What Is War, Really?
Clausewitz famously defines war as “an act of ___ to compel our enemy to do our will.”
What is “force”?
Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” includes passion, chance, and this rational element.
What is reason?
Clausewitz uses this term to describe all the little things that go wrong and make even simple actions difficult in war.
What is friction?
Clausewitz defines this level of war as “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.”
What is strategy?
Clausewitz argues that the political object of the war serves this role for strategy. It guides what means and sacrifices are appropriate.
What is the end state/goal?
Rather than a self-contained activity, Clausewitz insists that war is a continuation of this with the addition of other means.
What is policy (or politics)?
In Clausewitz’s social mapping, this part of the trinity is most often associated with the people, the source of primordial violence and hatred.
What is passion (or primordial violence)?
Clausewitz calls war the “realm” of this, emphasizing that information is often wrong, incomplete, or contradictory.
What is uncertainty?
This Clausewitzian concept is the “hub of all power and movement” on which everything depends; the main source of an enemy’s strength.
What is the center of gravity?
In Clausewitz’s terms, a war that seeks something less than overthrowing the enemy (i.e. territory, concessions, or reputation) is this type of war.
What is a limited war?
Clausewitz contrasts “war on paper” with this messy, real-world version shaped by limits, politics, and friction.
What is “real war”?
This institution is usually associated with the rational “policy” pole of the trinity in a modern state.
What is the government (political leadership)?
For Clausewitz, this French term names the commander’s ability to see the decisive truth in a confusing situation at a glance.
What is coup d’œil?
For a Napoleonic-style state, Clausewitz suggests that this is often the true center of gravity, more important than individual units or fortresses.
What is the main army in the field?
Clausewitz links war termination to the changing relationship over time between the value of the political object and this cumulative factor.
What are the costs or sacrifices of the war?
In his “dual nature” of war, Clausewitz says war can aim either at this extreme objective or at limited political goals short of it.
What is the complete overthrow or disarmament of the enemy?
Clausewitz’s trinity is not a checklist of three institutions, but rather three interacting tendencies. Name the tendency most associated with the professional military.
What is chance and probability (or the play of chance and probability)?
Clausewitz’s “military genius” combines intellect with this character trait—the strength to act decisively despite risk and uncertainty.
What is determination (or strength of character)?
This Clausewitzian concept marks the point in an offensive when further advance risks overextension and failure instead of progress.
What is the culminating point of the attack?
In a limited war, the aim is often to occupy or threaten only part of the enemy’s territory as a bargaining chip. Clausewitz warns that such a strategy still depends on affecting this intangible element in the enemy.
What is the enemy’s will, or resolve, to continue the struggle?
Clausewitz notes that as the situation shifts, this—the reason for fighting—can change, necessitating a total reassessment of strategy and required means.
What is the Political Aim?
When a modern democracy fights a long, inconclusive war, pressure from domestic opinion, elections, and media reveals which pole of the trinity driving strategy.
What is the passion/people element of the trinity?
Modern joint doctrine often promises to “reduce fog and friction” through ISR and technology. Clausewitz would likely argue that such tools merely change their form. Name two Clausewitzian sources of friction that technology cannot eliminate.
(Any two): What are human error, fear, fatigue, terrain/weather, miscommunication, enemy adaptation, or uncertainty in information?
Applied to contemporary joint planning, a truly Clausewitzian COG analysis must begin not with target sets but with this higher-level consideration.
What is the enemy’s political aim and overall source of power/will?
Reading Clausewitz alongside recent “forever wars,” Stoker would say that the U.S. often commits significant means without clearly defining this achievable condition necessary for ending the war on acceptable terms.
What is a clear, attainable political aim (or political end state)?