Clifford and James
Clifford concludes that his fictional shipowner is blameworthy, but of what exactly?
Forming a belief without sufficient evidence, specifically believing the ship was seaworthy despite doubts and without proper investigation.
What, according to Popper, characterizes a pseudoscientific theory?
Being unfalsifiable, meaning it avoids or accommodates potential refutations rather than being open to them.
Which historical figure is usually associated with first formulating the problem of induction?
Hume
According to Kuhn, is there historical evidence of a universal and unchanging scientific method?
No
What are your resources for understanding content deeper? Name at least three
Power points, fellow students, readings, coming to class/notes, research individually, asking questions in class, reaching out to professor...
Does Clifford believe that the shipowner would be blameless if the ship had in fact been seaworthy? Why, or why not?
No, Clifford believes the shipowner would still be blameworthy. The moral wrong lies in the irresponsible formation of the belief—suppressing doubts and failing to inquire—regardless of whether the ship was actually safe or the outcome was positive
What does it mean for a hypothesis to be falsifiable?
A hypothesis is falsifiable if it makes predictions that can be tested and potentially proven false through observation or experiment, distinguishing it from unfalsifiable claims.
What does it mean to say that observations are theory-laden?
Observations are theory-laden when influenced by prior theories, expectations, or frameworks, rather than being neutral data (e.g., what scientists "see" depends on theoretical priming, like expecting certain results in experiments).
Why is pre-paradigm science unproductive, according to Kuhn?
Pre-paradigm science is unproductive due to the lack of a shared framework, leading to disorganized efforts, competing schools, and debates over fundamentals instead of cumulative progress.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY! Choose an existing question to draw on the board as an illustrated example!
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Why does Clifford conclude that even trivial beliefs – based on insufficient evidence – can be harmful?
Trivial beliefs based on insufficient evidence cultivate habits of credulity that erode critical thinking and can indirectly harm society, as no belief is truly insignificant or private—it influences actions and others' beliefs.
According to Popper was Einstein’s theory of general relativity falsifiable? Was Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis falsifiable?
Yes, Einstein's theory of general relativity was falsifiable, as it made testable predictions open to refutation (e.g., light bending). No, Freud's psychoanalysis was not, as it could explain any outcome without being disproven.
What is experimenter’s bias? How does this illustrate a complication for naïve empiricist attitudes toward science?
Experimenter's bias is when researchers unconsciously influence or interpret results to match expectations, through selective attention or subtle cues. It complicates naive empiricism by showing observations aren't purely objective or experience-driven; human expectations undermine the assumption of neutral, reliable data for scientific progress.
How does a scientific paradigm differ from a scientific theory?
A paradigm is a broader framework encompassing exemplars, methods, assumptions, and worldviews that guide inquiry, while a theory is a specific explanatory model within that paradigm for solving puzzles.
What makes rival paradigms incommensurable, according to Kuhn?
Rival paradigms are incommensurable because they address different problems, ask different questions, use terms with shifted meanings (e.g., "mass" in Newton vs. Einstein), and apply different evaluation standards for theories, including rationality and progress, lacking a common measure for direct comparison.
What does it mean to describe a hypothesis as living (rather than dead), forced (rather than avoidable), and momentous (rather than trivial)?
A living hypothesis is a credible, appealing possibility to the believer (e.g., belief in God for a theist), unlike a dead one that seems implausible. A forced hypothesis presents an unavoidable choice where not deciding is effectively one option (e.g., accept or reject a proposal; no neutral stance). A momentous hypothesis involves unique, significant, irreversible stakes (e.g., a life-changing decision), contrasting trivial ones that are low-risk and repeatable.
What is the problem of demarcation?
The problem of demarcation is distinguishing genuine science from pseudoscience or non-science, determining reliable indicators for what counts as scientific inquiry versus what does not.
What is the problem of induction?
The problem of induction, formulated by Hume, is that we cannot logically justify generalizing from past observations to future or unobserved events, as there's no guarantee nature's patterns will continue (e.g., all observed swans being white doesn't prove all swans are white). It relies on assuming uniformity in nature, which itself needs justification without circularity.
Why does Kuhn’s description of change within normal science science not fit with standard empiricist attitudes toward scientific change?
Kuhn's normal science involves puzzle-solving within a fixed paradigm, protecting core assumptions and ignoring anomalies until crisis, rather than constant testing. This contrasts with empiricist views of science as gradual, cumulative progress through objective observation, logic, and responsiveness to all evidence, highlighting science's dogmatic phases over unbiased refinement.
History shows us that scientists have got things wrong in the past. How is this observation sometimes thought to undermine scientific authority? Why might the argument be important? How persuasive is the argument? Think about what you would say to a friend or community member who encouraged you not to trust science purely on the grounds that science has been wrong before.
This observation undermines authority by implying current theories may also be overturned, suggesting science is unreliable or equivalent to pseudoscience (e.g., past errors like geocentric models used to dismiss modern consensus on disliked topics). It's important for fostering humility, critical scrutiny, and recognizing science's self-correcting nature, encouraging ongoing improvement. However, it's not persuasive because science demonstrates stability, progress from errors via peer review, diverse communities, and better methods; rejecting it ignores successes like technology and medicine. To a friend: "Science advancing by correcting past mistakes is its strength, not weakness—it's self-improving through evidence, unlike fixed beliefs. Dismissing it means ignoring how it's reliably transformed our world despite occasional errors."
Does James believe that it is always permissible to believe on the basis of insufficient evidence? In what circumstances is it permissible?
No, James does not believe it is always permissible to believe on insufficient evidence; he criticizes Clifford's strict evidentialism as overly cautious, potentially leading to missed truths in situations where belief is necessary for action or gain. James argues that belief without sufficient evidence is permissible only when the option is a "genuine option," defined as living (a real, appealing possibility to the believer, not dead or irrelevant), forced (an unavoidable binary choice where suspending judgment equates to one option, like rejecting a friendship by not believing in it), and momentous (involving unique, high-stakes, irreversible opportunities, unlike trivial or repeatable matters). For example, in religious faith, it may be living for those inclined, forced because agnosticism might forfeit potential spiritual benefits, and momentous due to profound life implications. James uses analogies like an Alpine climber who must believe they can leap a chasm to survive, or forming social bonds where evidence is ambiguous but belief fosters positive outcomes. He contrasts this with Clifford's "avoid error" maxim, advocating a pragmatic "believe truth" approach where passions can guide in intellectual deadlocks, but only in genuine options to avoid gullibility. This allows for optimism in uncertain but high-reward scenarios, without endorsing baseless beliefs broadly.
What led to the discovery of the planet Neptune? What can this help illustrate about the role of falsifiability in science?
Discrepancies in Uranus's orbit, which didn't match Newtonian predictions, led Urbain Le Verrier and John Couch Adams to hypothesize an unseen planet's gravitational influence; Johann Galle observed Neptune in 1846 based on their calculations. This "glorious rescue" turned an apparent falsification into a confirmation by adding an auxiliary hypothesis rather than abandoning Newton's theory. It illustrates that falsifiability in Popper's view is nuanced: theories must risk refutation, but apparent falsifications aren't always decisive due to possible errors, unknown factors, or modifications like auxiliary hypotheses. Popper recognized perseverance can lead to discoveries, showing science isn't strictly about immediate rejection but bold, testable conjectures. However, it highlights challenges to strict falsificationism, as ad hoc adjustments can save theories, requiring judgment on when modifications are legitimate versus pseudoscientific evasion, thus refining the role of falsifiability in scientific progress.
Why does Hume think that we can’t solve the problem of induction by appealing to laws of nature, causal relations, or something similar?
Hume argues that appealing to laws of nature or causal relations to justify induction is circular, as our knowledge of them comes from inductive inferences based on past experiences. For instance, we infer causality (e.g., fire causes heat) from repeated observations, but predicting future instances assumes the uniformity induction presupposes. Mere inspection of objects reveals no inherent causal powers; experience is required, yet using causal knowledge to support induction begs the question. Attempts like "induction has worked before" or "nature is uniform" also rely on induction, creating a vicious circle. Hume concludes induction is a psychological habit, not rationally grounded, challenging empiricism's foundation in experience for reliable predictions and generalizations in science.
Why does Kuhn’s description of change within revolutionary science science not fit with standard empiricist attitudes toward scientific change?
Revolutionary science per Kuhn is non-cumulative paradigm shifts like gestalt switches, driven by crisis and rival frameworks, with incommensurability preventing rational comparison. This doesn't align with empiricist expectations of continuous, evidence-based progress through logical evaluation, emphasizing subjective, community-influenced conversions over objective accumulation.
We all have our biases, including scientists. How is this observation sometimes thought to undermine scientific authority? Why might the argument be important? How persuasive is the argument? Think about what you would say to a friend or community member who encouraged you not to trust science purely on the grounds that everyone is biased.
It undermines authority by portraying science as subjective, influenced by personal, cultural, or funding biases, implying results are agenda-driven rather than objective (e.g., confirmation bias favoring expected data). The argument is important for promoting transparency, reforms like blind review, and awareness of human elements in knowledge production. It's not persuasive because science mitigates biases through replication, diverse collaboration, methodological controls, and community scrutiny, making it more reliable than individual views. To a friend: "Biases are universal, but science counters them with evidence-based checks, experiments, and global peer review—it's collectively objective. Rejecting it overlooks how these processes yield trustworthy advancements beyond personal opinion."