Lovey
Where is Hayley domiciled?
what is arizona?
- who tf knows
Springstart jack traveled to Paris, Texas on vacay. While shopping at a local department store there (very local place, never advertised outside of texas) he was wrongfully detained and searched. Back home in the middle of farm lands Ohio, Springstart Jack filed a suit against the store. Can an Ohio court constitutionally assert jurisdiction over Springstart Jack's claim against the Texas store?
No, the store's contacts with Ohio are insufficient to permit the assertion of jurisdiction
what is a counterclaim?
follow-up, what is a compulsory counterclaim? what happens if you don't state a compulsory counterclaim?
another follow-up, what is a permissive counter claim?
counter-claim is a claim by a defendant against a plaintiff.
compulsory counterclaim is if a claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence. if D does not assert a compulsory counterclaim, too bad so sad, D is barred from using that claim in further litigation
permissive counter claim is a claim that does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. can be brought up at Ds discretion
If DBC sues Chura, claiming that Chura intentionally assaulted and battered him (right on Chura ✊🏻). Can DBC join to this claim a claim that Chura owes DBC money on a contract entirely unrelated to the tort?
yes.
What is the Erie doctrine?
In diversity cases, the federal court must apply state judge-made law on any substantive issue.
Jack, an artist from California, wants to sue Michael Chen and Emerson, both from Hell (assume Hell is US state), on two breach of contract claims. When visiting Jack's gallery in San Diego, Mike Chen and Emerson each bought one of Jack's large oil paintings of California landscapes and paid by check. The painting's purchased by Mike Chen cost $45,000 and the painting purchased by Emerson cost $35,000. Sadly but unsurprisingly, both of the checks bounced. IF Jack brings a single suit against Mike Chen and Emerson in federal court seeking to recover the purchase prices of the paintings from Mike Chen and Emerson, is there federal jurisdiction over the claims?
No, the $45,000 and $35,000 breach claims are not aggregated; separate claims against codefendants are not aggregated
What are the defenses under 12(b) that a defendant can make?
(hint: there are 7)
1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction
2) lack of personal jurisdiction
3) improper venue
4) insufficiency of process
5) insufficiency of service of process
6) failure to state a claim upon while relief may be granted; and
7) failure to join a necessary party under rule 19
what are the five types of discovery?
2. document production
3. interrogatories
4. request for admission
4. physical exams
Joinder of parties, tell me about it.
Let's say Chura sues DBC for intentionally battery and assault after a night out drinking with "the bridge boys" where DBC jumped on top of Chura, making Chura fall back and hit his head, all because Chura made fun of his continuing appetite for clementines and plain almonds.
Can Lentz, Dino, and Blake join in with Chura in that claim if they were also intentionally battered and assaulted by DBC?
if the parties satisfy the two step under rule 20 allows permissive joinder of parties.
yes if their claims for relief arises from a single "transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" and there must be a question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs which will arise in the action
Hotdog is a corporation that manufactures valves to be used in various heating devices. Hotdog is incorporated in Germany and has its only offices there. Hotdog sells many valves to Hotcat Co., a Spanish manufacturer of boilers. A boiler made by Hotcat Co. and with a valve made by Hotdog is installed in a hotel in Amsterdam, Holland. While Linguini, a Texas resident, is visiting that hotel, the boiler explodes, cause Linguini to be burned in the ensuing fire. Hotdog has a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, Hotdog-Sub, that is incorporated in Delaware, and has its principle place of business in Virginia (Virginie if you will). From the Virginia office, Hotdog-Sub makes sales of Hotdog's products throughout the U.S.; these sales collectively represent 12% of Hotdog's worldwide sales. About 8% of Hotdog-Sun's sales (and less then 1% of worldwide sales) are made to customers located in Texas. In reliance on Hotdog-Sub's sales in Texas, Linguini brings a product liability suit against Hotdog and Hotdog-Sub in Texas state court, claiming that a defect in the valve that was sold by Hotdog to Hotcat Co. and incorporated by the latter into the boiler installed in Amsterdam was the case of Linguini's injuries. Hotdog and Hotdog-Sub both move to dismiss the suit on grounds that personal jurisdiction may not constitutionally be exercised against either by the Texas Court. How should the Texas Court rule on the motions?
(answer for both Hotdog and Hotdog-Sub)
Linguini's suit requires general (not specific) jurisdiction over both Hotdog and Hotdog-Sub in order to proceed. This is because the suit arises out of a valve made and installed abroad, so that the suit does not arise out of whatever contacts Hotdog and/or Hotdog-Sub might have with the forum state.
The due process clause requires voluntary connections between the defendant and the forum state. Where the defendant is a corporation, the forum state may normally exercise general jurisdiction over it only if the corporation is "at home" in the forum state. And a corporation is deemed to be "at home" in a state only if the corporation is either incorporated in that state or has its principal place of business there.
Since neither Hotdog nor Hotdog-Sub is either incorporated in Texas or has a principle place of business in Texas, neither defendant is "at home" at Texas. Therefore, Texas cannot exercise general jurisdiction against either defendant. So although Hotdog would be able to sue both Hotdog and Hotdog-Sub for an accident occurring in Texas arising out of a defective valve sold by Hotdog-sub to a texas-based boiler customer, P may not sure either Hotdog or Hotdog-sub for this non texas based accident.
Exam question hand out
with hayley
Sharona has brought a medical malpractice suit against Adamson in federal court based on Diversity. Sharona's complaint asserts that Adamson performed an operation upon Sharona to reduce the size of Sharona's nose, and that the results were disastrous. The complaint asserts that the operation took place on October 17th, 2020. Adamson has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, and has submitted in support of that motion an affidavit stating that he was not in the U.S. on October 17th, 2020. Adamson's moving papers give much additional information, all of which tends to indicate that Adamson could not have performed the operation on the date Sharona said Adamson performed it (e.g., an affidavit from Adamson's travel agent stating that Adamson was in the South of France that day, as well as charges on Adamson's phone bill showing calls made from the South of France to Adamson's office on that date). Sharona in opposition to Adamson's motion, has submitted an affidavit that furnishes a couple of details about the alleged operation (e.g., "on October 17th, 2020, I went to Adamson's offices at 456 Main Street. Adamson was a brown haired man of about 45 years of age who wore glasses, and he performed the surgery on me."). Sharona has not submitted any other information in opposition to Adamson's motion. In reviewing these moving papers, the federal judge concludes that there is about a 90% chance that Sharona is either honestly mistaken or is lying when she asserts that Adamson performed the operation on her on that date. Should the federal judge grant Adamson's motion for summary judgment?
No, motion for summary judgment may be rendered only if all the materials submitted by both parties "show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact..." It is not enough that the judge concludes that the moving party is very likely to wi at trial - the judge must conclude that as a matter of law all issues must be decided in favor of the movant, before the judge may grant summary judgment. Here, there is some chance that P will be able to come up with more evidence that D's evidence was fraudulent.
Conrad was a lifelong smoker. The only two brands he ever smoked were Acme and Baker. On average, he smoked two packs of Acme per day, and one pack of Baker. He contacted lung cancer, and then brought a products liability suit against Acme in Ames state court, asserting that Acme was responsible for his long cancer. Acme presented evidence that Conrad's lunch cancer was of a type not usually associated with cigarette smoking, that it was a type usually associated with asbestos exposure, and that Conrad had worked around asbestos for many years. The case was tried to a judge, who concluded that Conrad had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that cigarette smoking (regardless of the brand) contributed substantially to his getting lung cancer. Conrad then brought a suit against Baker, again in Ames state court, making the same type of allegations he made against Acme. Baker now argues that Conrad should be collaterally estopped from asserting that his lung cancer was caused by any brand of cigarette. Granting Baker's request will result in Conrad's claim being dismissed before trial. Should Baker be permitted to use collateral estoppel to bar Conrad from claiming hat his lung cancer was caused by cigarettes?
Yes. when it is the defendant in the second action action who seeks to use collateral estoppel, and seeks to use it against a party who was a plaintiff in the first action, the case for allowing collateral estoppel is at its strongest. Thus, conrad had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the causation issue during his first trial, and Baker is merely trying to use collateral estoppel as a shield rather than a sword in the second action.