A model pictures reality by simplifying it. Stats are useful but do not show how things work together
Waltz
a country is better off at producing what it is best at and exchanging its products with countries in return for things it is not good at.
Frieden's description of comparative advantage
Mesquita's empirical implications for aid
1. aid primarily provided by countries with large winning coalitions
2. most aid goes to countries with small winning coalitions
3. when aid foes to large winning coalition country, it is unusually large
Leeds argument for the violation of alliance agreements
costs are comparatively low and factors have changed since the formation of the agreement
Rough terrain, foreign sanctuary, distance, and political instability
Conditions that favor insurgency and in turn cause civil war according to Fearon
To give meaning/motivation to the scientific method
the function of theory according to the Elements of Science
Rho and Tomz argument
there is a connection between economic interests and policy preferences. most voters do not understand protectionism so it is hard for them to choose a policy. college grads use cues for self interest while people without a degree use cues for altruism
Short term efficacious intervention may have few long term benefits
Moyo's micro-macro paradox
1. aggressors underestimate the willingness of the status quo powers to fight (WWII)
2. states exaggerate each other's hostility when their differences are bridgeable (WWI)
Examples of misperceptions leading to war according to Jervis
Is justice possible in the international system according to Simmons and Hyrean?
1. ICC ratification reduces intentional civilian killing by governments but not rebel forces
2. ICC action reduces behavior by both governments and rebels
Wendt and the constructivist principle
Davis reasoning for why states adjudicate
To manage domestic political pressure and pursue international cooperation. a constrained executive is more likely to adjudicate
Bechtel
domestic cleavages underline mass attitude toward climate policy (pollutive industry worker-> 7% less likely to support climate policy)
States have a range where they are both better off to compromise than go to war. However, incomplete info (Kuwait invasion)/commitment problem (Golan Heights)/indivisibility (Jerusalem) can weaken this range. Additionally, if states are outside of the range, they will prefer war.
the Bargaining Model
1. Peters (trade)
2. Hainmeuller (domestic economic concerns)
3. noneconomic issues (culture and race)
Reasons for immigration policy and public opinion
Cooperation after hegemony is possible through regimes
Keohane, liberalism
Trade reshaped US industry-> uncertainty for individuals
Guisinger
We have an interest in environmental cooperation because the environment is a non-excludable rival good. However, individual actions have little effect on the global ecosystem and people tend to free ride
Tragedy of the Commons
Sagan's nuclear weapons as political objects argument
The consensus view of nuclear weapons is dangerously inadequate. Instead, states build nukes for a plethora of reasons: security (strategic chain reaction WWII), domestic (India), and norms (France). Furthermore, states disarm when there is a reduction in threats (Ukraine and South Africa)
1. Moral obligations lead people to support humanitarian intervention
2. peacekeepers help maintain peace
3. changing normative context influence
1. Kreps
2. Fortna
3. Finnemore
the goal of the state is to be the hegemony. the international system involves defensive states with opposition to the status quo within anarchy
Mearsheimer's offensive realism
less trade Barries leads to economic growth
free trade
Terrorism frequently delivers to the desired response so it is a form of costly signaling
Kydd
Normative prohibition explains the non-use of nuclear weapons. Nukes are a taboo
Tannenwald
Governments will not honor treaties when it is not in their interest. Governments join treaties as a low-cost opportunity to rationally express themselves or to gain benefits.
The Theory of Compliance according to Simmons