Bundle of Sticks
types of lost property
abandoned
lost
misled
How do you calculate reliance damages using the three columns approach?
Take the plaintiff's position after upon breach and subtract their position before contracting. The result will put the plaintiff back in the position they would have been in had the contract never existed.
When a defendant acts intentionally or with reckless disregard of an obvious or known risk.
What is Malice?
Pam and David had been friends for 20 years and resided in different towns. They were both teachers and had met when they were doing their student teaching. Pam had a Jeep that David had always liked. Pam wrote David a letter that said: I have decided to give up my Jeep and buy a new one. I know you’ve always liked my Jeep, so I wanted to know if you would like to buy it from me. I will sell it to you for $8,000. Please let me know if you would like to buy my Jeep.
Pam put the letter in the mail on October 1. David received the letter on October 5. On October 8, Pam lost her job. She now could not afford to buy a new car. She sent David a new letter on October 9 that said:
I lost my job and I now cannot afford to buy a new car. I am canceling my offer and I’m going to keep my Jeep.
On October 11, David mailed Pam a letter accepting her offer. David called Pam on October 15 to ask about when he should pick up the car. Pam told David that she wasn’t selling her car anymore. David received Pam’s second letter on October 18.
What is the issue?
What is the mailbox rule?
Grandmother promises to give Grandson $10,000 for graduating law school. He graduates and demands payment
Issue:
Is there a contract formed between the grandmother and grandson?
Rule:
A valid contract requires consideration, meaning a bargained-for exchange in which the promise induces the detriment and the detriment induces the promise. A conditional gift—where a promise is conditioned on an event but not bargained for—is not consideration.
Application:
Here, Grandmother promised $10,000 if Grandson graduated law school. There is no indication that she sought his graduation in exchange for the money or that he agreed to attend law school because of her promise. His graduation appears to be a condition of receiving a gift rather than a bargained-for exchange. Thus, there is no mutual inducement.
Conclusion:
The promise is likely unenforceable for lack of consideration because it is a conditional gift, not a contract.
Unprivileged intentional encroachment upon property owned by another.
What is trespass?
What makes up a prima facie case for a contract to be formed?
Mutual Assent (Offer and Acceptance) +
(Bargained for) Consideration
A killing in the course of the commission of a misdemeanor or felony that does not qualify for felony murder.
What is manslaughter?
Jordan recently moved to State X. In his previous state, it was legal to carry a concealed handgun without a permit. Believing the same rule applies, Jordan carries a concealed handgun in State X without obtaining a permit. He is arrested and charged under a statute that makes it a crime to knowingly carry a concealed weapon without a valid permit.
Jordan argues, “I didn’t know I needed a permit here.”
What is the narrow issue being tested?
What is mistake of law?
On Monday, Seller emails Buyer: “I’m thinking about selling my motorcycle. Buyer immediately replies, “I accept! I’ll bring the money tomorrow.” Seller refuses to sell.
Was there a valid offer?
Issue:
Whether Seller’s email constituted a valid offer capable of acceptance.
Rule:
An offer is a manifestation of present intent to enter into a bargain that is definite and certain in its terms and invites acceptance. Statements of preliminary negotiation or invitations to negotiate do not constitute offers.
Application:
Seller stated he was “thinking about selling” the motorcycle which suggests uncertainty and a lack of definite commitment. The language indicates preliminary negotiation rather than a present intent to be bound.
Conclusion:
No valid offer was made because Seller’s statement was merely preliminary negotiation. Therefore, Buyer’s purported acceptance did not form a contract.
Types of delivery of a gift
manual
construstive
symbolic
A farmer who wanted to sell her land received a letter from a developer that stated, “I will pay you $1,100 an acre for your land.” The farmer’s letter of reply stated, “I accept your offer.” Unbeknownst to the farmer, the developer had intended to offer only $1,000 per acre but had mistakenly typed “$1,100.” As both parties knew, comparable land in the vicinity had been selling at prices between $1,000 and $1,200 per acre.
Which of the following states the probable legal consequences of the correspondence between the parties?
A. There is no contract, because the parties attached materially different meanings to the price term.
B. There is no enforceable contract, because the developer is entitled to rescission due to a mutual mistake as to a basic assumption of the contract.
C. There is a contract formed at a price of $1,000 per acre.
D. There is a contract formed at a price of $1,100 per acre.
(D) is correct. An enforceable contract requires mutual assent as determined by the parties’ objective, rather than subjective, manifestations of assent. Given the parties’ knowledge of the price of comparable land, the developer’s offer created a reasonable understanding that the developer would purchase the land for $1,100 per acre. Moreover, because the farmer neither knew nor had reason to know that the developer intended to purchase the land for only $1,000 per acre, the developer will be bound to purchase it for $1,100 per acre. Accordingly, the parties’ conduct gave rise to a contract formed at $1,100 per acre when the farmer accepted the developer’s offer. (A) is incorrect. There is a general rule that contract formation may be defeated, under some circumstances, where parties attach materially different meanings to a material term. That rule, however, is inapplicable here where the critical issue relates to the developer’s intent, as manifested by his conduct, and the impact of the farmer’s lack of knowledge of the developer’s mistake. An enforceable contract requires mutual assent as determined by the parties’ objective, rather than subjective, manifestations of that assent. Here, given the parties’ knowledge of the price of comparable land, the developer’s offer created a reasonable understanding that the developer would purchase the land for $1,100 per acre.
What are the Four Common Types of Rapes in Modern Statutes
Forcible rape
Rape by deception
Rape of person actually unable to consent
Rape of person legally unable to consent
Grantor conveys Blackacre “to Anna for life, then to Ben if he graduates law school, but if Ben does not graduate, to City Library.”
What future interests are created in Ben and City Library?
What is a life estate in Anna, a contingent remainder in Ben, and an alternative contingent remainder in City Library?
Grandfather tells his granddaughter, “I want you to have my antique diamond ring.” He places the ring back in his desk drawer and says, “I’ll give it to you next week at your graduation party.” Before the party occurs, Grandfather dies. The ring is found in the desk drawer. Granddaughter claims it; the executor refuses.
Did Granddaughter acquire the ring by gift?
Issue:
Whether Grandfather made a valid inter vivos gift of the ring before his death.
Rule:
A valid inter vivos gift requires (1) present donative intent, (2) delivery (actual, constructive, or symbolic), and (3) acceptance. Donative intent must reflect a present transfer of ownership, not a future promise. Delivery must divest the donor of dominion and control.
Application:
Although Grandfather expressed an intent for Granddaughter to have the ring, his statement—“I’ll give it to you next week”—suggests a future intent rather than a present transfer. Additionally, he retained possession and control by placing the ring back in his desk drawer. There was no actual, constructive, or symbolic delivery. Without delivery and present intent, the elements of a valid gift are not satisfied.
Conclusion:
No valid gift was made because there was no present donative intent and no delivery. The ring remains part of the estate.
A tenant agreed in writing to lease a retail site in a shopping mall from the owner of the property. The term of the tenancy was two years, and rent was payable in monthly installments at the beginning of each month. At the end of the second year, there had been no discussions between the tenant and the owner regarding renewal or termination. The tenant did not vacate the premises at the end of the term; instead, she sent a check for the next month’s rent to the owner. The owner cashed the check and then informed the tenant that he was holding her to a new tenancy and a rent increase of 10%.
What is the status of the tenancy that the owner created?
A. A month-to-month tenancy for the original rent amount.
B. A year-to-year tenancy for the original rent amount.
C. A month-to-month tenancy for the increased rent amount.
D. A tenancy at will, terminable at any time, for the increased rent amount.
The owner can hold the tenant to a year-to-year tenancy for the original amount. When a tenant continues in possession after the termination of her right to possession, the landlord has two choices of action: He may treat the hold-over tenant as a trespasser and evict her under an unlawful detainer statute, or he may, in his sole discretion, bind the tenant to a new periodic tenancy, in which case the terms and conditions of the expired tenancy apply to the new tenancy. Unless a residential lease is involved, a year-to-year tenancy results from holding over if the original lease term was for a year or more. The new tenancy has the same terms as the original tenancy unless the landlord notified the tenant before termination of the original tenancy that occupancy after termination will be at an increased rent. Here, the original lease was a commercial lease for a two-year term, so the owner’s decision to hold the tenant to a new tenancy makes it a year-to-year tenancy. However, because the owner did not notify the tenant of the rent increase prior to the end of the term, the new tenancy is at the original amount of rent. (A) is wrong because the lease here is not a residential lease; thus, the periodic tenancy created is a year-to-year tenancy rather than a month-to-month tenancy. (C) is wrong for the same reason that (A) is wrong and also because the new tenancy is at the original amount of rent, as discussed above.(D) is wrong because when a landlord elects to bind a hold-over tenant to a new tenancy, it will be a periodic tenancy rather than a tenancy at will.
On January 1, a car salesman offered to sell an antique car to a collector for $35,000 cash on delivery. The collector paid the car salesman $100 to hold the offer open for a period of 25 days. On January 4, the collector called the car salesman and left a message on his answering machine, asking him whether he would consider lowering the price to $30,000. The car salesman played back the message the same day but did not reply. On January 9, the collector wrote the car salesman a letter, telling him that he could not pay more than $30,000 for the antique car, and that if the car salesman would not accept that amount, he would not go through with the deal. The car salesman received this letter on January 10 and again did not reply. The car salesman never heard from the collector again.
When did the offer that the car salesman made to the collector on January 1 terminate?
A. On January 4, when the collector made a counteroffer.
B. On January 9, when the collector mailed to the car salesman what amounted to a rejection.
C. On January 10, when the car salesman received from the collector what amounted to a rejection.
D. On January 25, when the 25-day option expired.
The car salesman’s offer terminated on January 25, when the 25-day option expired. An option is a distinct contract in which the offeree gives consideration for a promise by the offeror not to revoke an outstanding offer. The collector paid the car salesman $100 to hold the offer open for a period of 25 days, and the offer could not be terminated before that time, not even by the offeree (here the collector). Nor did the offer survive the option period because the option specifically identified how long the offer would be open. (A) is incorrect because the collector’s words did not amount to a counteroffer because they merely inquired as to whether the collector would consider lowering his price; the words were not unequivocal. (Even if this were a counteroffer, it would not extinguish the car salesman’s offer, because of the option, as explained above.) (B) is incorrect because, as discussed above, even a rejection by the offeree will not terminate the option. Also, if the communication were effective as a rejection, it would be effective when received by the offeror. (C) is incorrect because, as discussed above, even unequivocal words of rejection by the offeree will not extinguish an option, absent detrimental reliance on the part of the offeror, which was not the case here.
A party’s duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-finder
What is burden of production?
Samantha rented an apartment in Fort Worth from Jessica. The lease was for one year, beginning on July 1. The rent was $1,300 each month to be paid on the first of the month. The lease said that the landlord had a duty to “keep the apartment in good condition.” When Samantha arrived at the apartment on July 1 with all of her moving boxes, Robert (the prior tenant) was still there. Samantha complained to Jessica. Jessica called Robert and Robert moved out on July 10. Samantha was finally able to move in on July 11. She stayed at a friend’s house from July 1 to July 11 and had to pay to have her boxes stored in a storage unit. When Samantha moved in, she realized that the air conditioner wasn’t working. It was July in Fort Worth and the temperature outside was at least 90 degrees every day. Samantha went back to stay at her friend’s house and notified Jessica on July 11 about the air conditioner. Samantha told Jessica that if the air conditioner was not fixed by July 31, she would be moving out. As of August 1, the air conditioner was still not working. Samantha moved out and handed her keys to Jessica. Jessica repaired the air conditioner and was able to rent the apartment to a new tenant on November 1.
What claims can Samantha make against Jessica?
Duty to Deliver Possession
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
During an argument at a bar, Devin shoves Marcus and yells, “Let’s take this outside!” Outside, Marcus pulls out his fists but does not strike Devin. Devin says, “Forget it, I don’t want to fight anymore,” and begins backing away toward the parking lot exit. Marcus advances toward him. Devin, now near his car, pulls out a knife and stabs Marcus.
The jurisdiction follows a stand-your-ground rule but retains the castle doctrine.
Issue:
Can Devin claim self-defense even though he started the altercation?
Rule:
At common law, a first aggressor generally cannot claim self-defense. However, if the aggressor withdraws from the fight and clearly communicates that withdrawal, the right to self-defense is restored. In most modern jurisdictions, there is no duty to retreat if a person is lawfully present (stand-your-ground), though traditionally there was a duty to retreat if safe to do so. There is no duty to retreat inside one’s home under the castle doctrine.
Application:
Devin was the initial aggressor because he shoved Marcus and escalated the confrontation. However, he later stated, “I don’t want to fight anymore,” and began backing away, which may constitute withdrawal if clearly communicated. If the jury finds that Marcus continued advancing after Devin withdrew, Devin’s right to self-defense may have been restored. Because the jurisdiction follows stand-your-ground, Devin had no duty to retreat further if he was lawfully present. However, deadly force is only justified if he reasonably believed he faced imminent serious bodily harm. Since Marcus was unarmed and had not yet struck him, whether deadly force was proportional is questionable.
Conclusion:
Devin may argue self-defense based on withdrawal and stand-your-ground, but the success of the defense will likely turn on whether his withdrawal was clear and whether the use of deadly force was proportional to the threat.
A brother and a sister leased a house from a landlord. During the term of the lease, the sister verbally invited a friend to share the house with her and her brother. The friend agreed to pay part of the rent to the landlord, who did not object to this arrangement, despite a provision in the lease that provided that “any assignment, subletting, or transfer of any rights under this lease without the express written consent of the landlord is strictly prohibited, null, and void.” The brother objected to the friend’s moving in. When the friend moved in, the brother brought an appropriate action against the landlord, the sister, and the friend for a declaratory judgment that the sister had no right to assign. The sister’s defense was that she and the brother were tenants in common of a term for years, and that she had a right to assign a fractional interest in her undivided one-half interest.
In this action, will the brother prevail?
A. Yes, because a co-tenant has no right to assign all or any part of a leasehold without the consent of all interested parties.
B. Yes, because the lease provision prohibits assignment.
C. No, because he is not the beneficiary of the nonassignment provision in the lease.
D. No, because his claim amounts to a void restraint on alienation.
(C) is correct. The landlord, as the beneficiary of the nonassignment clause, could have taken positive action to avoid the transfer, but by accepting rent from the friend, he waived his right to avoid the transfer. The brother has no such right to contest the transfer because he was not the beneficiary of the nonassignment clause. (A) is wrong because one co-tenant generally does not need the consent of other co-tenants to assign her interest. Only the landlord’s consent was necessary under the lease clause. Because the landlord waived his right to avoid the transfer, the transfer became valid. (B) is wrong because the right to enforce this lease provision was waived by the landlord. (D) is wrong because nonassignment clauses in leases are valid. They are not considered to be void restraints on alienation.
For several weeks, a wealthy, unemployed widow and an auto dealer negotiated unsuccessfully over the purchase price of a new luxury sedan, which, as the dealer knew, the widow wanted her son to have as a wedding gift. On April 27, the dealer sent the widow a signed, dated memo saying, “If we can arrive at the same price within the next week, do we have a deal?” The widow wrote “Yes” and signed the bottom of this memo and delivered it back to the dealer on April 29.On May 1, the widow wrote the dealer a signed letter offering to buy the luxury sedan “with all available equipment, for $180,000 cash on delivery not later than June 1.” By coincidence, the dealer wrote the widow a signed letter on May 1 offering to sell her the luxury sedan “with all available equipment, for $180,000 cash on delivery not later than June 1.” These letters crossed in the mails and were respectively received and read by the parties on May 2.
If the widow subsequently asserts and the dealer denies that the parties entered a binding contract on May 3, which of the following most persuasively supports the widow’s position?
A. A sale-of-goods contract may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
B. A sale-of-goods contract does not require that an acceptance be a mirror image of the offer.
C. With respect both to the making of an agreement and the requirement of consideration, identical cross-offers are functionally the same as an offer followed by a responsive acceptance.
D. Since the dealer is a merchant in the transaction, and the widow is not, the dealer is estopped to deny that the parties’ correspondence created a binding contract.
(A) is correct. This contract is governed by Article 2 of the UCC. Under the UCC, a contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement. Thus, the contract can be oral, written, or established through any conduct of the parties that indicates a contract was formed. Furthermore, an agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined. By themselves, the crossing offers sent on May 1 would not have formed a contract. However, through the April 27 memo, the widow and the car dealer agreed that if they could arrive at the same purchase price for the sedan within the next week, they had a deal. They did in fact arrive at the same price within the next week, as evidenced by the May 1 crossing offers. Therefore, it could be argued that the combination of the April 27 memo and the May 1 offers was sufficient to show agreement between them on the sale and purchase of the sedan and resulted in a contract.(B) is incorrect. This is a correct statement of law but inapplicable to the situation here. Under Article 2 of the UCC, any acceptance or written confirmation sent within a reasonable time that indicates an intention to enter into a contract will be effective as an acceptance, even if it states additional or different terms for the contract. The facts here involve identical crossing offers, rather than an acceptance that varies from the terms of the offer. Thus the provision finding a contract when there is not a mirror image acceptance is not applicable to the facts of this question.(C) is incorrect. This is an incorrect statement of law. If offers stating precisely the same terms cross in the mail, they do not give rise to a contract despite the apparent meeting of the minds. An offer cannot be accepted if there is no knowledge of it.(D) is incorrect. If an acceptance indicates an intention to enter into a sale-of-goods contract but states additional or different terms for the contract, a contract is formed, but it will include only the terms of the offer if one of the parties to a contract is not a merchant. However, the facts here involve identical crossing offers, rather than an acceptance that varied from the offer. Therefore, the dealer’s status as a merchant will not support the widow’s position.
During a shift at a restaurant, Liam and his coworker argue. The coworker snaps a towel at Liam and insults him in front of customers. Liam becomes enraged, pulls a knife from his apron, pauses for a few seconds while staring at the coworker, and then fatally stabs him.
Liam is charged with first-degree murder, which requires willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
Does the evidence support a finding of premeditation?
Under State v. Guthrie, premeditation and deliberation require some period of reflection prior to the killing. Although the time needed for premeditation can be brief, it must be sufficient for the defendant to form a conscious intent to kill after thinking about the act. Mere intent to kill formed in the heat of passion, without reflection, is insufficient for first-degree murder.
Here, Liam reacted after being insulted and humiliated. Although he paused for a few seconds before stabbing, the key question is whether that pause demonstrates actual reflection or merely instantaneous rage. If the jury finds he acted in the heat of passion without meaningful reflection, premeditation may be lacking. However, if the pause suggests he had time to consider and chose to proceed, a jury could infer deliberation.
Under Guthrie, mere intent formed in a moment of rage is insufficient; the prosecution must prove actual reflection. The outcome likely turns on whether the brief pause demonstrates deliberation rather than impulsive action.
On Monday, Seller mails Buyer a signed letter offering to sell a vintage car for $25,000 and states the offer will remain open until Friday. On Wednesday, Seller sells the car to Third Party and posts on Instagram, “Car SOLD!” Buyer sees the post Wednesday night. On Thursday morning, Buyer mails an acceptance of Seller’s offer. The jurisdiction follows common law contract rules.
What is the narrow issue being tested?
What is indirect revocation?
Samantha liked to take risks. No risk was too great for her. Her friend, Jill, dared Samantha to ride her motorcycle blindfolded down Jill’s street in Jill’s busy residential neighborhood at 5:00pm on a Tuesday night. Samantha agreed. She brought her motorcycle to one end of the street and looked down the street. There was no one in the street or on the sidewalks. Jill blindfolded Samantha. Samantha began to ride down the street. Jill’s neighbor, Tina, came out of her house with her dog and began walking her dog across the street to go to a nearby dog park. Jill saw that Samantha was heading towards Tina and her dog and did not shout at Samantha to hit her breaks and stop the motorcycle. Tina was talking on the phone and did not see Samantha coming towards her. Samantha hit Tina with her motorcycle and Tina was killed instantly.
It was later discovered that Jill was mad at Tina because Tina’s dog was constantly destroying Jill’s flowers. Jill had talked to Tina about her dog and Tina had done nothing to stop her dog from destroying the flowers. Jill knew that Tina went to the dog park with her dog at 5:00pm everyday. She was hoping that Tina would be scared when she saw Samantha coming towards her on her motorcycle. Jill thought that Tina would leap out of the way when she saw Samantha’s motorcycle.
This state follows the Model Penal Code and states that a person can be liable for the death of another if they acted recklessly.
Can Samantha be held liable for Tina’s death?
It is likely that Samantha can be held liable for Tina’s death.
To be held liable for a criminal act there must be both actus reus and mens rea. Actus reus is a voluntary physical act. Mens rea analyzes the mental state of the individual who commits the act. Mens Rea can be established when one either acts purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently and causes harm. A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a prohibited result will follow, and this disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
Here, Samantha committed a voluntary physical act because she rode her motorcycle down the street blindfolded. This is something that Samantha chose to do. Even though Jill dared Samantha to do it, Samantha could have said no. Samantha acted recklessly when she rode down the street blindfolded. While she did look down the street before she started riding, she disregarded the substantial risk that someone could come out of their house and walk in the street while she was driving her motorcycle blindfolded. A reasonable person would not have driven a motorcycle down a street while blindfolded in a busy residential neighborhood.
In conclusion, it is likely that Samantha can be held liable for Tina’s death because she will meet both the actus reus and mens rea requirements.