The Logic of Violence
Why might cartels sometimes prefer to bribe politicians rather than use violence?
Because bribery is cheaper, less visible, and avoids drawing unwanted attention from federal authorities or the media.
Why do cartels tend to target local politicians more often than federal ones?
Because local officials often control police and local resources, and they are more vulnerable and less protected by national forces.
Why is violence considered a major obstacle to development?
Because it undermines economic investment, weakens institutions, and erodes public trust in the state and undermines personal development.
Which region of the world has the highest homicide rates outside of warzones?
Latin America.
What has President Bukele done that has made him extremely popular in El Salvador?
He drastically reduced gang violence by arresting tens of thousands of suspected gang members and militarizing public security.
According to Trejo and Ley, why did cartels begin targeting local politicians during election cycles?
Because elections create windows of opportunity to capture incoming governments and expand criminal control over territory.
What does the term criminal governance mean in the context of cartels and the state?
It refers to the way cartels establish control over territories and populations, acting like informal governments by regulating behavior, resolving disputes, and collecting rents.
According to Bergman, why is it surprising that crime rose during a time of economic growth in Latin America?
Because rising crime is usually associated with poverty, but in Latin America, violence increased even as poverty and inequality declined.
How does weak state capacity help explain the persistence of high violence levels in certain parts of Latin America?
Because when police, courts, or local governments are ineffective or corrupt, they fail to contain violence, allowing criminal organizations to operate with impunity.
Why do many Salvadorans support the government’s mass incarceration strategy, even with reports of human rights abuses?
Because for the first time in decades they feel safe, and many prioritize security over civil liberties after years of gang terror.
What is the difference between using violence for retaliation and using it for governance?
Retaliation is reactive and aims to punish enemies or the state; governance is proactive and seeks to control territory, populations, and political decisions.
How does political polarization at the national level affect cartels’ ability to attack local politicians?
It weakens protection for opposition politicians, especially when local leaders belong to rival parties, making them easier targets for cartels seeking territorial control.
What kind of approach does the World Bank suggest is needed to reduce violence beyond just law enforcement?
A comprehensive approach that includes prevention, institutional reform, social programs, and regional or international cooperation.
According to Trejo and Ley, why are high-profile attacks often clustered in neighboring municipalities?
Because cartels seek to establish control over entire regions, not just isolated towns, in order to dominate territory and governance.
Based on the frameworks we’ve studied, what risk does El Salvador face by concentrating power and using mass incarceration as a long-term strategy?
It may undermine democratic institutions, erode due process, and create a fragile peace that depends on repression rather than structural reform.
How does Benjamin Lessing’s concept of “violent lobbying” challenge the idea that violence is always a sign of state weakness?
It shows that cartels may use violence strategically to influence state behavior, not just when the state is weak, but when it becomes too repressive or unpredictable.
Why do cartels increase violence during transitions between local administrations?
Because incoming leaders are still forming their teams, making them easier to co-opt, intimidate, or eliminate before they consolidate power.
How do weak or poorly coordinated state institutions contribute to rising crime?
They fail to respond effectively, allowing impunity and making it easier for criminal groups to operate and expand.
What does the term “homicidal ecology” refer to?
Specific subnational areas where violence is especially intense due to the presence of criminal markets, weak state capacity, prime trafficking routes, and competition over territory.
How does El Salvador’s security strategy reflect a trade-off between short-term safety and long-term democratic health?
While mass arrests and militarized policing have reduced violence quickly, they also weaken democratic checks and balances, concentrate power in the executive, and normalize rights violations that could damage democratic institutions over time.
Why might violence increase after a country becomes more democratic or wealthier, rather than decrease?
Because democratization and prosperity can create new opportunities for crime, weaken centralized control, and expose local institutions that are unprepared for rising criminal competition.
How can democratic decentralization unintentionally make it easier for organized crime to expand?
By transferring power to weak local governments that lack resources or protection, decentralization can give cartels more opportunities to infiltrate and dominate local politics.
What is one way that organized crime benefits from greater prosperity?
Prosperity increases consumerism and market activity, which creates more opportunities for theft, extortion, and trafficking of illegal goods.
What does Bergman mean when he describes the region as having different "crime equilibria"?
He means that some countries have reached relatively stable levels of high, medium, or low crime, depending on how profitable crime is and how effectively institutions can deter it, even if overall crime is rising across the region.
In light of what we've learned about “criminal governance,” how might Bukele’s dismantling of gangs reshape El Salvador’s governance landscape, for better or worse?
Removing gang control may restore state authority, but replacing it with unchecked state repression risks substituting one form of domination for another, without solving deeper institutional weaknesses.