Dualism
Reconstruct the Indubitability Argument for Dualism
(1) My body is such that its existence is dubitable (open to doubt).
(2) My mind is such that its existence is indubitable.
(3) Nothing can be such that its existence is both dubitable and indubitable.
Conclusion: Therefore, my mind is distinct from my body.
Explain the distinction between Methodological Behaviorism and Logical Behaviorism
Methodological Behaviorism: In explaining human behavior, psychologists should eliminate reference to minds and mental states.
Logical Behaviorism: Mental states just are dispositions to behave, so we can translate mentalistic language into sentences that refer only to behavioral dispositions.
Explain Type Physicalism
The property of experiencing a yellowish afterimage is identical with the property of being in a certain neurophysiological state. More precisely, for any type of mental state M, there is some type of neurophysiological state P such that M is identical to P.
Explain Functionalism about mental states.
Functionalism is the view that an agent’s mental states depend on their functional organization. More precisely, for any mental property M, there is a functional role R such that M is the property of being in some state or other that plays R.
Reconstruct the Conceivability Argument for Dualism
1) I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my body.
(2) If I can clearly and distinctly conceive of something, then it is possible.
(3) Therefore, it is possible for my mind to exist without my body.
(4) If it is possible for X to exist without Y, then X is distinct from Y.
(5) Therefore, my mind is distinct from my body.
Explain Chomsky’s general objection to Skinner’s theory of verbal behavior
While the notions of stimulus, response, and reinforcement are well-defined in Skinner’s bar-pressing experiments, we have no clear criteria for applying them to complex human behavior. Instead, Skinner relies on metaphorical extensions of these notions. The resulting extensions are no more “objective” or “scientific” than the mentalistic language that Skinner and Watson seek to eliminate from psychology.
What is a 'nomological dangler'?
A nomological dangler is a law that does not fit into the established, systematic laws of physical science. For example, it is a law (or set of laws) that relates physical states to mental states, but does nothing else. (Recall epiphenomenalism.)
Explain the Multiple Realizability Argument against Type Physicalism.
If we find just one type of mental state that has different physical ‘correlates’ in different creatures, then Type Physicalism is false. Now suppose that octopuses can be in pain, but they don’t share our brain state N. Then being in pain ≠ N and Type Physicalism is false.
Draw a Diagram of Interactionism, Epiphenomenalism, and Parallelism
Zig-Zag, Comb, Parallel Lines
What 'lesson' does Putnam take the example of polio to teach us about the relationship between causes and effects?
Causes [polio] are not logical constructions out of their effects [symptoms]. Putnam argues that mind words, like disease words, pick out the causes of certain typical symptoms (behaviors), not the symptoms themselves
Explain Objection 1 to Type Physicalism, and how Smart responds
People can talk about mental states without knowing anything about brain states. However, just because two terms have different meanings does not entail that those terms refer to different things. Consider Batman and Bruce Wayne, Hesperus and Phosphorous, etc.
What distinguishes Functionalism from Behaviorism?
Behaviorists attempt to identify mental states with patterns of behavior. Functionalists do not. The functional role of a mental state involves not only its relations to behavior, but to other mental states as well.
Explain the Puzzle of Mind-Body Interaction
Things in space can only causally interact with things they come into contact with, and it is only possible for them to come into contact with other things located in space. Thus, if the mind is not located anywhere in space, then the mind cannot interact with the body.
Explain the distinction between Super-Spartans and Super-Super-Spartans
Super-Spartans admit that they feel pain, but always in pleasant well-modulated voices… They do not wince, scream, flinch, sob, grit their teeth, clench their fists. Super-Super-Spartans suppress even talk of pain. But they still feel pain, and they privately think about feelings of pain.
Explain Objection 3 to Type Physicalism and how Smart responds.
Although Type Physicalism avoids asserting the existence of irreducibly psychic processes, it does not avoid asserting the existence of irreducibly psychic properties. Smart replies that our mental terms are topic-neutral: they don't involve asserting irreducibly psychic properties, such as the yellowness of this yellow afterimage, known only to me. Instead, they assert only that certain similarities exist between experiences, like seeing a lemon and having a yellow afterimage. And if you don’t know anything about neuroscience, then you can’t state the respect in which having a yellow afterimage is like seeing a lemon.
Explain the Causal Exclusion Objection to Functionalism
The Principle of Causal Closure says that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. For example, wincing is a physical event, so it must have a sufficient physical cause: namely, C-fiber firing. According to Functionalism, pain is distinct from C-fiber firing. Yet if C-fiber firing is already sufficient for wincing, there is no causal work left for pain to do. It is excluded! Mental states are once again 'nomological danglers.'
What was the first name and full title of Descartes' correspondent who raised the Puzzle of Mind-Body Interaction?
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia
How does the Logical Behaviorist appeal to Verificationism in replying to Putnam, and why does Putnam deem this reply unsuccessful?
The hypothesis that Super-Super-Spartans are in pain is not verifiable. Thus, it is meaningless nonsense! Putnam responds by adverting to neuroscience: supposing we find a neural response N that correlates with our feeling of pain, we could verify that Super-Super-Spartans are in pain by verifying that their brains produce N.
Explain Objection 4 to Type Physicalism and how Smart responds
In general, experiences seem to have properties that the brain does not have. For example, the brain is not yellow, but nevertheless I experience a yello afterimage. Thus, mental states are not brain states. In reply, Smart argues that the experience is not yellow, it represents yellowness. By analogy, the word “yellow” is not yellow, but it represents yellowness.
The word “yellow” is not yellow, but it represents yellowness.
Explain the Inverted or Absent Qualia Objections to Functionalism
There is something it’s like to be in a conscious state. Call this the qualitative character of experience, or 'qualia' for short. Thus, there is something it’s like to have a yellow afterimage. But intuitively, a system could have the exact same functional organization as you do, yet have the exact opposite kind of experience (Inverted Qualia) or even no conscious experience at all (Absent Qualia). For example, I might experience a blue afterimage when you experience a yellow afterimage, or I might have no color experience at all (consider computer vision).