ERIE
An author sued a publisher for breach of contract under state law and copyright infringement under federal law. The author sued in a federal district court located in State A. The parties’ contract did not contain a choice-of-law clause.
What substantive law will the district court apply to the author’s claims?
Incorrect
C. The district court will apply federal substantive law to the breach-of-contract claim and State A substantive law to the copyright-infringement claim.
Plaintiff (CA) files a complaint against Defendant (NV) in federal court, asserting two claims: (1) that Defendant fired Plaintiff due to Plaintiff’s race, in violation of federal employment law, and (2) a state law negligence claim, alleging that in an auto accident unrelated to the employment relationship, Defendant hit Plaintiff with Defendant’s car, causing $80,000 in damages to Plaintiff.
May the entire case be heard in federal court?
Yes. Joinder of the two claims is proper, because a person asserting a claim may assert all claims against Defendant in a single lawsuit. Federal court SMJ is proper because the first claim arises under federal law and the second satisfies diversity requirements, since the parties are from different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest.
Peter sues Donna for trespassing. He provides eyewitness testimony of more than 45 occasions on which Donna came on his property without permission. However, the trial court erroneously excludes the testimony of one witness to two or more instances of trespass. The jury returns a verdict for Peter, and the court enters a final judgment on the verdict.
Can Peter now appeal on the grounds that the exclusion of the witness was
erroneous?
Peter cannot appeal a judgment in his favor
because he suffered no prejudice; he is
not the “aggrieved” (aka losing) party. In all
but the rarest of cases, you cannot appeal a
judgment in your favor, no matter what error
the trial court may have committed.
A group of homeowners sought a lawyer’s advice in deciding whether to pursue a class-action lawsuit against a natural-gas drilling company in federal district court. All of the homeowners claimed that they had been injured as a result of the company’s drilling activities in their neighborhoods, which were spread across five states. Some of the homeowners claimed to have been sickened when chemicals used in the drilling process seeped into the ground water. Other homeowners claimed a loss of their livelihoods when drilling operations impacted their ability to use their farmland and raise livestock. Some homeowners were confident that they wanted to sue as a class, but others were not. The reluctant homeowners asked the lawyer if they could leave any class that ended up forming and pursue their own claim.
What issue should the lawyer research first to answer the reluctant homeowners’ question?
On March 1, a man filed a diversity action in federal court against a corporation, seeking to recover for injuries he sustained while using a baseball bat sold by the corporation. On March 15, the corporation filed its answer, claiming that the man was not entitled to relief because he had been misusing the bat when he was injured. Discovery closed on May 15. On May 30, the court held a pretrial conference to formulate a trial plan, and trial was scheduled to begin on August 1. On June 20, the corporation moved for summary judgment, correctly noting that the man likely did not have enough evidence to support his claim. There was no court order or local rule that determined when the motion for summary judgment could be made.
Could the corporation successfully bring its motion for summary judgment at this time?
What rule governs this motion?
Incorrect
C. No, because the motion was brought more than 30 days after the close of discovery.
C. No, because the motion was brought more than 30 days after the close of discovery.
Assume that the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet rendered the Erie decision. An Arizona man was injured by an air conditioning unit. The man filed a diversity action against the unit’s manufacturer in federal court in Texas. Under Texas choice-of-law rules, Texas law would apply to the case since the manufacturer’s headquarters were in Texas. A Texas statute spoke directly to an important issue in the case, but there was no controlling federal statute or constitutional law.
What law should the court use in deciding the issue?
A. Texas law, because a Texas statute spoke directly to the issue.
B. Texas law, because Texas choice-of-law rules would apply Texas law.
C. Federal common law, because federal judges are no less competent than state judges.
D. Federal common law, because the case was based on diversity jurisdiction.
A. Texas law, because a Texas statute spoke directly to the issue.
Two defendants may be joined if their liabilities arise from the same series of events and share common legal or factual issues. This is the governing rule.
Rule 20(a) — Permissive Joinder.
Perry collided with another car while driving a co-worker Cara, home from work. Perry sued Drake (the driver of the other car), alleging that Drake caused the accident. The jury concluded that Drake was not negligent, and the court enters a judgment in favor of Drake. Later, Cara sues Drake for her own injuries from the incident. Drake raises the affirmative defense of claim preclusion and moves for summary judgment on these grounds. The court should:
A. deny the motion because Cara was not a party
to the first case.
B. Grant the motion, because Cara had a
sufficient relationship with Perry to give rise to
non-party preclusion.
C. Deny the motion, but only if Cara’s injures were
more severe than Perry’s and Cara had a greater
incentive to litigate the case zealously.
D. Grant the motion because it would be unfair to
require Drake to defend this case again.
A. deny the motion because Cara was not a party
to the first case.
A group of 75 plaintiffs brought a class-action lawsuit against a mortgage company in federal district court. The plaintiffs claimed that the mortgage company had systematically overcharged them, in violation of state law. The class members all had the same type of mortgage and challenged the mortgage company’s interpretation of its late-payment policy. The mortgage company was a citizen of States A and B, while the class representative was a citizen of State C. The damages claimed by each class member ranged from $5,000 to $100,000. Approximately 20 class members claimed damages in excess of $75,000. For example, the class representative claimed $80,000 in damages. The mortgage company moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the class action failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.
Is the district court likely to grant the mortgage company’s motion?
B. Yes, because a majority of class members do not seek more than $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
C. No, because the class members may aggregate their damages claims to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.
D. No, because the district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear claims brought by class members seeking less than $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
D. No, because the district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear claims brought by class members seeking less than $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
Same facts but Salem submits jailors’ affidavits swearing that the brother showed no signs and said nothing suggesting that he might be a suicide risk.
In which of the following situations should the court deny Salem’s motion for summary judgment?
A. Slaven submits an affidavit in which she swears that “the officers knew or had reason to know that” her brother was suicidal.
B. Slaven submits an affidavit in which she swears that when she talked to her brother in his cell he told her that he wanted to commit suicide.
C. Slaven submits a memorandum of law citing case law declaring that, if the officers knew or had reason to know that her brother was suicidal, they had a duty to protect him from suicide.
D. Slaven submits an affidavit from Slimey Sam, a local bookie under arrest for extortion, in which he swears that he told the officers that he had heard the brother moaning in despair and threatening suicide.
D. Slaven submits an affidavit from Slimey Sam, a local bookie under arrest for extortion, in which he swears that he told the officers that he had heard the brother moaning in despair and threatening suicide.
Assume that Harry Tompkins III is walking on a lateral pathway along the tracks of the Erie Railroad in PA in 2021. He was injured when hit by something projecting from a passing train. He sues the Erie Railroad in federal court under the Federal Interstate Railway Act which authorizes suits for damages arising from railroad accidents. He also asserts a state law claim again the Erie for negligence. On the negligence claim, the railroad argues that PA law does not allow trespassers on the right of way to recover damages, absent of willful or wanton negligence, but Tompkins argues that the court should apply the “more modern” due care standard to the negligence claim.
What should the federal judge do and why?
There is NO Erie problem. The case is a federal
question case rather than a diversity case. Tompkins has sued under the Federal Interstate Railway Act. Additionally, Tompkins has asserted a
state law negligence claim. The state law negligence claim would be properly before the federal court
under supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §1367). Supplemental jurisdiction similar to diversity jurisdiction gives the federal court the authority to hear state claims but no power to create the governing law. In a diversity case, under Erie the court’s job is to apply state law to the supplemental claim, not to make up its own rule.
D wants to sue X for contribution from the same accident; P and X are both VA citizens. Is supplemental jurisdiction available?
Yes — D→TPD claims are allowed under §1367(a); §1367(b) only restricts plaintiff claims.
A and B have a contract relating to their business
relationship, one provision of which stipulates that B will make no effort to sell to A’s customers directly. A learns that B is, in fact, selling to A’s customers, so A sues B for breach of contract. There is a verdict for B. A now sues B again under the same contract and regarding the same underlying events, this time asserting that B engaged intentional interference with A’s business relationship (a tort) by selling to A’s customers. We assume earlier that the second suit is probably barred by claim preclusion.
Would this be true under the transactional test?
Under the transactional test, claim preclusion is likely. The same facts give rise to both claims – B’s alleged selling to A’s customers. Thus, the two claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.
A national fitness chain installs biometric hand-scan devices at all of its gyms. P alleges the company systematically violates privacy laws by collecting members’ biometric data without consent.
P seeks only injunctive relief requiring the company to change its data-collection practices nationwide. All class members experienced the same uniform policy and seek identical prospective relief — no damages.
Under Rule 23(b), what type of class is most appropriate?
Rule 23(b)(2) class.
P sues D for excessive force. D moves for summary judgment and submits video footage showing part of the encounter, but the footage is blurry and does not fully support D’s version of events.
P submits a sworn affidavit contradicting D's narrative.
May the judge weigh credibility or decide which version of events is more believable?
No. Credibility cannot be weighed at SJ; conflicting testimony creates a genuine dispute of material fact.
A federal court cannot find a state supreme court decision on point. Intermediate appellate decisions conflict. This predictive process guides the court’s analysis.
An Erie Guess.
P wants to assert a negligence claim directly against TPD, but P and TPD are both PA citizens. What blocks this?
28 U.S.C. §1367(b) — original plaintiff cannot assert claims against a TPD in a diversity case.
Is this an appealable final decision?
Ashanti sues Cornwall, Termain, and Janowitz. Termain moves to dismiss the claim against her for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The court grants the motion. Ashanti appeals the decision.
Because claims against other defendants remain pending, the dismissal of Tremain is not a final judgment for appeal purposes. Ashanti must wait until all claims are resolved unless an exception applies.
However, under Rule 54(b), the court may direct entry of final judgment on the dismissed claim if it expressly finds “no just reason for delay,” which would allow an immediate appeal.
A group of homeowners sues a pesticide manufacturer for property damage after chemical runoff contaminated several neighborhoods. The plaintiffs seek money damages, and although many issues overlap, individual questions (causation and amount of damage per home) may vary.
The court is determining class certification and must decide whether notice to all class members and the right to opt out are required.
Which Rule 23(b) category triggers these mandatory protections?
Rule 23(b)(3).
P sues D for breach of contract. D moves for summary judgment and objects to an email P submitted because it is hearsay. P argues she can call the sender as a witness at trial to authenticate and introduce the email through admissible testimony.
Under Rule 56, may the court consider the email?
Yes. Evidence may be considered if it can be presented in admissible form at trial (Rule 56(c)(2)).
Pennsylvania’s rule requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to file a “certificate of merit.” Federal law has no such requirement. Identify the Erie step the court must analyze before deciding whether the case is dismissed.
Determine whether a Federal Rule is on point and conflicts with the state rule.
A patient brought a diversity action in federal court against a medical device manufacturer for injuries sustained from a device that malfunctioned. The patient claimed that the malfunction was a result of the manufacturer’s negligent design of the device. The manufacturer claimed that the surgeon and hospital were joint tortfeasors and were liable for some or all of the patient’s claimed damages. Joinder of the surgeon and hospital would defeat diversity jurisdiction.
Are the surgeon and hospital necessary parties who must be joined?
B. Yes, because the interests of the surgeon and hospital could be adversely affected if the liability of the manufacturer is determined without joining the surgeon and hospital as parties.
C. No, because subsequent proceedings can resolve claims of indemnification or contribution.
D. No, because adding the surgeon and the hospital would defeat the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding.
C. No, because subsequent proceedings can resolve claims of indemnification or contribution.
A plaintiff sues two defendants, D and S, for injuries arising out of a 3-way car accident. S could have alleged a cross-claim against D but decides not to do
so. The case goes to trial, and the plaintiff wins against D and S. S now files his own claim against D, alleging
that D is liable for the injuries that S suffered in the accident.
Does claim preclusion apply here?
NO! Claim preclusion does not apply to this hypo. D and S were both parties to the first action, but they were not parties against each other. Thus, claim preclusion does not apply. S has never had his day in court against D.
The answer would be different if S had asserted one cross-claim against D, but had neglected to assert a related, second claim. Then D would be precluded from asserting the 2nd claim in a later action.
A group of 22 passengers who had been injured when their tour bus crashed met with a lawyer to discuss suing the tour bus company. All of the passengers had been on the same bus and were involved in the same crash. The passengers’ injuries ranged from cuts and bruises to broken bones. One of the passengers asked the lawyer about bringing a class action.
Assuming the group includes a proper class representative, may the passengers form a class?
B.Yes, because all 22 of the passengers’ claims share common issues of fact.
C. No, because 22 people are too few to compose a class.
D. No, because the passengers all suffered different injuries.
B.Yes, because all 22 of the passengers’ claims share common issues of fact.
A designer sued a supplier for breach of contract and tortious interference with business relationships, arguing that the supplier had delivered sub-par fabric and, therefore, had breached the parties’ purchase agreement and damaged the designer’s relationships with its customers. Specifically, the designer claimed that the supplier had breached the parties’ contract by delivering fabric with an inadequate thread count. The supplier moved for summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim, arguing that the thread count of the delivered fabric met the contractual requirements. The supplier supported its motion for summary judgment with expert testimony on trade practices and industry standards for measuring thread count, indicating that the delivered fabric conformed to industry standards and, therefore, to the contract’s requirements.
Which of the following pieces of evidence provides the strongest basis for the designer’s breach-of-contract claim to survive summary judgment?
B. Deposition testimony from the designer’s director of marketing, stating that the designer had lost five customers since it began to resell the fabric it purchased from the supplier.
C. An affidavit from the brother of one of the supplier’s employees, stating that the affiant’s brother had told him that the supplier often cut corners on thread-count quality.
D. An affidavit from an industry expert, stating that the thread count of the delivered fabric, if measured according to industry standards, does not conform to the contract’s requirements.
D. An affidavit from an industry expert, stating that the thread count of the delivered fabric, if measured according to industry standards, does not conform to the contract’s requirements.