entering a judgment as a matter of law that the railroad’s case was supported by the testimony of four eyewitnesses whose unimpeached testimony clearly outweighed the circumstantial evidence provided by the plaintiff’s two witnesses.
Argue that the district judge erred in entering judgment.
Penn. R.R. v. Chamberlain Hypothetical
Even though Bainbridge’s testimony is suspicious, it should be up to a jury (as fact-finder) to determine where the truth lay. Up to the jury, not the judge. Just because Chamberlain presented a case that wasn't the best, she presented credible evidence, so a negligence case isn't ruled out.
Entered judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) because there may not be a retrial - took a chance.
Assume that, in addition to the facts mentioned in the case, the Salem Jail Log included the following when describing the booking of Joseph Fitzgibbons.
Fitzgibbons was sent to his cell wearing his belt because his trousers were loose and baggy. The prisoner also declared that “he wouldn’t be alive in the morning if placed in a jail cell.” He was also weeping loudly, and the deputies had to drag him to his cell.
His sister obtained this entry from the log, which was regularly kept by the jail. She argues that this evidence is admissible as part of the regular kept record of the jail, and she presents this material at the hearing on the city's motion for summary judgment.
Argue for the denial of that motion.
Slaven v. City of Salem Hypothetical
Complete opposite of Slaven. Officers are aware of Joseph's suicidal tendencies, so MSJ would be denied and trial would most likely show that officers and jail were negligent - they owed him a duty and they breached it by putting him in the cell.
In 1939, the Hardaway River Authority, an Illinois agency, began building a dam on the Hardaway River to protect the city of Hamburg, Illinois, from flooding by the river. The Authority planned to use the dam to reduce the flow of the river and thereby permanently lower the water level by 10 feet.
Fifty homeowners own property upstream from Hamburg on the banks of the river in an area known as the Hardaway River Subdivision (HRS). Roland Snow, a homeowner in HRS, sued the Authority in an Illinois state court. He asked that court to declare the planned dam an unconstitutional taking of his property and to permanently enjoin its construction. All 50 homeowners in the HRS have boats and fishing piers that would become useless if the water level were reduced by 10 feet.
At this time, no Illinois procedural rule existed to authorize a class action. As Mr. Snow’s individual case proceeded to judgment, the other residents began protesting the planned dam and many provided money to pay Mr. Snow’s lawyers. In 1941, the trial court ruled that Mr. Snow had no right to prevent construction of the dam. Exhausted and out of money, Mr. Snow did not appeal. However, Haley Frost, Mr. Snow’s next-door neighbor brought the same claim in an Illinois state court seeking to prevent construction of the dam. The Authority moved to dismiss her suit, contending that she could be bound by the judgment in Mr. Snow’s suit without violating due process.
Argue in favor of the Authority’s motion.
Hansberry v. Lee Hypothetical
He was an adequate representative because his interests were precisely the same as the others. His interests were the value of his property. They could join him but decided not to. He was asserting the same argument/legal contentions as the interest of his neighbors.
In January 2020, six female employees of Home Warehouse, Inc., which sells goods for the home, sued the company in the federal court in San Antonio. They each assert the same federal cause of action that bars gender-based discrimination in pay.
Home Warehouse is a Texas corporation that has stores in San Antonio and Dallas. Two of the plaintiffs work in the Dallas store, and four work in San Antonio. Home Warehouse has filed a Rule 21 Motion to Sever the claims of each of the plaintiffs. It contends they cannot be joined under Rule 20 because each holds a job either in different departments of Home Warehouse or at different levels of managerial authority. Home Warehouse therefore contends their individual claims cannot arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”
The plaintiffs seek back-pay damages that range from $14,000 to $16,000 and in total are for $95,000. As a practical matter, they oppose the defendant’s motion because it would not be financially feasible to bring individual suits for their damages. They also contend that the all-male executive group of Home Warehouse enforces a company-wide policy that causes lower pay for female employees.
Argue against the Motion to Sever.
Hohlbein Hypothetical
Joinder is proper because although the claims have differences, they are allowed under Rule 20 (arise out of the same transaction). The company-wide policy of pay discrimination is a pattern.
In this hypothetical, assume the plaintiff’s attorney had filed a motion for new trial after she had interviewed the jury’s foreman named Sam Barnett. Mr. Barnett told her in front of the judge that he owned the same wood-burning stove as Ms. Wilson. After listening to her testimony, he went home and had his wife use her phone to make a video of him trying to light the stove in the manner Ms. Wilson had described.
In the video, he made the following commentary. “I’ve lighted the wood, which requires me to leave the stove door open a bit, but, as you see, my clothes were never in any danger of catching fire. I’m now putting a paper towel several inches into the stove while the wood is beginning to burn, and it isn’t catching fire.”
When the jury retired to consider its verdict, Mr. Barnett used his phone to play the video with his narrative for the other jurors. After showing the video, Mr. Barnett said that Ms. Wilson could only have been burned by the stove if she had intentionally put her arm inside it.
Argue that the jury was prejudiced by this extraneous material.
Wilson v. Vermont Casings, Inc. Hypothetical
The video is extraneous material because the video is clearly weighing against causation. Yes, gotten closer to prejudice because:
The video is clearly in regard to causation (she wouldn't have been burned unless she put her arm in the stove). Should get a new trial because the jury was tainted.
In the case itself, Hardee’s filed its motion for judgment as a matter of law after Lane presented his evidence but before its own evidence was introduced. Assume instead that Hardee’s filed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law after the close of the evidence. And assume that the only evidence on the standing-water issue was the following.
Lane introduced testimony by George Halloran who was employed at the restaurant as a busboy. Mr. Halloran testified that on the morning of the accident he had just wet-mopped the men’s bathroom floor around 10:30. He had, however, been unable to also go over the floor with a dry mop to remove standing water because he had been called away to clean a mess made in the restaurant. While he was cleaning the mess in the restaurant, he heard shouting and discovered that Mr. Lane had fallen in the restroom.
Hardee’s put into evidence testimony by its manager, Ms. Thompson, who stated that she typically placed warning signs after any mopping. She did not remember doing so on the morning of this accident because of the uproar in the restaurant when a waiter had dropped a tray full of hot food in the lap of a customer.
Hardee’s then filed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the district judge granted the motion. The judge concluded that Mr. Lane had the obligation of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Hardee’s was responsible for the dangerous condition that caused his accident. But the judge found that Lane’s evidence did not outweigh Hardee’s evidence and therefore was insufficient to be presented to the jury. Mr. Lane appeals this decision by the district judge.
Argue that the district judge erred in granting the motion.
Lane v. Hardee’s Food Hypothetical
There is direct testimony from the employee, Halloran, who actually left the water, instead of only circumstantial evidence.
There's better evidence, even if its circumstantial, that the fall was the fault of the employees, not the customers.
[Let's assume this "Georgia Nightmare" was largely the fault of the district judge and is not likely to be repeated. Also assume modern cases, such as the Iqbal decision, apply.]
The Chudasama plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court on diversity grounds alleging their injuries were caused by the defects in their Mazda automobile. As noted in the case, they asserted 3 product-liability and a fraud claim. The fraud claim was the basis for the extraordinary requests for information about the structure and personnel of Mazda.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs assert the fraud claim by contending that "Mazda misrepresented their vehicles as safe and that this claim was the reason the plaintiffs purchased their Mazda. And their reliance on this fraudulent misrepresentation caused their injuries when that Mazda failed to protect them." The complaint was accompanied by the vague and unending discovery requests concerning Mazda's corrupt corporate structure.
1. What objections would you include in a pre-answer motion before even considering a response to the discovery requests?
2. As Mazda's lawyers, how would you respond to these tactics under the Discovery Rules?
Chudasama Hypothetical
Question 1:
Really try to get out of the court, so transfer the case. Get the judge to rule on the Rule 26(b) motion to reduce the scope of the action/discovery.
Rule 9(a) - Pleading Special Matters
Rule 12(e) - More Definite Statement
Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to State a Claim
Even if the district judge had acted promptly on this motion, the plaintiffs would likely have continued with their discovery tactics.
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Question 2:
Maintain documentation of good-faith (and any judicial neglect)
Rule 26(b)(1) - Scope of Discovery
Rule 26(b)(5) - Privilege
Rule 26(c)- Protective Orders
Rule 37 - Sanctions
Seek judicial rulings!
Assume the district court had denied intervention to Rag Shop in this case and had later entered a judgment in favor of Michaels against Castle Ridge Plaza holding that the master lease did not exclude its arts and crafts store from the mall.
Could you sue Michaels and Castle Ridge Plaza on behalf of the Rag Shop to overturn that judgment? Explain.
Michaels Stores, Inc. v. Castle Ridge Associates (D.N.J. 1998) Hypothetical
Yes, because Rag Shop was never barred from suing.
Michael Dell, a Texas citizen, contracted for the construction of a $10 million home in the Hill Country of Texas. The company that signed the contract and with which Mr. Dell had all his contacts is Hacker Development, Inc. It is incorporated in Delaware and has its executive offices in Oklahoma. After Mr. Dell had paid $8 million, he proposed that Hacker give him access to the completed home. Before making the final payment, he hired engineers who found defects requiring over $3 million in repair. Despite his demands, Hacker Development refused to correct the defects.
He then filed a complaint in federal court in Austin and served Hacker Development as the lone defendant shortly before the running of the statute of limitations. After the limitations period, Hacker Development, which has very few assets, filed a motion to dismiss claiming that it only signed the contract as an “agent.” Its sole job is to arrange construction contracts for the builder, Hacker Construction, Inc., also incorporated in Delaware and having its executive offices in Oklahoma. Both Hacker corporations are owned by the same family and have the same president. They also both use the same lawyer and have the same agent for service of process in Texas.
Mr. Dell has made a motion for leave to amend in order to add Hacker Construction as the defendant in his suit. Hacker Construction opposes the motion and contends that the statute of limitations period has lapsed. It also contends that Mr. Dell is solely responsible for mistakenly naming the wrong defendant. On at least one occasion, he came to the construction site when trucks with the name of Hacker Construction on their sides were present.
Argue in favor of Mr. Dell’s motion.
Krupski v. Costa Crociere Hypothetical
His motion should be granted because it satisfies all of the requirements for under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Although he amended it after 90 days and after the statute of limitations, the proper defendant could have reasonably known about the suit because they are so closely linked (highlighted). Although he knew the existence of each party, he can still be mistaken about their roles and who to sue. It's on the proper defendant to know if they could be sued, not on the plaintiff to know who to sue.