do something! (or don't)
What is the actus reus of a crime?
The voluntary act or conduct of a crime.
Physical/ external parts of a crime
MPC categories
2.02 model penal code
What is proximate cause?
Proximate cause is the legal cause of a result. A defendant’s actions are a proximate cause if the result is a natural and probable consequence of those actions. In order to be criminally liable, a defendant’s conduct must be both the actual cause and the proximate cause of the result. A victim’s preexisting condition that exacerbates the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct will not break the causal chain to the defendant. This is true whether or not the defendant knew of the condition before acting.
this mistake is not a defense
mistake of law
ignorance of law
A murder trial took place in a state that has enacted the Model Penal Code. The victim was poisoned, and it is not disputed that the defendant put the poison in the victim’s food.
Under which of the following circumstances would it nevertheless be proper for the jury to acquit the defendant?
The jury believed that the defendant was unaware that the substance was poison.
MPC: An act is not voluntary when...
(MPC 2.01)
not an exclusion list, included but not limited to.
when does mens rea not matter for a crime?
strict liability
What two types of causation must be present for a defendant to be found guilty of a crime that requires a particular result?
If a crime requires a particular result, then the defendant must actually and proximately cause the prohibited result. Both actual cause and proximate cause must be present for criminal liability to attach. The test for actual cause, or cause-in-fact, is the but-for test. This test requires that the harm actually be caused by the defendant's actions. In other words, the harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s actions. Proximate cause requires that the harm be a natural and foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions as opposed to a remote or unlikely consequence.
mistake of fact
What are the elements of murder under the common law?
The elements of murder under the common law are:
failure to act = breach of duty
OMISSION
If a criminal statute does not specify a required mens rea (or culpability), under what circumstances is a federal court likely to construe the statute to impose strict liability?
If a criminal statute does not specify a required mens rea, or culpability, federal courts are most likely to construe the statute to require strict liability when:
What is an intervening cause?
An intervening cause is a force that intervenes between the time of the defendant’s act and the time of the result. If the intervening cause is unforeseeable, it is a superseding cause that relieves the defendant from liability. Conversely, if the intervening cause is foreseeable, it does not break the causal chain and does not relieve the defendant from liability. Because a victim’s refusal to seek medical treatment and negligent medical treatment are foreseeable, they do not break the causal chain. However, grossly negligent or reckless medical treatment generally will break the causal chain. Foreseeable responses of the victim, or of third parties, to the defendant’s actions will not break the causal chain.
A federal statute made it a crime to purposely assault a federal legislator in retaliation for that legislator’s official behavior. A voter was furious over a law recently enacted by his state’s legislature. He threw a rock at his United States senator (which constituted assault), reasonably but mistakenly believing her to be a member of his state’s legislature. The senator pressed charges under the federal statute. The defendant moved for judgment of acquittal. He argued that, according to the evidence, he was mistaken about the senator's status, believing her to be a state official, not a federal official.
Assuming that this mistake is the only factual premise that the evidence reasonably supports, should the defendant’s motion for acquittal be granted?
Yes. The defendant should be acquitted. Generally, a mistake of fact will absolve a defendant of criminal liability if the mistake negates the mens rea, or culpability, for the underlying offense. Some jurisdictions also require the mistake to be reasonable.
Here, the federal statute prohibits purposely attacking a federal legislator; the mens rea is purpose. The voter reasonably thought he was attacking a state legislator; his attack on her was the result of a mistake of fact. He thus harbored no purpose to assault a federal legislator. Because the voter lacked the requisite mens rea for liability under the statute, he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal as a matter of law, though he could likely be convicted in state court under a general assault statute.
The defendant was a sports fan. After the defendant's team lost a game, the defendant encountered a fan of the opposing team celebrating inside the stadium. The defendant approached the opposing team's fan, picked up a metal folding chair, and swung at the fan's back. The impact from the chair caused the fan to fall to the ground, which in turn caused a fatal skull fracture. Upon realizing that the fan was dead, the defendant immediately shouted that he never meant for the fan to die.
Assuming the jury believes that the defendant did not intend for the victim to die, did the defendant satisfy the mens rea for common-law murder?
Yes. The defendant satisfied the mens rea for common-law murder. Under the common-law definition of murder, the requisite mens rea, or culpability, is malice aforethought. Malice aforethought can be satisfied if the defendant merely intends to seriously injure the victim, even if the defendant does not intend to kill the victim.
Here, the defendant swung a metal chair at the victim's back. This is sufficient to demonstrate an intent to cause serious bodily injury, and thus to establish that the defendant acted with malice aforethought. Accordingly, the defendant satisfied the mens rea for common-law murder.
when is there a duty to act?
1. Statute imposed duty (ex. Taxes, registering for the draft, Vermont’s good Samaritan law)
2. There is a certain relationship (ex. Parent/child, spouses, etc.) (Common law duty)
3. Assumed contractual duty ( ex. EMT or a person’s job contract creates a duty. Caregivers, Firefighter.)
4. One voluntarily assumed care of another and secluded the helpless person to prevent them from seeking help
5. When a person creates a risk of harm to another (Ex. Hit and run or you set a fire and someone gets injured.)
Under the MPC, what is the difference between recklessness and negligence?
Under the MPC, the difference between recklessness and negligence is in the perception of risk: a reckless defendant perceives a risk and a negligent defendant does not. Negligence requires that the defendant fail to perceive a substantial, unjustifiable risk that his or her conduct will produce a harm. Recklessness requires that the defendant perceive a substantial, unjustifiable risk that his or her conduct will produce a harm and consciously disregard that risk.
A man assaulted his neighbor with a knife. The resulting knife wound would not normally have proven fatal. The neighbor, however, suffered a rare disease that prevented proper blood clotting, and bled to death. The man did not know that the neighbor suffered from this health condition. On trial for murder, the man moved for judgment of acquittal on the ground that it was the neighbor’s disease, not the man’s action, that proximately caused the neighbor’s death.
Should the man’s motion for acquittal be granted on that ground?
No. The man’s motion for acquittal should not be granted. For a defendant’s action to be the proximate cause of harm, the illegal harm be a natural, foreseeable result of the action. A defendant’s action can be the proximate cause of harm even if a victim’s preexisting condition exacerbates the harm, and even if the defendant did not know of the condition before acting.
Here, the man’s attack is clearly the actual cause of the neighbor’s death; the neighbor would not have died but for the stabbing. The attack is also the proximate cause of the death. Though this particular wound would not have been fatal in a person without the clotting disease, death is a natural, foreseeable result of stabbing in general. The fact that the man did not know about the disease does not change the causation. Thus, the man should not be acquitted on the grounds that the disease proximately caused the death.
differences between common law approach to mistake of fact and MPC
common law
a) specific- no specific intent then no mens rea then no crime
b)general- mistake must be reasonable in order to invoke defense
MPC 2.04- mistake of fact = defense when it negates Mens Rea of material offense
MPC gets rid of specific and general intent
with exceptions (2.04(2))
Under the Model Penal Code (MPC), what are the four mental states applicable to homicide?
Under the MPC, the four mental states applicable to homicide are:
Keep in mind that the MPC modifies the common-law definitions of homicide and defines homicide with respect to these mental states.
defendant was charged with murder 1 for stabbing his son in the chest. At trial ∆ raised evidence from a psychologist, that his military training caused a conditioned response. This confuses the trial court, because they say that this is an insanity defense. In the state of Washington insanity defense is not admissible
On appeal: was this act voluntary or not?
remember state v. utter
appellate: nah
if jury has been correctly been instructed there “could” have been an acquittal. The appellate court decided that the jury could not reasonable determine or infer from the evidence, the act was involuntary. So the error in turn, this time, was harmless. But regardless we are changing the law and automatism is in fact an accepted defense.
A teenager set off a firecracker next to some bales of hay inside an abandoned barn. The sparks from the firecracker caused the hay to catch fire, which caused the barn to burn down. The teenager was arrested and charged with reckless burning, an offense under the MPC. At trial, the teenager testified that he never imagined that the firecracker would cause a fire.
If the jury were to believe this testimony, could it lawfully convict the teenager of reckless burning under the MPC?
No. The jury cannot lawfully convict the teenager of reckless burning under the MPC. Reckless burning requires starting a fire and thereby recklessly exposing a building to danger of destruction. Recklessness requires conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the prohibited result will occur.
Here, the teenager started a fire that put the barn at risk of destruction. But to have done this recklessly, he would have to have perceived the risk and consciously disregarded it. The teenager did not perceive the risk—he testified that he never imagined that his conduct might cause a fire—so he could not consciously disregard the risk, and thus could not act recklessly. Because he did not act recklessly, the teenager cannot be guilty of reckless burning.
Each of two sisters independently resolved to kill her stepmother. One sister put a drop of poison in the stepmother's breakfast each morning. The other sister put a drop of poison in the stepmother's dinner each night. Neither sister knew of the other's actions. Ultimately, neither sister administered a fatal amount of poison to the stepmother. But the combined quantity of poison they administered together did kill the stepmother. On trial for murder, each sister moved for judgment of acquittal. Each argued that her actions alone did not—and indeed could not have—been a cause in fact of the stepmother's death, as each administered a nonfatal dosage.
Should the motions to acquit be granted?
No. The motions to acquit should not be granted because the sisters' separate acts of poisoning were concurrent causes of the stepmother's demise. Criminal liability requires that a defendant’s actions be a cause in fact, usually a but-for cause, of the illegal harm. Generally, this requirement is met if the harm would not have occurred without the defendant’s act. Concurrent causes exist when (1) multiple acts combine to cause a result, and (2) no one of those acts alone would have been sufficient to cause the result. In that case, each act is deemed a but-for cause of the result.
Here, neither stepsister acting alone administered a fatal dose of poison. Even so, the combined poisonings did cause the stepmother's death. Accordingly, each sister’s act was a but-for cause, so the motions for acquittal should be denied.
exceptions to a usually unacceptable mistake
1. statute i snot known to the defendant and was not made reasonable available. ex. due process violation (lambert v. CA)
2. entrapement by estopell: incorrect statement made by a (judge, congress, cop--> ppl responsible for either interpretation or enforcement of the law.
MPC 2.04
Does the Model Penal Code (MPC) adopt the common-law rule for felony murder?
Yes. Although the MPC does not use the common-law term felony murder, it presumes that the defendant was sufficiently reckless for murder if a death occurs in the course of committing, attempting, or fleeing after the enumerated crimes of:
Keep in mind that the MPC defines homicide in terms of mental states, which is different from the common law.