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International Level
State Level
Organizational
Individual
Current Events
100
Theorists of the Power Transition/Hegemonic War theory and structural realism
Gilpin and Thucydides- Power transition theory. Waltz- Structural realism
100
Preventive War
Preventive war is when the enemy has the capabilities and is threatening the nation, and the nation eliminates the treat through preventive war before the enemy has a chance to attack.
100
Jus Ad Bellum
When it is just to fight, either as a last resort, there is a reasonable prospect of success or as a justified intervention.
100
Cognitive Bias
Cognitive bias is when a decision maker see what they want to see, disregarding any disconfirming evidence
100
The role of misperceptions in the South China Sea conflict
Wong and Jacobs, how far each nation will go to get/protect what is theirs.
200
Security Dilemma
The security dilemma is where one nation increases their own national security and it diminishes that of its neighbor. This puts pressure on the neighbor to increase its own security in the fright of being attacked, out manned or losing its status in the international system etc.
200
Preemptive War
Preemptive war is attacking a nation before they have the chance to develop the capabilities to become a threat, when the time is right. ILLEGAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
200
Jus In Bello
How to fight justly in a war, see the principles of proportionality and discrimination.
200
Motivated Bias
We see what we want to see, seeking out information that confirms what we believe.
200
The role of misperceptions in Crimea
What Ukraine vs Russia vs Crimea wants, how far each will go, the capabilities of each
300
Waltz and Gilpin on polarity
Waltz argues that a bipolar world is more stable, Gilpin argues that a unipolar world is more stable.
300
Democratic Peace Theory
Kant- The republic, the pacific union, cosmopolitan law. Democracies don't go to war with other democracies.
300
COIN
A counterinsurgency policy recommended by Krepinevich, concerning winning the hearts and minds of the citizens to combat the insurgents.
300
Mead's argument about war
That war is a learned habit, that humans are not biologically programmed for war.
300
Rich- Expansionism
Expansion at a low cost, in both Crimea and the South China Sea
400
Power Transition Theory
Imbalances of power make war less likely, power transitions are what make war inevitable. Differential growth rates are the driving force of international politics.
400
Diversionary war and Hendrickson's 4 propositions
Diversionary war is when a leader takes their nation to war to distract from domestic problems. 4 principles: leader will limit number of advisors, diplomacy is still an option, opponents will criticize the use of force, foreign nations will denounce the use of force.
400
Tocqueville
Military organization theory about how democratic armies are more ambitious due to an ability to move up and down in rank, as opposed to the rigid structure in a monarchy.
400
James' argument about war
That humans are hard wired to seek out violence, that war is inevitable because of the power-seeking habit in humans.
400
Sifry and Friedman in Crimea
Why the USA thinks its good to step in, both in the case of Egypt in 1958 and in Crimea today. Maintaining Alliances. Also true in the South China Sea
500
Structural Realism
The international system is defined by polarity, with nations balancing and band-wagoning with/against each other.
500
Inadvertent war theory
A crisis might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war nobody wants (once something starts it can’t be stopped) A system of interlocking mobilizations caused by mechanisms like the Schiefflen plan are a part of the inadvertent war thesis. These kinds of plans are created in response to the tension and assumptions states make about other state’s actions and are ultimately a preparation for a war they now believe inevitable.
500
Offensive Doctrine
That the offense is the best strategy to take as it will supposedly make wars shorter and more decisive, with the aggressors smushing the opponents and other nations bandwagoning with the aggressors.
500
Tocqueville's argument about the individual level of military ambition
Generals (and majors, colonels, etc) have already reached the top of the military chain, and therefore do not want to go to war, as they have everything to lose. Lower ranked soldiers push for war as they can gain rank by proving themselves in combat.