Models and Motivations
(1) No assurances provided initially; (2) Agreement in advance on the exact proffer, with plea/charging before testimony; (3) Guilty plea entered before testimony, but sentencing delayed until after testimony.
What are the three models of prosecutorial cooperation with informants/accomplice witnesses?
Any promise, reward, or inducement given in exchange for testimony must be disclosed but courts have never defined this precisely, so only direct, explicit deals clearly qualify.
What is required for a "promise, reward, or inducement" to trigger mandatory disclosure under Giglio v. United States?
The signed false statement rate rose to 96%, compared to 65% when neither was present.
In Swanner, Beike, & Cole (2009), what happened to false secondary confession rates when both false evidence and an explicit incentive were present?
It avoids the appearance of an explicit "deal" and reduces disclosure obligations, but gives the witness no formal incentive to cooperate.
Why might a prosecutor choose Model 1 (no upfront assurances)?
By using vague, non-binding language (e.g., testimony will be "taken into consideration," they'll "put in a good word," or be "fair" on other charges.)
How do prosecutors avoid triggering Giglio disclosure while still incentivizing a witness?
Diagnosticity dropped from 2.65 (no incentive) to 1.58 (incentive), incentives increased false confessions without increasing true ones.
What did Experiment 2 of Swanner et al. reveal about incentives and the diagnosticity (reliability) of confessions?
The witness's benefit still hinges on satisfying the prosecutor, creating an ongoing incentive to shape testimony to please the prosecution.
What is the main risk of Model 3 (sentencing delayed until after testimony)?
(1) The prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense; (3) the evidence was "material" — a reasonable probability disclosure would have changed the outcome.
What three elements must the defense prove to establish a Brady/Giglio violation?
Guilty verdict rates and credibility ratings didn't change with testimony history. Jurors didn't meaningfully use this information.
Why did revealing a jailhouse informant's testimony history (0, 5, or 20 prior times) have little effect on guilty verdicts in Neuschatz et al.'s study?
(1) Strengthening a marginal case against a more culpable co-defendant; (2) solving a separate, more serious crime than the one the witness is charged with.
What two main reasons does a prosecutor have for using informant/snitch testimony?
The Court held the accused is protected by "established safeguards of the American legal system" such as cross-examination and jury instructions despite the risk dishonest informants pose.
According to Hoffa v. United States, why does using dishonest informants not violate Due Process?
Jurors attribute an informant's decision to testify to good character (e.g., guilty conscience) rather than the situational incentive actually driving it, making them less skeptical than they should be.
What does the "fundamental attribution error" explain about how jurors evaluate informant testimony?
Balancing public safety (favoring use of informants) against moral condemnation of rewarding criminals for testimony complicated by the fact that prosecutors "pay" more for information they perceive as highly valuable, which increases the informant's motivation to fabricate.
What is the "prosecutor's dilemma" in the broadest sense, and what is a key non-judicial motivation that fuels it?
Whether offering a witness a reduced sentence for testimony violated the federal anti-bribery statute. A three-judge panel initially agreed, but the full Tenth Circuit reversed 9–3 as "patently absurd" incentives to informants remain legal.
What did United States v. Singleton address, and how was it ultimately resolved?
Incentives measurably increase false confession rates (Swanner), yet jurors are largely insensitive to information like incentives or testimony history meant to help them discount unreliable testimony (Neuschatz), suggesting existing courtroom safeguards fail to protect against the fabrication those incentives cause.
Considering both Swanner et al. and Neuschatz et al., what overall conclusion do these two studies support about legal safeguards against informant fabrication?