Health Insurance :)
Taxes :)
Provisions & Redistibution :)
Fun! :)
100

What are some reasons an individual might choose not to purchase health insurance?

100

With perfect information and fully rational producers and consumers, does it matter if the tax is an excise tax or a sales tax, and why or why not?

100

Please give an example of a pension plan structure from either the US or a foreign country and explain it

100

What was the number of our classroom in Sanford all semester?

Sanford 05

200

What is the main difference when comparing insurance coverage Pre-ACA to insurance coverage Post-ACA?

Pre-ACA: The difference seemed mostly from higher private spending; but public insurance used to cover only ~30% of the US population 


Post-ACA (now ~18% of GDP): Public insurance expanded to cover >50% of people and 61% of expenses (Medicare – 17%, Medicaid – 19%, ACA plans – 16%)

200

Many economists argue that payroll tax incidence falls largely on workers (based on the relative elasticities of supply and demand curves for labor). Please explain.

200

Provide and explain concisely an example of a real-world policy intended to help the poor that actually largely benefits the non-poor.

200

Please explain to me the process of downloading and using an electronic blue book, which you'll need for the exam.

300

Moral hazard in health care. There are two sides to moral hazard in health insurance markets. What are they? Describe them concisely in words.

300

Explain the idea of optimal commodity (Ramsey rule) taxation, as best you can.

Set commodity taxes where: 

MDWLi / MRi = λ

MDWLi = marginal DWL from increasing tax on good i; 

MRi = marginal revenue raised from the tax increase; 

λ = the value of additional government revenue (relative to leaving it in private hands)

300

List the potentially problematic assumptions behind the Tiebout model in bullet form.

Depends on a number of assumptions

-  Perfect mobility (no cost to move)

-  Perfect information on the taxes paid and the precise benefits received from the locality

- Sufficiently large number of localities to choose from

- Efficiencies of scale for providing many public goods with fixed costs (e.g. schools): These do not create problems  

300

Where was Professor Jeuland when he was a member of the Peace Corps?

Mali

400

Explain what happens to the demand for health services when individuals are covered by health insurance, based on the common structure of health care provision.

400

Cawley and Frisvold argue that low pass-through suggests the Berkeley tax was ineffective at changing behavior. Do you agree with this assessment, and why or why not?

400

How can one balance the economic argument in favor of redistribution with the idea that a progressive income tax is economically inefficient?

400

Professor Jeuland assigned a paper to the syllabus that he worked on. What was the subject of this paper?

Using Private Demand Studies to Calculate Socially Optimal Vaccine Subsidies in Developing Countries

500

Explain the problem of adverse selection and provide intuition for why it is so severe in the context of private health insurance.

Adverse selection occurs in health insurance when there is an imbalance of high-risk, sick policyholders to healthy policyholders. The imbalance can happen due to sick individuals, who require more insurance, using more coverage and purchasing more policies than the healthy individuals, who need less coverage and may not buy a policy at all.  

500

Briefly discuss the the following: 

main advantages (theoretical and practical) of a wealth tax 

 the main challenges (theoretical and practical) with a wealth tax in practice 

500

Good exam question: What would an unconditional cash transfer look like?

500

 Where were my office hours located and when (partial credit available)?

Rubenstein Hall 242

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